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SYSTEM AND LIFEWORLD IN
HABERMAS'S THEORY OF LAW
Hugh Baxter*
ABSTRACT
JUrgen Habermas's recent work on law and democracy divides
into two parts. With his "discourse theory of law and democracy,"
Habermas seeks to explain the conditions under which modern
constitutional legal and political orders may claim legitimacy. Here
Habermas's method is primarily philosophical and legal-theoretical.
The second part of the project-the part on which this article
focuses-develops what Habermas calls his "communication theory
of society." Here Habermas seeks to "translate" the normative
conclusions of his discourse theory into a substantive social-
theoretical model. The idea is to determine whether the ambitious
normative theory of democracy is plausible under contemporary
conditions of social complexity.
Habermas's presentation of the "communication theory of
society" is difficult to understand, partly because he invokes,
without much explanation, the "two-level" theory of society that he
developed in his work of the 1970s and 1980s. I return to that work
to excavate the basic concepts of "communicative action, " "system, "
and "lifeworld. " I discuss the model of society developed in that
earlier body of work-a model of "interchange" between the
normatively rich "lifeworld" and the money- and power-driven
economic and administrative systems. My account is critical. Each
distinction on which Habermas relies to construct the "interchange"
model is drawn too sharply, and the resulting model makes the
normative ideal Habermas consistently has defended-radical
democracy-literally inconceivable.
The more recent work on law professes continued loyalty to the
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system./lifeworld conception of society. But at the same time, it
develops a different model-the "model of the circulation of
power"--that is designed to show the possibilities for, and
resistances, to radical democracy. I argue that the new model is
irreconcilable with Habermas's earlier and unretracted conceptions
of "system" and system/lifeworld "interchange." The
unacknowledged amendments are significant improvements, I
argue, but one effect is to leave the notion of social "systems"
unclearly theorized. I suggest in the final part of the article that
Habermas could shore up his "system" conception by selectively
and critically appropriating insights from a more recent version of
social systems theory-the "autopoietic" theory of Habermas's
longtime theoretical sparring partner, Niklas Luhmann.
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I. INTRODUCTION: AN OVERVIEW OF HABERMAS'S PROJECT
By any standard, Jrgen Habermas has ranked among the
very most prominent contemporary European philosophers and
social theorists for more than thirty years. Only recently, however,
has he gained a significant audience among American legal
academics.' One reason for this delayed reception likely has been
the notorious difficulty of Habermas's work, which synthesizes a
variety of different disciplines and theoretical approaches-
including, but not limited to, speech-act theory in the philosophy
of language,2 phenomenological sociology,3 sociological systems
theory,' the Frankfurt School tradition of critical theory, the works
of canonical social theorists (Marx, Weber, Durkheim, Mead, and
Parsons),5  pragmatism,6  hermeneutics,7  psychoanalysis,8
1 As an index of his recent prominence: no fewer than three English-language
symposia have been organized to consider Habermas's work on law. See Exploring
Habermas on Law and Democracy, 76 DEN. U.L. REV. 927 (1999); Habermas on Law and
Democracy: Critical Exchanges, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 767 (1996); Habermas, Modernity
and Law, 20 PHIL. & SOC. CRITICISM 1 (1994).
2 See, e.g., Jurgen Habermas, Moral Development and Ego Identity, in
COMMUNICATION AND THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY 69-94 (Thomas McCarthy trans.,
1979) (1974), [hereinafter Moral Development]; Jurgen Habermas, Historical Materialism
and the Development of Normative Structures, in COMMUNICATION AND THE EVOLUTION
OF SOCIETY, supra, at 95 [hereinafter Historical Materialism].
3 See JORGEN HABERMAS, 2 THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION:
LIFEWORLD AND SYSTEM: A CRITIQUE OF FUNCTIONALIST REASON 119-35 (Thomas
McCarthy trans., 1987) (1981) [hereinafter 2 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION].
4 Habermas's interest in systems theory began with his debate with the important
German sociologist, Niklas Luhmann. See JURGEN HABERMAS & NIKLAS LUHMANN,
THEORIE DER GESELLSCHAFT ODER SOZIALTECHNOLOGIE: WAS LEISTET DIE
SYSTEMFORSCHUNG (1971). Shortly thereafter, Habermas began to appropriate critically
insights from systems theory. See JORGEN HABERMAS, LEGITIMATION CRISIS (Thomas
McCarthy trans., 1975) (1973) [hereinafter LEGITIMATION CRISIS].
5 Habermas develops the argument of his magnum opus, The Theory of
Communicative Action, in dialogue with these theorists and with the neo-marxist thinkers
from Lukacs to the Frankfurt School. See JURGEN HABERMAS, 1 THE THEORY OF
COMMUNICATIVE ACTION: REASON AND THE RATIONALIZATION OF SOCIETY 143-271
(Thomas McCarthy trans., 1984) (1981) [hereinafter 1 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE
ACTiON](discussing Weber); id. at 339-99 (discussing Lukacs and the Frankfurt School); 2
THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 3, at 1-111 (discussing Durkheim and
Mead); id. at 199-299 (discussing Parsons); id. at 301-403 (discussing Weber, Marx, Lukacs,
and the Frankfurt School).
6 See JORGEN HABERMAS, KNOWLEDGE AND HUMAN INTERESTS 81-139 (Jeremy J.
Shapiro trans., 1971) (1968) [hereinafter KNOWLEDGE AND HUMAN INTERESTS] (on
Peirce); Jirgen Habermas, Peirce and Communication, in POSTMETAPHYSICAL
THINKING: PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS 88 (William Mark Hohengarten trans., 1992) (1988)
[hereinafter POSTMETAPHYSICAL THINKING].
7 See JURGEN HABERMAS, ON THE LOGIC OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 143-70 (Shierry
Weber Nicholsen & Jerry A. Stark trans., 1988) (1967) [hereinafter ON THE LOGIC OF
THE SOCIAL SCIENCES] (discussing Gadamer); Juirgen Habermas, Zu Gadamers Wahrheit
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developmental psychology,9 and neoevolutionary social theory.
A further and perhaps more important reason for Habermas's
erstwhile neglect was that his work-while hardly indifferent to
law"-did not speak directly to the issues that occupy most legal
academics. Only in the late 1980s did legal issues become a focal
point in Habermas's writing.12 Since then, his growing interest in
legal matters has culminated in his first book-length treatment of
law: Faktizitift und Geltung, translated under the title Between
Facts and Norms. This book has moved Habermas, deservedly,
toward the center of debates in American legal theory.'3
Yet even by Habermas's standards, Between Facts and Norms
is a difficult book. Those unfamiliar with Habermas's prior work
will find some of the basic concepts-particularly "communicative
action," "system," and "lifeworld"-only lightly explained. The
book's scope, both substantive and methodological, is
extraordinarily broad. As Habermas warns readers on the first
page of his preface, his argument ranges across "moral theory,
social theory, legal theory, and the sociology and history of law."' 4
The "theoretical objectives" Habermas pursues include conceptual
analysis, interpretation, description, explanation, and social
und Methode, in HERMENEUTIK UND IDEOLOGIEKRITIK 45 (1971); Jirgen Habermas,
Der Universalitatsanspruch der Hermeneutik, in HERMENEUTIK UND IDEOLOGIEKRITIK,
supra, at 120; 1 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 5, at 107-37.
8 See Jirgen Habermas, On Systematically Distorted Communication, INQUIRY,
Summer 1970, at 205 [hereinafter On Systematically Distorted Communication]; ON THE
LOGIC OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES, supra note 7, at 180-86; JURGEN HABERMAS,
Introduction: Some Difficulties in the Attempt to Link Theory and Practice, in THEORY
AND PRACTICE 11-13 (John Viertel trans., 1973) (1971). The idea of systematically
distorted communication developed from Habermas's earlier reading of Freud, see
KNOWLEDGE AND HUMAN INTERESTS, supra note 6, at 214-90, with its suggestion that a
critical social theory's methodology might be linked to the analysis of distorted
communication. See id. at 281-89.
9 See, e.g., Moral Development, supra note 2, at 69-94.
10 See Historical Materialism, supra note 2, at 130-77; Jirgen Habermas, History and
Evolution, TELOS, Spring 1979, at 5.
1t See 1 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 5, at 162-68, 174-75, 190-
91, 199, 218-19, 243-71 (discussing critically Max Weber's account of the development and
significance of modern law); 2 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 3, at
79-86, 107-09 (discussing critically Durkheim's and George Herbert Mead's
understandings of law); id. at 155, 172-97 (developing a theory of social evolution in which
the development of law and morality have a "pacemaker" role); id. at 309-11 (analyzing
role of law in creating modern systems of economic and political action); id. at 356-73
(describing tendencies toward "juridification" and the ambivalence of modern social-
welfare law).
12 See Jirgen Habermas, Law and Morality, in 8 THE TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN
VALUES 217 (Sterling M. McMurrin ed., Kenneth Baynes trans., 1988) (1986).
13 See supra note 1.
14 JURGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: A DISCOURSE THEORY OF
LAW AND DEMOCRACY xxxix (William Rehg trans., 1996) [hereinafter BETWEEN FACTS
AND NORMS].
[Vol. 23:2
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criticism. 5  And the theory is multiperspectival. Echoing
Dworkin's opening to Law's Empire, Habermas distinguishes
between the "internal" or "participant's" perspectives of judges,
politicians, legislators, and citizens, on one hand, and the
"external" perspective of a sociological "observer," on the other.6
But unlike Dworkin, Habermas systematically takes up each of
those perspectives, not just the perspective of the appellate judge. 7
The multiplicity of methods, objects, purposes, and perspectives
makes Habermas's argument unusually complex.
One way to penetrate the complexity is to begin with the
rhetorical motif Habermas employs again and again: he first
develops an opposition between two terms, then attempts to
resolve or at least mediate the opposition. Much of Habermas's
argument is, in form, a nesting of these mediated oppositions."
15 Id. at 6.
16 Id. at xxxix. Dworkin distinguishes between the "internal" perspective of
participants in legal argument and "the external point of view of the sociologist or
historian, who asks why certain patterns of legal argument develop in some periods or
circumstances rather than others...." RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 13 (1986).
Among the various possible "internal" perspectives, Dworkin mentions those of judges,
citizens, politicians, law teachers, policemen, district attorneys, welfare officers, school
board chairmen, and other officials. See id. at 12, 14.
17 Dworkin first pronounces both the "internal" and "external" perspectives
"essential," adding that "each must embrace or take account of the other." Id. at 13-14.
But he then suggests that theories that have adopted the "external" point of view have
taken that point of view only, "ignor[ing] questions about the internal character of legal
argument, so their explanations are impoverished and defective, like innumerate histories
of mathematics." Id. at 14. According to Dworkin, Holmes epitomizes this "perverse"
approach," and "the depressing history of social-theoretic jurisprudence in our century
warns us how wrong he was." Id.
At this point, Dworkin seems to abandon the possibility of integrating "internal"
and "external" approaches. Law's Empire "takes up the internal, participant's point of
view," and (unless one counts the moral philosopher's point of view as "external") the
"internal" point of view only. Further, to the extent Dworkin operates from any of the
"internal" perspectives he has identified, see supra note 16, he proceeds predominantly
"from the judge's viewpoint"-even as he allows that the other "internal" perspectives
could serve as "paradigms," and even as he acknowledges that a theory that did so would
be a "more complete study." Id. at 12-14 (conceding that his approach in Law's Empire is
"narrow" and "partial").
For his part, Habermas notes that legal theory, for good reason, "privileges the
judge's perspective." BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 14, at 196. "Legal
theory," he says, "remains first of all a theory of adjudication and legal discourse." Id. at
197. But at the same time, for Habermas legal theory is not just a theory of adjudication.
See id. (legal theory investigates other aspect of the legal system and perspectives other
than the judicial perspective, e.g., those of "the political legislator and the administrator,
or of private legal persons and citizens." And more important, as noted above in text, and
as will become clear below, Habemas's account of law draws on social theory as well as
legal theory.
18 As will become clear below, however, Habermas also relies on parallel trichotomies,
most evidently in his accounts of the "validity claims" presupposed in "communicative
action," the "structures of the lifeworld" that operate as background to communicative
action, and in the processes of "rationalization" these lifeworld structures undergo. See
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The most basic such opposition appears in the book's German
title. Modern law, according to Habermas, expresses in its internal
structure a tension between "facticity" 19 and "validity. ' 2° On the
side of "facticity," Habermas places modern law's positivity-its
basis of authority in "changeable decisions of a political
lawgiver, ''2 as well as its reliance on coercive state power for
enforcement.2 In that sense, law has the status of a social fact of
which Holmes's "bad man" will take account in fashioning his
plans of action. 3 This function of securing compliance is enhanced
to the extent that law's operation is a predictable and certain social
fact. On the side of "validity," by contrast, Habermas locates law's
claim to legitimacy and "rational acceptability" 24 -that is, its claim
to be normatively worthy of obedience. Modern law, according to
Habermas, is legitimate only to the extent that its enactment and
application can be justified convincingly. And on Habermas's
premises, justification in a post-traditional and "post-
metaphysical" society25  can be convincing only through
"discourse"-that is, through argumentation in which participants
reciprocally offer reasons and criticisms.
For Habermas, then, law is neither just a social fact nor a
realm of ideal validity. It must be sufficiently coercive,
predictable, and certain if it is to secure compliance. But at the
same time it must be legitimate if the legal order is to be stable.
Both moments-facticity and validity-are essential, and so is the
tension between them.26
infra Part lI.B. Here too, however, we find a basic figure that appears, in parallel form,
elsewhere in the theory.
19 The German title is Faktizitdt und Geltung. The German word "Faktizitit" is not so
unusual as the English equivalent "facticity." I would use "factuality" instead, but
Habermas's translator, and the English-language literature, use "facticity." What
Habermas means by Faktizitat is something like "the quality of being a fact," or really,
"the quality of being a (mere) fact."
20 Habermas ultimately traces the tension between "facticity" and "validity" to the use
of language, see, e.g., BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 14, at 15-17, 34-35, or
more generally to "the symbolic infrastructure of sociocultural forms of life." Id. at 446.
21 Id. at 447. For Habermas's association of "positivity" and "facticity," see id. at 38-
39, 95, 137, 152, 447-48.
22 See id. at 28, 29-30, 32, 198.
23 See O.W. Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897).
24 BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 14, at 38.
25 Habermas uses the term "post-metaphysical" more comprehensively, see generally
POSTMETAPHYSICAL THINKING, supra note 6, but in this context, what he means by a
"post-traditional" and "post-metaphysical" society is that neither tradition nor
comprehensive religious or metaphysical world-views can ground or legitimate social
institutions. See BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 14, at 132. For Habermas's
account of the "rationalization" processes that weakened the hold of religious and
metaphysical worldviews, see infra Part II.B.3 (discussing the "rationalization of the
lifeworld").
26 See BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 14, at 8, 39, 41, 42, 64, 65, 82, 95, 136,
480 [Vol. 23:2
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With each term of the facticity/validity distinction, Habermas
associates a methodological approach to law-each, in his view, a
one-sided approach. The "philosophy of justice," exemplified by
Rawls, foregrounds questions of legitimacy. But according to
Habermas, Rawls understates the "institutional" and coercive
dimension of law," as well as the "external tension" between law's
claim to legitimacy and the "facticity" of its relations to systems of
power 8 An opposing one-sided approach to law, according to
Habermas, is Niklas Luhmann's "autopoietic" version of social
systems theory. 9  This approach, according to Habermas,
"certainly makes a contribution" with its "keen observations of
how the democratic process is hollowed out under the pressure of
functional imperatives .... I3 But autopoietic theory occupies
only an "observer's perspective," and it is (at least predominantly)
a descriptive or analytic theory, not a normative account.
Accordingly, Habermas contends, it flattens out the tension
between facticity and validity by refusing to engage law's
"normative self-understanding"-or at least refusing to engage it
from a normative perspective.
These readings of Rawls and Luhmann are surely
contestable." The present point, however, is the methodological
conclusion that Habermas draws. An adequate approach to law
must be both "internal" and "external"-both normative and yet
sociologically adequate to the complexity of modern societies.
The two main parts of Between Facts and Norms divide along these
lines. Habermas first develops his "discourse theory of law and
democracy" by "reconstructing" the "normative self-
understanding of constitutional democracies."32 He then develops
152, 197, 288, 428, 444, 446.
27 See id. at 64-65.
28 See id. at 64 (Rawls's method "foreshortens our perception of the external tension
between the claim to the legitimacy of law and social facticity"); id. at 39 (referring to "the
overpowering of the legal system by illegitimate power relations that contradict its
normative self-understanding" as "an external relation between facticity and validity").
29 See Hugh Baxter, Autopoiesis and the "Relative Autonomy" of Law, 19 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1987 (1998), for an account of Luhmann's autopoietic theory of law which, though
critical, is more sympathetic than Habermas's account. See also Part IV, infra.
30 BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 14, at 335.
31 In Part IV, infra, I criticize Habermas's polemics against autopoietic theory. For
Habermas's most recent polemics, see Between Facts and Norms, supra note 14, at 47-56,
74, 130-31, 330, 333, 334-36, 341-53, 461, 481. An earlier broadside against autopoietic
theory is Jtlrgen Habermas, Excursus on Luhmann's Appropriation of the Philosophy of
the Subject Through Systems Theory, in THE PHILOSOPHICAL DISCOURSE OF
MODERNITY: TWELVE LECTURES 368 (Frederick Lawrence trans., 1987) (1985)
[hereinafter Excursus on Luhmann's Appropriation].
32 BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 14, at 94; see also id. at 65 (criticizing
autopoietic theory for passing over the legal system's "normative self-understanding," and
arguing that theories of law need to "combine external access with an internal
2002]
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a "communication theory of society" that examines the ways in
which this "normative self-understanding" is both vindicated and
frustrated in complex modern societies.33 The former theory is
primarily philosophical and legal-theoretical. The latter is
primarily sociological. Both parts of the project, Habermas
maintains, are important.
I have criticized elsewhere, in a companion article to this one,
the first part of Habermas's project.34 In the present Article, I
focus on the second part: the "communications theory of society,"
and in particular, the social-theoretical model of "system" and
"lifeworld" that Habermas uses to organize that theory. My
contentions will be: (1) this model of society is seriously flawed
(Part II below); (2) Between Facts and Norms purports to retain it
but necessarily subverts it with a refined model (Part III); and (3)
the refined model needs further refinement (Part IV). A few
words on the first part of the project, however, will be helpful by
way of introduction.
A. The "Reconstructive" Theory of Law and Democracy
The aim of Habermas's reconstructive theory is to discover
the conditions under which modern legal and political orders count
as legitimate. This part of Habermas's project, I said, corresponds
to the "validity" side of Habermas's organizing distinction
between facticity and validity. But here, as elsewhere, that
distinction reappears, reinscribed within the reconstructive theory
itself. And accordingly, Habermas's reconstructive theory has two
phases. He first examines the idea of legitimate law, as he finds it
in philosophical writings on law and (to a lesser extent) in legal
theory. He then considers the ways in which the principles he
discovers are realized, even if imperfectly, in modern legal and
political orders. The object of the first reconstructive investigation
is (what Habermas calls) "the system of rights." The object of the
reconstruction"); id. at 69 ("reconstructive analysis undertaken from the participant's
perspective of the judge or client, legislator or citizen, aims at the normative self-
understanding of the legal system, that is, at those ideas and values by which one can
explain the claim to legitimacy.., of a legal order (or of individual norms)"); id. at 288
(contrasting "the normative self-understanding of the constitutional state, as explained in
discourse-theoretic terms" with "the social facticity of ... [actual] political processes").
33 See BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 14, at 82-83 (introducing the "system
of rights" by noting that "the concept of individual rights plays a central role in the
modern of law").
3 See Hugh Baxter, Habermas's Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy, 50 BUFF.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2002).
[Vol. 23:2
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second reconstructive investigation is the "constitutional state"
[Rechtsstaat] 35 that is to secure those rights through law.
Habermas's account of the system of rights follows his pattern
of developing, then reconciling, a tension between pairs of terms.
The "sole ideas that can justify modern law," Habermas claims,
are "human rights and the principle of popular sovereignty."36
Habermas traces the tension between these two justifying ideas in
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century political and legal theory
(particularly Kant and Rousseau),37 but to see the tension one
might think also of twentieth-century debates over the
"countermajoritarian difficulty." The reconciliation strategy
Habermas pursues is to understand basic rights more abstractly-
as general "categories" of rights that become concrete, legally
enforceable rights only when enacted positively through
democratic and discursive lawmaking.
The first three categories of rights Habermas identifies point
toward "private autonomy": (1) the right to the greatest possible
measure of equal individual liberties, (2) membership rights in the
legal community, and (3) rights to due process and equal
protection.38 Even in his definition of these categories, Habermas
specifies that they generate concrete, enforceable legal rights only
when positively enacted through a discursive lawmaking process.39
35 ,In some contexts, the term "Rechtsstaat" may be translated as "the rule of law." See
William H. Rehg, Translator's Introduction, in BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note
14, at ix, xxxiv-xxxv.
36 BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 14, at 99.
37 See id. at 92-104 (re Kant and Rousseau); see also id. at 84-89 (re German civil-law
jurisprudence).
38 The argument here has two steps. Any community's law must define who is a
member and who is not (second category), and it must specify who has which rights and
how they may be protected (first and third categories). That much is inherent in "the legal
form," or, the very idea of law. The equality conditions Habermas builds into his first
three categories-especially in the first and third-come, he claims, from application of
"the discourse principle." By "discourse principle" he means the idea that "[j]ust those
action norms are valid to which all possibly affected persons could agree as participants in
rational discourses." Id. at 107. Habermas's analysis of discourse requires an equality of
opportunity to participate (by raising topics, arguments, criticisms, and so forth). See
infra text accompanying notes 144-49.
39 Habermas's full definitions of these categories:
1. Basic rights that result from the politically autonomous elaboration
of the right to the greatest possible measure of equal individual liberties.
2. Basic rights that result from the politically autonomous elaboration
of the status of a member in a voluntary association of consociates
under law.
3. Basic rights that result immediately from the actionability of rights
and from the politically autonomous elaboration of individual legal
protection.
BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 14, at 122.
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That process is the topic of a further category: (4) the right to
equal participation in a process that "generate[s] legitimate law."40
Because basic rights presuppose enactment through democratic
institutions and procedures, Habermas claims, basic individual
rights and democracy are "co-original" in the idea of legitimate
law. Further, Habermas argues, realization of private autonomy
presupposes citizens' exercise of "civic autonomy" through
participation in democratic lawmaking. And thus, Habermas
concludes, basic rights are not a limit on popular sovereignty.4
One may well doubt that this strategy genuinely succeeds in
reconciling the tension between basic rights and democracy-
particularly in its homelier forms of expression, such as the
"countermajoritarian difficulty." That, however, is not my present
concern.42  What matters here is that Habermas is seeking an
"internal" or conceptual link between legitimate law and
democratic lawmaking. To the extent that the tensions he
identifies can be reconciled, he maintains, it is through democratic
lawmaking that genuinely engages the citizenry's energies. Thus,
Habermas's stated aim of developing a "discourse theory of law
and democracy." And thus his need to account for the ways in
which legitimate law and democracy mutually presuppose and
reproduce one another.
Habermas's "reconstruction" of the "principles of the
constitutional state" [Rechtsstaat] elaborates on this connection
between legitimate law and democratic politics. A central
principle of the constitutional state, he maintains, is the reciprocal
link between law and political power. Institutions for making and
applying law are typically (though not always) state-organized, and
the legal decisions of such institutions are enforced through state
coercive power. Viewed from the other side, political power is
legitimate only when exercised in legal form and according to legal
procedures. Law and political power, Habermas maintains,
40 Habermas's full definition of this fourth category: "Basic rights to equal
opportunities to participate in processes of opinion- and will-formation in which citizens
exercise their political autonomy and through which they generate legitimate law." Id. at
123.
41 Habermas includes a fifth category of rights: "Basic rights to the provision of living
conditions that are socially, technologically, and ecologically safeguarded, insofar as the
current circumstances make this necessary if citizens are to have equal opportunities to
utilize the civil rights listed in (1) through (4)." Id. These social welfare rights are thus
only "relatively justified"-relative to the "absolutely justified" categories that directly
define private and civic autonomy.
42 For a negative judgment, see Robert Alexy, Basic Rights and Democracy in JAirgen
Habermas's Procedural Paradigm of the Law, 7 RATIO JURIS 227, 231-35 (1994); see also
Baxter, supra note 34.
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mutually presuppose one another."3
That, however, does not yet establish that lawmaking is
legitimate only if democratic. Habermas must rely on what he
calls "the discourse principle"-the central premise of his
discourse theory of law and democracy." With the transition to
modernity, he argues, the justifying power of tradition has been
broken. Claims count as true, and norms as right, only if they may
be justified in discourse-that is, in argumentative speech in which
participants are free to offer reasons and criticisms and accept the
obligation to be bound by the force of the better argument. For
Habermas, the discourse principle is a general principle of
justification. It applies to legal norms, he maintains, in the more
particularized form of the "principle of democracy."
Understood at full strength, this principle is extraordinarily
demanding: "the democratic principle states that only those [laws]
may claim legitimacy that can meet with the assent of all citizens in
a discursive process of legislation that in turn has been legally
constituted. '45 Recognizing that the criterion of universal assent is
excessively demanding for legal norms, Habermas includes the
possibility of (procedurally fair) bargaining and compromise,
where time constraints or irresolvable conflicts make universal
agreement impossible. 6 It turns out that Habermas leaves
considerable room for these options-to the point of contending
that "compromises make up the bulk of political decision-
43 For the argument sketched in this paragraph, see BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS,
supra note 14, at 133-51.
4 Actually, the "discourse principle" is essential also to Habermas's account of the
"system of rights." See BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 14, at 122 (explaining
that the first three categories of rights "result simply from the application of the discourse
principle to the medium of law as such"); id. at 124 (explaining that the idea or form of law
presupposes the idea of legal liberties, but the right to the greatest possible measure of
equal liberties requires application of the discourse principle); id. at 124-25 (explaining
that the idea of the "legal code" requires demarcation between members and non-
members, but the requirement of equal concern for all affected by membership rules
requires "application of the discourse principle"); id. at 125 (due process and equal
protection rights presuppose the discourse principle); id. at 127 (explaining the connection
between participatory rights and the discourse principle).
45 Id. at 110 (translation amended). In the quoted passage, Habermas's translator
renders "juridische Gesetze" (see JURGEN HABERMAS, FAKTIZITAT UND GELTUNG 141
(1992)) as "statutes"; I have opted instead for "laws." Habermas's theory indeed sees the
legislatively enacted statute as the "cornerstone" of the constitutional state. See
BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 14, at 189 (describing the "concept of the legal
statute" [Gesetzesbegriffj as the "cornerstone in the modern natural-law constructions of
the bourgeois constitutional state," and continuing to describe "approval of the people's
representatives" as the source of legal norms' legitimacy more generally). But the term
"Gesetz" can have a broader meaning, including all positive law, whether or not enacted
by a legislature. That broader meaning seems appropriate here.
46 See BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 14, at 108.
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making."47
Habermas's reconstruction of the constitutional state is
designed to show how this democratic principle has been
institutionalized, so that the system of rights he has "abstractly
posited"4 has been realized, at least in part, as a set of fully
specified, enforceable legal rights. The centerpiece of his
reconstruction is the notion of "communicative power," which
Habermas distinguishes from "administrative power."
Administrative power is essentially the power of official command.
Communicative power, by contrast, is the "motivating force" of
common convictions reached through unconstrained discussion.49
This idea of communicative power is the basis for Habermas's
reinterpretation of the idea of popular sovereignty. According to
Habermas's discourse theory, popular sovereignty means not that
"the people" constitute a single body with a general will, but
instead, that "all [legitimate] political power derives from the
communicative power of citizens."5 The idea of the constitutional
state, Habermas maintains, is to bind the exercise of administrative
power by state agencies to the "jurisgenerative" (i.e., law-
generating) communicative power of discussions among citizens.
One precondition for this connection between communicative
and administrative power is a robust "public sphere" of political
discussion, and a "civil society" of voluntary associations. At this
point in the development of Habermas's theory, his account of the
public sphere is largely negative: it must be "undeformed' and
"relatively undisturbed"52 by administrative manipulation and
"social power" (i.e., the power differentials arising from social and
economic inequality).53 Similarly, Habermas's account of civil
society is largely negative: it must be distinct from state
institutions 4 and free from the influence of "class structures,"
undistorted by administrative and social power." Only in the
second part of his overall project-the "communication theory of
society"-does Habermas explain positively what he means by
"the public sphere," "civil society," and the relation between them.
17 Id. at 282.
48 Id. at 121.
49 Id. at 147 (emphasis omitted).
50 Id. at 170.
5' Id. at 148.
52 Id. at 182.
53 See id. at 175 (defining "social power" as a "measure for the possibilities an actor
has in social relationships to assert his own will and interests, even against the opposition
of others"); id. at 182 (public-sphere discussion of citizens must be "relatively undisturbed
by the effects of power").
54 See, e.g., id. at 175.
55 See id.
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A second set of preconditions concerns legal arrangements
within and among state institutions. The sorts of arrangements
Habermas mentions are the familiar techniques for constraining
the official use of power: an independent and impartial judiciary
bound by the rule of law, legal controls over the state
administration, and the separation of powers. The innovation in
Habermas's account is his interpretation of these familiar
arrangements through a typology of different kinds of discourse.
Details of this typology are unnecessary for present purposes.
Interesting, though, are two consequences of Habermas's
separation-of-powers theory for the judiciary. Both consequences
arise from Habermas's decision to take legislation, influenced by
citizens' communicative power, as the paradigm for legitimate
lawmaking.
First, because Habermas in this way conditions legal rules'
legitimacy on their democratic pedigree,56  common-law
adjudication would seem to be illegitimate on his theory. 7 Oddly,
particularly given his engagement with American legal theory, 8
Habermas does not remark upon this apparent consequence-he
neither endorses it in the teeth of American practice nor explains
why common-law adjudication in fact is (more or less) consistent
with his theory. 9
Second, Habermas's emphasis on democratic pedigree as the
source of legal legitimacy introduces a tension into his theory of
constitutional adjudication. On one hand, it leads him to criticize
"value jurisprudence" in constitutional adjudication. Courts are
not to act as "regent" for the absent people6 They are not to
engage in "discourses of justification," in which they create new
legal norms. Instead, courts are (generally) confined to
"discourses of application," in which they determine which existing
norm is "appropriate" to regulate the situation, as well as how that
56 See id. at 83 (legitimacy of legal rules derives "from a legislative procedure based for
its part on the principle of popular sovereignty"); id. at 189 ("Democratic genesis, not a
priori principles to which the content of norms would have to correspond, provides the
statute with its justice .... ); id. at 263 ("Only the procedural conditions for the democratic
genesis of legal statutes secures the legitimacy of enacted law.").
57 See Catherine Kemp, Habermas Among the Americans: Some Reflections on the
Common Law, 76 DEN. U. L. REV. 961 (1999).
58 See BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 14, at 203-33 (discussing Dworkin's
theory of "constructive interpretation," but without mentioning its application to
common-law decisionmaking); id. at 251-53 (discussing Sunstein's theory of statutory
interpretation); see also id. at 257-58 (discussing Michael Perry's theory of constitutional
interpretation); id. at 257, 264-66; id. at 267-74, 277-78 (discussing Michelman's civic
republicanism); id. at 274-77 (discussing Sunstein and deliberative politics); id. at 284
(discussing Sunstein and Madisonian Republicanism).
59 I discuss this point further in Baxter, supra note 34.
60 See BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 14, at 278, 280.
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norm applies to the facts of the case.6 The main thrust of the
theory, then, is directed against courts' constitutional activism in
converting "values" into legal norms.62
And yet on the other hand, Habermas's linking of legitimacy
to genuine democracy leads him to certain "activist" conclusions.
Courts, Habermas says, are to "keep watch over" the "system of
rights that makes citizens' private and public autonomy equally
possible."63 This task, Habermas allows, requires "a rather bold
constitutional adjudication."'6 Securing "the implementation of
democratic procedure and the deliberative form of political
opinion- and will-formation,"65 he suggests, requires checks not
just on the administrative power of the state apparatus, but checks
also on the "social power" generated by social inequality66 and on
the mass media's control over public discussion.67 Habermas
suggests, further, that political parties, though in principle
61 See id. at 162, 172, 192, 266 (distinguishing between discourses of justification and
discourses of application, and confining judicial decisionmaking to the latter); see also id.
at 217 (discussing the relevance of justification/application distinction for problem of
indeterminacy in adjudication). But cf id. at 196 (acknowledging that the legislative
function "also involves the courts insofar as they interpret and develop law").
62 See id. at 258-61 (using distinction between justification and application, and
distinction between rights and values, to argue against "value jurisprudence" in
constitutional adjudication); see also id. at 253 (cautioning against the possibility that
constitutional courts might "engage in a politically inspired 'creation of law,' which,
according to the logic of the separation of powers, should be reserved to the democratic
legislature").
63 Id. at 263.
64 Id. at 280.
65 Id.
66 See id. at 263 (criticizing the "classical" separation-of-powers notion and noting that
"basic rights must now do more than just protect private citizens from encroachment by
the state apparatus"); id. at 39 (noting the danger that "legally uncontrolled social power"
might "overpower[]" the "legal system" and thereby "contradict its normative self-
understanding"); id. at 150 (the idea of the constitutional state presupposes that "the
administrative system" must be "kept free of illegitimate interventions of social power");
id. at 150 ("the relation between social power and democracy is problematic"); id. at 263-
64 ("Private autonomy is endangered today at least as much by positions of economic and
social power, and it depends for its part on the manner and extent to which democratic
citizens can effectively exercise their communicative and participatory rights."); id. at 308
(genuine democracy can develop "[o]nly in an egalitarian public of citizens that has
emerged from the confines of class and thrown off the millennia-old shackles of social
stratification and exploitation"); id. at 364 (noting the dangers to democracy posed by the
"social power" of "large and well-organized interest groups").
67 See id. at 265 (judicial review must "start by examining the communication
structures of a public sphere subverted by the power of the mass media"); id. at 442
(endorsing "a stronger constitutional regulation of the power of the media"); see also id. at
385 (noting the threat that the "social power" of large mass-media organizations poses to
"the constitutionally regulated circulation of power"); id. at 442 (suggesting that genuine
citizen participation in democratic processes requires "curbs on the power of the media").
But cf id. at 368 (constitutional free-press guarantees help "constitut[e]" the public sphere
of democratic discussion).
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necessary for democracy,68 have in some measure undermined
democracy by becoming "arms of the state"69 and cynical managers
of public opinion. Habermas does not make clear just how far
courts should go in the name of protecting genuine democracy.
But his endorsement of this kind of judicial review is at least in
tension with his criticism of constitutional "value jurisprudence. '"70
Those are the general contours and claims of Habermas's
reconstruction of constitutional democracies' "normative self-
understanding." Legitimate law and democracy are internally
linked, such that the source of legitimacy is enactment through a
genuinely democratic process in which citizens' "communicative
power," formed through unconstrained public discussion,
influences the establishment of legal norms and the exercise of
"administrative power" by the state apparatus. Courts are
decidedly secondary in this picture, limited to the elaboration of
existing norms, not creation of new legal norms-although their
role as guardian of the democratic process may require "bold"
action.
Recall, however, that Habermas's project is not purely
reconstructive or normative. He has said that the theory of law
and democracy must be sociologically adequate to the complexity
of modern societies. In terms of his organizing distinction,
Habermas must explore also the "external relation between
facticity and validity"-that is, the "tension between the normative
self-understanding of the constitutional state, as explained in
discourse-theoretic terms, and the social facticity of ... political
processes" that do not necessarily conform to the normative
model.7' Otherwise, Habermas observes, the normative account
might appear to be an impotent "ought" counterposed against the
"is" of actual power politics. Further, because Habermas claims
68 See, e.g., id. at 171 ("competition between different political parties" is necessary for
"popular sovereignty") (emphasis omitted); id. at 355 (noting that "party competition" is
basic to "democratic opinion- and will-formation"); id. at 368 (noting role of parties in
connecting state administrative apparatus to citizens' discussion in political public sphere).
69 See id. at 375 ("established political parties.., have largely become arms of the
political system"); id. at 434 ("parties have taken possession of the core areas of the
political system without fitting into the functional separation of powers"); id. at 442
(discussing the need for "political parties that are not simply arms of the state").
70 I discuss this problem further in Baxter, supra note 34 (pagination not available).
71 Id. at 288.
72 See id. at 56, 65-66 (discussing the work of Rawls and Dworkin under the heading
"The Return of Modern Natural Law and the 'Impotence of the Ought,"' and concluding
that normative theory must be connected with a particular kind of sociological analysis);
see also JUrgen Habermas, Reply to Symposium Participants, Benjamin N. Cardozo School
of Law, in HABERMAS ON LAW AND DEMOCRACY: CRITICAL EXCHANGES (Michel
Rosenfeld & Andrew Arato eds., 1998), at 381, 444 (turn to social science is "meant to
make it plausible that the reconstructed normative self-understanding of modern legal
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that legitimate lawmaking requires an interaction between formal
political institutions (especially legislatures) and informal
communication among citizens in the political public sphere, he
needs to develop an account of how these formal and informal
circuits of communication are linked. For both of these tasks,
Habermas explains, we must have recourse to social theory. And
that brings us to the points this Article will address.
B. The Communication Theory of Society: System and Lifeworld
As Habermas makes clear at the outset of Between Facts and
Norms, his social theory of choice is the one he developed most
systematically in his 1981 magnum opus, Theory of Communicative
Action.3 Described most generally, that theory has two aims. One
is methodological, and the other is substantive.
The methodological objective is to integrate the two dominant
general approaches in social theory. One is the "interpretive"
approach that begins with social actors-individual or collective-
and tries to understand the social world as meaningful from that
standpoint. The other is the approach of social systems theory,
which takes the relation between "systems" and their
"environments" to be the basic unit of analysis-where a "system"
might be specified as (for example) the international order, a
nation-state, a particular political system, or a business firm.
According to Habermas, each of these approaches illuminates part
of the social world, but each requires supplementation by the
other.
The substantive objective of Theory of Communicative Action
is to show that what Habermas calls "communicative
rationality"-expressed in its purest form in "discourse," or,
rational argumentation-has been progressively but only partially
realized in modern societies. In this aspect of the project,
Habermas seeks to reinterpret Max Weber's influential theory of
cultural and societal "rationalization," in a way that expresses
more systematically the ambivalence with which Weber regarded
those historical developments.
These two general objectives come together in the
"system/lifeworld model" of modern societies that Habermas
orders does not hang in mid-air," but instead "connects with the social reality of highly
complex societies").
73 See BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 14, at 7 ("1 pursue the dual goal of
explaining how the theory of communicative action accords central importance to the
category of law and why this theory in turn constitutes a suitable context for a discourse
theory of law.").
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presents in Theory of Communicative Action. The interpretive
theoretical perspective, which begins from the problematic of
social action, sees society as the "lifeworld" of social actors.
Habermas develops a concept of the three "structural
components" of society seen as lifeworld: (1) "culture," or the
stock of knowledge and interpretive schemes that have developed
historically and are transmitted (albeit differentially) to a society's
members; (2) "society," or, the complex of basic institutions
(especially political and legal), and (3) "personality," or, the stock
of personal dispositions, competences, and motivations (also
distributed differentially) that make social action possible.
Habermas's reinterpretation of Weber's theory of rationalization
traces the realization of what Habermas calls "communicative
rationality" in each of these dimensions. Particularly important
for Habermas is the greater contingency of social institutions and
relations in modern societies, as compared with traditional
societies.
This greater contingency, Habermas maintains, creates both
opportunity and danger. The opportunity is for rational discussion
about what is to be done and for consensual action based on
rational agreement. The danger is that conflicting interests, time
limitations, and the like, will prevent this sort of rational
agreement. And dissensus over questions of value is all the more
likely to the extent that societies have become more pluralistic.
Thus the process of "communicative rationalization" creates
the need for social mechanisms to deal with these failures to reach
communicative agreement. Two such mechanisms, Habermas
argues, are the market and bureaucratic organizations around
which modern economic and administrative systems are centered.
These systems operate through the "media" of money and power
that circumvent the process of reaching consensus, through
rational discussion, on questions of truth or moral rightness. The
conditions Habermas calls the "rationalization of the lifeworld"
are thus at the same time the conditions for the development of
"systems" that operate independent of communicatively realized
agreement.
Habermas describes the process by which these systems
develop as an "uncoupling of system from lifeworld."74 This marks
a revision of his conception of the lifeworld. No longer does that
concept encompass society as a whole. Instead, the lifeworld
comes to be defined as "not system"-as the spheres of informal,
non-economic, non-bureaucratic relations and interaction.
74 That is the title of Part VI.2 in 2 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra
note 3, at 153-97.
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How, then, does Habermas combine these two
methodological perspectives-"interpretive" theory and systems
theory-and their associated substantive society concepts
(lifeworld and system)? The answer is in Habermas's model of
system/lifeworld interchange. Here the frame of reference is
systems-theoretical. Borrowing from Talcott Parsons's concept of
system interchange, Habermas presents a model in which systems
and lifeworld, as separate social spheres, stand in a relation of
input/output exchange. The relation is controlled by the "media"
of money and power. This official model of system/lifeworld
interchange grounds Habermas's diagnosis of crisis tendencies in
modern societies. And that diagnosis is the ultimate aim of
Habermas's project in Theory of Communicative Action.
The system/lifeworld model figures prominently in the theory
of law developed in Between Facts and Norms. Law, Habermas
tells us, "belongs to the societal component of the lifeworld,"75 but
at the same time, it accomplishes the "legal institutionalization of
markets and bureaucratic organizations"76 through which the
economic and administrative "systems" function. Law, Habermas
says, is integral to the "social integration" through which society as
"lifeworld" reproduces itself, but at the same time, it operates as a
mechanism of "system integration."" Or, to use some of
Habermas's favorite metaphors: law is the "mediating function,"78
"hinge,"79 or "transformer"' between system and lifeworld.
Habermas's invocation of the system/lifeworld model in his
work on law presents three problems. First, his explication of
concepts basic to that model-communicative action, lifeworld,
and system-is cryptic. Habermas sensibly assumes that social
theorists will be familiar with the more extended treatment he has
given those concepts in prior work, but for reasons stated in
opening this article, that assumption is understandably
questionable with respect to American legal theorists. For that
reason, I spend considerable time with Theory of Communicative
Action and other roughly contemporaneous writings in Part II,
before turning specifically to Habermas's more recent work on
law.
A second difficulty with Habermas's invocation of the
system/lifeworld model-and an additional reason to spend time
75 Id. at 80.
76 Id. at 75.
77 Id. at 40.
78 Id. at 56.
79 Id.
10 Id. at 56, 81, 354; see also id. at 176 (describing law as a "power transformer that
reinforces the weakly integrating currents of a communicatively structured lifeworld").
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with its original and more systematic development-is that the
model is seriously flawed. Considered on its own terms, I argue
throughout Part II, it has conceptual difficulties. I argue, further,
that the model has additional difficulties given Habermas's
longstanding intention-and the main theme of Habermas's work
on law-to investigate the conditions under which radical
democracy is possible under conditions of modern social
complexity. I argue in Part II.D that the system/lifeworld model
developed in Theory of Communicative Action makes such
democracy literally inconceivable-ruled out by conceptual fiat.
Third, despite his professed loyalty to the system/lifeworld
model he developed in Theory of Communicative Action,
Habermas's analysis in his work on law tacitly reworks that model,
even to the point of abandonment. His account of social
"systems," in particular, ultimately is inconsistent with the account
he gave in Theory of Communicative Action. While this
inconsistency is in my view an improvement, the unacknowledged
shift in Habermas's recent work leaves the concept of "system"
untheorized. The shift, also, makes unnecessary the concept of the
"lifeworld" as distinct and partial social sphere.
Part III of this article is devoted to this last set of issues. Part
III.A shows that Between Facts and Norms purports to retain the
earlier conceptions of system and lifeworld. Part III.B outlines the
"model of the circulation of power" that Habermas uses to
"translate" his discourse theory of law and democracy into social-
theoretically adequate terms. Part III.C argues that,
notwithstanding Habermas's apparent belief to the contrary, the
"circulation of power" model substantially reworks Habermas's
notions of systems and system/lifeworld interchange. Part IV
criticizes the "circulation of power" model and suggests a
reformulation that borrows from, and at the same time revises,
ideas from Habermas's longtime adversary, Niklas Luhmann.
II. BASIC CONCEPTS IN HABERMAS'S THEORY OF SOCIETY
Habermas's system/lifeworld model, as presented in both
Theory of Communicative Action and Between Facts and Norms,
takes the notion of 'the "lifeworld" as the basic conception of
society, to be amended or supplemented only for cause. And in
both works, Habermas develops the notion of the lifeworld only
after presenting the idea of "communicative action," to which the
idea of the lifeworld is in Habermas's view a "complementary
concept." For that reason, I begin first with Habermas's notion of
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communicative action (Part II.A), then turn to his notion of the
lifeworld (Part II.B) and system (Part II.C), before considering
how Habermas puts the lifeworld and system concepts together in
his model of system/lifeworld interchange (Part II.D).
My argument will be that in elaborating each of these basic
concepts, Habermas tends toward polar distinctions that cannot be
maintained. Communicative action is not so clearly demarcated
from other forms of action as Habermas suggests, and because
Habermas constructs his notion of the lifeworld around
communicative action, the distinction between system and
lifeworld similarly is too sharply drawn. This tendency toward
stylized oppositions, I contend, ultimately undermines the
system/lifeworld model Habermas develops in Theory of
Communicative Action. And thus to the extent that Habermas
relies on that model in Between Facts and Norms, his account of
law is correspondingly weakened."
A. Communicative and Strategic Action
Habermas distinguishes among three types of rational action: 2
instrumental action, strategic action, and communicative action.
Typically he marks the differences among these types with a pair
of crosscutting distinctions."3  One distinction is between two
''orientations" of action: toward "success," or toward an
"understanding" between the actor and others. The other
distinction tracks Max Weber's notions of "social" and "nonsocial"
action-where "social action" means action in which the actor
81 The remainder of this part is a longer version of parallel analysis appearing in
Baxter, supra note. 34. Expanded here is the discussion in Parts II.B.4, IIC, and II.D.
82 One might wonder why Habermas's action theory focuses only on rational action.
His explanation has two parts. First, he constructs his typology of action for purposes of
social theory, not for other classificatory purposes. See 1 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE
ACTION, supra note 5, at 273-74 (distinguishing sociological or social-theoretical
understandings of action from the "analytic action theory" of Anglo-American
philosophy); see also id. at 278-79. And the particular project Habermas has pursued
involves a reconstruction and reformulation of Max Weber's theory of "occidental
rationalism." Habermas accordingly privileges rational action in his typology.
For a critique of Habermas's decision to focus on rational action, see Hans Joas, The
Unhappy Marriage of Hermeneutics and Functionalism, in COMMUNICATIVE ACTION:
ESSAYS ON HABERMAS'S THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 97, 99-101 (Axel
Honneth & Hans Joas eds., Jeremy Gains & Doris L. Jones trans., 1991) (1986)
[hereinafter COMMUNICATIVE ACTION: ESSAYS].
83 For examples of this strategy, see 1 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra
note 5, at 285; Jtirgen Habermas, Reply to My Critics, in HABERMAS: CRITICAL DEBATES
219, 263-64 (John B. Thompson & David Held eds., 1982) (1980) [hereinafter Reply to My
Critics].
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"takes account of the behavior of others" and orients her conduct
accordingly.'
Both instrumental action and strategic action are oriented
toward success rather than mutual understanding. They differ,
however, along the lines of Habermas's second distinction.
Instrumental action is essentially the solitary performance of a
task, according to "technical rules." As such, instrumental action
is "nonsocial," in Habermas's typology. Strategic action, by
contrast, is designed to "influenc[e] the decisions of a rational
opponent," according to "rules of rational choice."85 Instrumental
actions may be elements of a pattern of social action-either
communicative or strategic-but they do not themselves comprise
a distinct type of social action.86
1. The Distinction Between Communicative
and Strategic Action
More difficult is the distinction between communicative and
strategic action. The general distinction Habermas draws between
these two forms of action-orientation toward success versus
orientation toward understanding-is not by itself very helpful.
As Habermas allows, communicative action as well as strategic
action is goal-directed," and the goals of communicative action are
not necessarily reducible to the aim of reaching understanding.88
Orientation to "success" versus orientation toward
"understanding," then, does not seem a promising basis for
distinguishing between strategic and communicative action-at
least not without additional explanation. Nor does the term
"communicative" by itself mark the difference: Habermas
acknowledges both that communicative action does not consist
84 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE
SOCIOLOGY 4 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., Ephraim Fischoff et al. trans., Univ.
of Cal. Press 1978) (1956).
85 1 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 5, at 285.
'6 See id.; see also Reply to My Critics, supra note 83, at 264, 268.
87 See I THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 5, at 101; Reply to My
Critics, supra note 83, at 265; Jurgen Habermas, Remarks on the Concept of
Communicative Action, in SOCIAL ACTION 154 (Gottfried Seebass & Raimo Tuomela
eds., Ruth Stanley trans., 1984) (1982) [hereinafter Remarks on the Concept of
Communicative Action]; Jurgen Habermas, A Reply, in COMMUNICATIVE ACTION:
ESSAYS, supra note 82, at 164 [hereinafter A Reply].
8 See, e.g., 1 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 5, at 101
("communicative action is not exhausted by the act of reaching understanding in an
interpretive manner").
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wholly in speech acts,89 and also that strategic action, too, may
include the use of speech.'
The picture becomes clearer, however, when one considers
the purpose of Habermas's typology. As a social theorist,
Habermas is interested primarily in how individual actions can be
coordinated into patterns of interaction.9' For this reason,
Habermas generally uses the terms "communicative" and
"strategic" to refer to types of interaction rather than to discrete
individual actions. The problem Habermas sets himself-and the
basis for his distinction between communicative and strategic
action-is to identify the mechanisms that coordinate these two
types of interaction.'
This task Habermas approaches through his "formal
pragmatics." With the term "pragmatics," Habermas signals his
focus on language in use-on utterances or "speech acts"-as
opposed to a semantic focus on the meaning of isolated sentences
or propositions. 93 By "formal," Habermas means that he seeks not
to describe and classify the "communicative practice of everyday
life"94 as it operates within a particular language 95-that would be
the approach Habermas calls "empirical" pragmatics-but instead,
to "rationally reconstruct" the necessary presuppositions of
communicative practice. What Habermas pursues in his formal
pragmatics is a theory of the unreflectively mastered,
pretheoretical communicative capacities of ordinary competent
speakers.96 This theory focuses, in particular, on the way speakers
may use speech acts to establish, maintain, or transform" social
relationships with other persons.
The central idea in Habermas's formal pragmatics, and the
89 See id. ("the communicative model of action does not equate action with
communication").
90 See Reply to My Critics, supra note 83, at 264.
91 See 1 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 5, at 298 ("From the
standpoint of a sociological theory of action, my primary interest has to be in making clear
the mechanism relevant to the coordinating power of speech acts."); id. at 273-74
(criticizing "analytic action theory" for failing to "consider the mechanisms for
coordinating action through which interpersonal relations come about"); id. at 282
("Social actions can be distinguished according to the mechanisms for coordinating
individual actions.").
92 See id. at 101 ("Concepts of social action are distinguished... according to how they
specify the coordination among the goal-directed actions of different participants.").
93 This, at any rate, is how Habermas characterizes the difference between pragmatics
and semantics.
94 1 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 5, at 328.
95 See id. at 319-20 (describing J.L. Austin's project).
96 For an excellent account of Habermas's method of reconstruction, see Michael K.
Power, Habermas and the Counterfactual Imagination, in HABERMAS ON LAW AND
DEMOCRACY: CRITICAL EXCHANGES 207 (Michel Rosenfeld & Andrew Arato eds.,
1998).
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basis for his conception of communicative action, is the notion of a
speech act's "validity." Habermas distinguishes among three
forms of validity to which speech acts may lay claim: propositional
truth,' normative rightness [Richtigkeit], and sincerity
[Wahrhafigkeit].98 Typically, Habermas observes, just one of these
validity claims is thematic in a particular speech act: in a
confession, for example, the claim to sincerity is thematic, as is the
97 Or, at least the claim that the utterance's "existential presuppositions" are satisfied.
See 1 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 5, at 99, 306-07. This
qualification is necessary to account for speech acts that do not directly assert matters of
fact.
98 See id. at 75, 99. One might ask: why these three and only these three forms of
validity? While Habermas does not pretend to a transcendental deduction of the three
categories of validity, see id. at 38, he does attempt to justify his choice systematically.
Truth, rightness, and sincerity, he argues, correspond to the three "worlds" to which
utterances may refer: the "objective" world of "existing states of affairs," the "social"
world of norms, and the "subjective" world of "desires or feelings." See id. at 51, 91-92;
see also id. at 70 (referring to "[tJhe world concepts and the corresponding validity
claims").
Habermas's terminology here is potentially misleading. It seems, first, to suggest
that the theory of communicative action depends upon some deep ontological claim about
the number and nature of "worlds." Further, the distinctions between the "objective
world" and "subjective world," and among the various "subjective worlds" to which
individual speakers have "privileged access," id. at 91, 100, could be thought to recreate
what Habermas elsewhere criticizes as the "philosophy of consciousness," with its sharp
division between subject and object, and among subjects. See id. at 386-99 (criticizing
earlier critical theory for remaining trapped within the philosophy of consciousness, and
distinguishing Habermas's own communications-theoretic approach).
In fact, however, formal pragmatics is a "rational reconstruction" of communicative
practice, not a revelation of timeless ontological truths. As a rational reconstruction,
Habermas tells us, it is hypothetical, revisable in principle, and subject to corroboration or
disconfirmation through empirical application. See, e.g., Jirgen Habermas, Reconstruction
and Interpretation in the Social Sciences, in MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND
COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 32 (Christian Lenhardt & Shierry Weber Nicholson trans.,
1990) (1983) [hereinafter Reconstruction and Interpretation in the Social Sciences].
Moreover, the theory has an explicitly historical cast: only in modern communicative
practice, we are told, have the three worlds and three kinds of validity claims been
distinguished clearly. See 1 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 5, at 48-
51, 235-36; 2 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 3, at 133, 159. Nor does
Habermas conceive of communicating human beings as monadic subjects, isolated in their
own "subjective worlds." Validity claims are raised, criticized, and defended publicly, with
respect to shared standards and criteria.
Habermas's tripartite division of validity claims has received significant criticism.
See MAEVE COOKE, LANGUAGE AND REASON: A STUDY OF HABERMAS'S
PRAGMATICS 51-94 (1994). For purposes of this article, however, I am willing to accept
Habermas's choice of truth, rightness and sincerity as plausible enough for an initial
theoretical decision. The important question for my purposes is not whether Habermas
has given a compelling argument for this initial theoretical decision, but whether, in the
further development of his theory, Habermas's initial choice importantly impairs the
analysis and specification of communicative practice. We are not yet in a position to
answer that question.
It is worth noting, also, that while Habermas adheres to the basic three-part schema,
he draws subdistinctions when necessary for explanatory purposes.
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claim to truth in a factual assertion.9 9 Habermas's formulation of
the main categories of speech acts reflects this insight: in
"constative," "regulative," and "expressive" utterances, the claims
to truth, rightness, and sincerity are (respectively) thematic. °°
Nonetheless, Habermas contends, any speech act in
communicative action raises simultaneously all three claims, even
if (ordinarily) the speaker raises only one directly or
thematically.10 1 Here perhaps Habermas stretches the notion of
"raising a claim" too far. We would not ordinarily say, for
example, that a speaker's request for a glass of water "raises a
truth claim"-that she claims it to be true that a glass of water can
be obtained and brought in a reasonable amount of time. 1°2 More
likely we would say that she presupposes these factual
circumstances. A weaker but more plausible formulation of
Habermas's position might therefore be that every utterance
constitutive for communicative action raises a claim to or
presupposes validity in the three respects Habermas identifies. An
alternative (and also weaker) formulation is that, at least in
principle, any speech act can be criticized along any of the three
dimensions of validity. 103  For example, a statement that the
argument of a colleague's book depends upon five identified
factual errors would be a constative speech act in which
propositional truth is the thematic claim. But if one were to make
such a statement at a party celebrating the book's publication, a
hearer might respond by saying that such a criticism, even if true,
is normatively inappropriate in the context of its utterance: Or the
hearer might reply by challenging the speaker's sincerity-by, for
example, suggesting that the criticism arises more from the
99 See 1 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 5, at 308-09.
100 See JURGEN HABERMAS, Toward a Critique of Meaning, in POSTMETAPHYSICAL
THINKING: PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS 77 (William Mark Hohengarten trans., 1992) (1988)
[hereinafter Toward a Critique of Meaning] (describing these kinds of speech acts as the
"three basic modes"); I THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 5, at 325-26.
Habermas distinguishes also "communicative" and "operative" speech acts, see id. at 326,
but the definitions of those classes are unimportant for present purposes.
101 See COOKE, supra note 98, at 59 (distinguishing between "direct" and "indirect"
raising of validity claims).
102 Cf 1 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 5, at 306 (using this
example).
103 Compare id. at 99 (asserting that a communicative actor "must raise at least three
validity claims with his utterance"), with id. at 306 (justifying this claim by noting that even
if one claim is thematic, the other two may come into play with a hearer's criticism); see
also Toward a Critique of Meaning, supra note 100, at 76, 77 (only one claim may be
"thematically emphasized in any explicit speech act," but "[e]very speech act as a whole
can always be criticized as invalid from three perspectives"). See also COOKE, supra note
98, at 60-61 ("The fact that any given speech act can be contested from more than one
point of view supports Habermas's claim that every speech act raises three validity claims
simultaneously.").
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speaker's jealousy than from a serious evaluation of the book's
merits. In this second revision of Habermas's thesis, every speech
act constitutive for communicative action involves all three claims
in that, in principle, a hearer can challenge the utterance in each of
the three different ways.
Either of these two weaker versions of Habermas's thesis
would suffice for his purposes. And the second of the two,
emphasizing the role of a hearer's criticism, connects to an
important theme in Habermas's notion of communicative action.
Validity claims, Habermas maintains, are essentially criticizable. 4
By "criticizable," Habermas means that in communicative action
the hearer may respond to the claims by taking a "yes or no
position"-either accepting the speech act's claims or opposing
them with criticism or requests for justification. 5 And at least to
the extent that the interaction is to remain communicative,"4 the
speaker assumes the obligation of providing such justification if
necessary. 7 Further, particularly in the case of regulative speech
acts (such as a promise), mutual acceptance of a validity claim may
impose future obligations. 8 In these senses, acceptance of validity
claims, or further discussion between speaker and hearer aimed at
consensus concerning those claims, is the "mechanism of
understanding [Versttindigung]" that coordinates communicative
action.
Because the point often has been misunderstood, it is worth
underscoring that Habermas does not equate communicative
action with the speech acts that coordinate it. In communicative
action, as in all rational action, the participants pursue goals and
plans of action, based on their interpretations of the situation. 9
But communicative action is action proceeding from or directed
toward achieving a consensus. In communicative action,
Habermas says, actors "coordinate their individual plans.., on the
basis of communicatively achieved agreement.' 10°
104 See, e.g., 1 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 5, at 301 ("Validity
claims are "internally connected with reasons and grounds"; they "can be rejected only by
way of criticism and can be defended against a criticism only by refuting it").
'o5 See, e.g., id. at 38-39, 101, 305-07.
106 Habermas is not always careful to include this qualification expressly, but it follows
from his position. The alternatives to providing a requested justification are either
breaking off interaction or switching over to strategic action. See Jirgen Habermas, What
is Universal Pragmatics?, in COMMUNICATION AND THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY, supra
note 2, at 3-4 [hereinafter What is Universal Pragmatics?].
107 See 1 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 5, at 99.
108 See id. at 303-04.
109 See 1 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 5, at 101; A Reply, supra
note 87, at 241; Remarks on the Concept of Communicative Action, supra note 87, at 154.
110 1 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 5, at 305; see also id. at 86
(explaining that communicative action implies an "understanding" among the actors
2002]
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The mechanism coordinating strategic action, on Habermas's
scheme, is not "consensus "-mutual acceptance of validity
claims-but "influence" [Einflufjnahme]1  The term "influence"
requires explication. In one sense of the word, communicative
actors may seek to influence each other. In discussing a
problematic claim, one may try to persuade the other that his
position is correct, and the other may try to convince the other of
her criticism. But by "influence" [Einfluj3nahme], Habermas says,
he means "exert a causal influence, 1.2  independent of the
convincing force of reasons that could support claims to validity.
So far, however, the characterization of "influence," and thus the
characterization of strategic action, is only negative-influence
operates in some way other than mutual recognition of validity
claims.
Habermas tries to characterize the mechanism of influence
more precisely by distinguishing between two subtypes-"open"
and "concealed" strategic action. Of these two subtypes,
Habermas has given far more attention to concealed strategic
action. The kind of "influence" characteristic of concealed
strategic action is, in effect, deception" 3-primarily conscious
deception. "4 The more technical criterion Habermas adopts for
"about the action situation and their plans of action" that allows them to "coordinate their
actions by way of agreement").
"I See id. at 286 (distinguishing between "causally exerting an influence upon" one's
partners in interaction and "coming to an understanding with" them"); A Reply, supra
note 81, at 242 (distinguishing between "influencing one's opponent" and "reaching
understanding"); JORGEN HABERMAS, Discourse Ethics: Notes on a Program of
Philosophical Justification, in MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND COMMUNICATIVE ACTION,
supra note 92, at 58 (distinguishing between exerting "influence" upon another with the
threat or promise of sanctions and coordinating action plans "consensually"); JURGEN
HABERMAS, Erlauterungen zum Begriff des kommunikativen Handelns, in VORSTUDIEN
UND ERGANZUNGEN ZUR THEORIE DES KOMMUNIKATIVEN HANDELNS 571, 572-73
(1984) (1982) (distinguishing between "influence" [Einflufinahme] and "consensus"
[Einverstandnis] as mechanisms for coordinating interaction).
112 See Toward a Critique of Meaning, supra note 100, at 79; Remarks on the Concept of
Communicative Action, supra note 87, at 153.
113 See 1 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 5, at 332-33.
114 He mentions also the possibility of unconscious deception, which he calls
"systematically distorted communication." See 1 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION,
supra note 5, at 332 (emphasis omitted). In this form of interaction, the parties believe
that they are acting communicatively, but at least one party is in the grip of an individual
psychopathology or powerful social ideology that distorts, and in distorting subverts, the
process of reaching understanding about claims to validity. This notion once occupied a
prominent place in Habermas's work, with a reconstructed version of psychoanalysis
providing a methodological model for critical social theory. See On Systematically
Distorted Communication, supra note 8; KNOWLEDGE AND HUMAN INTERESTS, supra
note 6. With Habermas's turn in the mid-1970s toward substantive social theorizing, and
away from epistemological concerns and ideology critique, the importance of this concept
in Habermas's work has receded. The notion occupies a position in the typology of social
action, see 1 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 5, at 333, but it now
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concealed strategic action concerns the "avowability" of the
parties' intentions or aims. In concealed strategic interaction, at
least one participant pursues aims that he knows could not be
avowed without jeopardizing that participant's success, while at
least one participant assumes that all are acting communicatively.
A simple example: one person requests a loan from another
person without disclosing that the money will be used for a
criminal purpose. Assuming that the person from whom the loan
is requested has no reason to endorse the criminal purpose, the
aim is nonavowable, in Habermas's sense, because to declare it is
to make tender of the loan unlikely. This kind of action is parasitic
on communicative action, Habermas believes, because the success
of the coordinating speech act depends upon the hearer's belief
that the speaker could redeem the claim to have spoken his
intentions sincerely or truthfully."5
Habermas has given less attention to the notion of openly
strategic action. From his general characterization of strategic
action-that it operates through "influence" rather than
"consensus"-we can assume that strategic actors do not
presuppose or seek a consensus in plans or goals, or at least not
one resting on mutual acceptance of validity claims. But how can
it be characterized positively?
receives comparatively little discussion. For a brief treatment in Habermas's recent work,
see A Reply, supra note 87, at 225-26.
'
15
*The discussion in text short-circuits Habermas's usual characterization of concealed
strategic action. Since 1981, in The Theory of Communicative Action, Habermas has
explicated concealed strategic action by modifying the notion of "perlocutions," borrowed
from J.L. Austin's speech-act theory. See J.L. AUSTIN, HOW TO Do THINGS WITH
WORDS 101-31 (1962) (on "perlocutions"); see also 1 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE
ACTION, supra note 5, at 288-95 (Habermas's initial analysis of perlocutions and
concealed strategic action). Habermas's initial formulation attracted significant criticism,
on two scores: Habermas's analysis of "perlocution" bore little resemblance to what
Austin meant by that term, and further, Austin's notion of perlocution had little
connection to what Habermas meant by concealed strategic action. See, e.g., Allen W.
Wood, Habermas' Defense of Rationalism, NEW GERMAN CRITIQUE, Spring/Summer
1985, at 157-62; Jonathan Culler, Communicative Competence and Normative Force, NEW
GERMAN CRITIQUE, Spring/Summer 1985, at 136; Hugh Baxter, System and Lifeworld in
Habermas's Theory of Communicative Action, 16 THEORY AND SoC. 39, 41, 81 n.8
(1987); Ernst Tugendhat, Habermas on Communicative Action, in SOCIAL ACTION, supra
note 87, at 179, 180. Habermas since has acknowledged that his usage of the term
"perlocution" is idiosyncratic and "leads to misunderstandings." A Reply, supra note 87,
at 239. He has proposed a revised theory in which (this time explicitly) only some
perlocutions count as constitutive for concealed strategic action. See id. at 239-40; see also
COOKE, supra note 98, at 22-24 (analyzing Habermas's present position).
We need not retrace Habermas's journey. The criterion of concealed strategic
action is essentially the same after as before Habermas's revisions, see A Reply, supra note
87, at 240, and it can be explicated without reference to any conception of "perlocution."
See COOKE, supra note 98, at 23 (concluding with the avowability criterion outlined in text
supra).
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In Theory of Communicative Action, Habermas attempted to
specify open strategic action with formal-pragmatic analysis.
Focusing on the variant of open strategic action most difficult to
distinguish from communicative action-the sort that, like
communicative action, is coordinated by speech acts-Habermas
assumed that the characteristic kind of coordinating speech act is
the "simple" or "pure imperative." By "simple" or "pure"
imperative, Habermas meant a command that is a sheer assertion
of power. To these simple imperatives Habermas contrasted
speech acts that are similar in form-involving a command or
order-but which, on Habermas's analysis, belong to
communicative action. These sorts of commands or orders
Habermas called "normatively authorized requests." Habermas's
example of such a request was a flight attendant's instruction to a
passenger to extinguish a cigarette."6
These two kinds of speech acts differ, Habermas argued, in
their "acceptability conditions,""' 7 by which Habermas meant the
speaker's basis for expecting compliance and the addressee's basis
for complying."8 In the case of pure imperatives, the basis for
compliance is only the addressee's fear of negative sanctions (or
interest in positive sanctions) over which the speaker has disposal.
This motivation Habermas characterized as "merely empirical.""' 9
In the case of normatively authorized requests, by contrast, the
speaker expects compliance not just because she can deploy
sanctions, but because compliance is normatively required. If the
addressee accepts the speaker's claim that compliance is
normatively required-required, in Habermas's example, by a
valid safety regulation-then the interaction is coordinated by
mutual acceptance of a claim to normative rightness.2 Because
the claim to normative validity is criticizable, Habermas argued, it
must be supported or opposed with reasons, not simply with
reference to potential sanctions. Accordingly, Habermas argued,
116 See 1 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 5, at 300.
117 Habermas constructs his formal-pragmatic analysis by analogy to formal semantics.
A prominent approach in formal semantic theory analyzes the meaning of a sentence or
proposition in terms of its truth conditions-the conditions under which the sentence or
proposition would be true. Habermas analyzes the meaning of an utterance-the basic
element of pragmatic theory-in terms of the conditions under which it would be
acceptable. See 1 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 5, at 297-98.
"Acceptable" is broader than "true" in two senses. First, it covers claims to rightness and
sincerity as well as claims to truth. Second, it addresses the issue whether the utterance is
normatively appropriate when made in a particular context, not just the question whether
it is abstractly valid.
118 See id. at 300 (acceptability conditions pure imperatives), 301-02 (acceptability
conditions for normatively authorized requests).
119 Id. at 301.
120 See id.
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the hearer's acceptance of the speaker's claim may be motivated
rationally, not just empirically. 1 ' Habermas thus characterized the
opposition between communicative and open strategic action
through a series of further oppositions: between normatively
authorized requests and simple imperatives, between validity
claims and power claims, between reasons and sanctions, and
between rational and empirical motivation.
Habermas since has disavowed this way of distinguishing
between communicative and open strategic action. In particular,
he has acknowledged the untenability of any "sharp distinction
between normatively authorized [requests] and simple
imperatives.' 22  Instead, Habermas now argues, from a
sociological perspective we see a "continuum" between purely "de
facto" power and "power transformed into normative authority.' 2
While at one end of the continuum is the pure or simple
imperative-his standard example is the bank robber's "Hands
up" demand-Habermas now admits that such an imperative is
only an "extreme case" or "limit case.' 2'  Rather than a
"categorial" difference between pure imperatives and normatively
authorized requests, Habermas maintains, there is only a
"difference of degree.' 125
With this concession, Habermas must abandon the idea that
pure imperatives exemplify open strategic action generally. If the
bank robber's command were the paradigm case, then open
strategic action would be a socially marginal form of action. And
that .would be inconsistent with the main line of Habermas's work.
A prominent feature of modern societies, Habermas argues, is the
development of "spheres of strategic action"-preeminently the
market.1 26  The category of open strategic action must be
understood more broadly than the "pure imperative" model would
suggest.
127
Habermas has not much elaborated on how we are to
conceive of open strategic action, if not along the lines of the pure
imperative. But from Habermas's preliminary specification of
121 See id. at 302.
122 See Jurgen Habermas, Reply to Skej, INQUIRY, Mar. 1985, at 112.
123 See Toward a Critique of Meaning, supra note 100, at 83.
124 See id. at 84; A Reply, supra note 87, at 239.
125 A Reply, supra note 87, at 239.
126 BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 14, at 26 ("[Tjhe functionally necessary
spheres of strategic action are growing.., in modern economic societies."); see also id. at
27 ("[T]he core of modern law consists of private rights that mark out the legitimate scope
of individual liberties and are thus tailored to the strategic pursuit of private interests.").
127 But cf COOKE, supra note 98, at 24 (mentioning the bank robber example and
"certain kinds of insults or curses" as the ways in which "Habermas has clarified what the
manifestly strategic use of language would look like").
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strategic action, together with other remarks scattered throughout
his work, we can construct at least a sketch. The paradigmatic case
of open strategic action seems to be competition among rational
opponents, each pursuing self-interested goals according to rules
of rational choice. Each tries to influence or steer each other's
choices, and each is aware that the other is operating in this way.
The choices of each are conditioned by their respective predictions
of the other's choices as well as by the consequences of their
interaction. Game theory, rational choice theory, and decision
theory, Habermas sometimes suggests, formalize this paradigmatic
case of open strategic action. 128
But even this paradigmatic case differs in important ways
from the norm-free, purely power-driven form of action that the
"6pure imperative" model described. Strategic competition,
Habermas acknowledges, typically takes place against a normative
backdrop.129 Strategic action in the marketplace, for example,
presupposes general acceptance of a variety of legal norms-such
as criminal-law norms that forbid some tactics or strategies and
permit others, norms of property law that outfit some with more
market power than their opponents, rules that define the
possibilities for different kinds of transaction, and the like. These
legal norms structure the participants' choices among strategies
and tactics. Further, apart from state-enforced law, informal social
norms may shape strategic interactions in particular spheres of
economic activity. Even paradigmatic cases of strategic action,
then, may involve the mutual recognition of legal and, social
norms.
Habermas's recognition that the pure imperative is only the
"limit case" of open strategic action, not the paradigmatic case, has
further consequences. In rejecting the "pure imperative" model,
Habermas recognized a "continuum" along which power relations
are more or less underwritten by social norms. This recognition
suggests a corresponding continuum within the concept of strategic
action, according to which instances of strategic action may be
more or less structured and coordinated by binding social norms
that the participants mutually recognize. If this is so, then strategic
interaction may shade more or less toward communicative action.
Open strategic action, in short, cannot be as "norm-free," or as
sharply distinguished from communicative action, as the "pure
128 See, e.g., A Reply, supra note 87, at 242 (game theory as model for strategic action);
id. at 243 (explaining game theory and decision theory as models, though actual strategic
action usually falls short of the standards of rationality these models postulate).
129 See, e.g., BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 14, at 25 ("Naturally, self-
interested action has always been fused with, or limited by, a normative order.").
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imperative" model suggested.
Similar observations apply on the other side of the
communicative/strategic distinction. In many actual instances of
communicative action, the sanctions Habermas considers
characteristic of strategic action may be ready to hand.
Habermas's own example of the flight attendant's "no smoking"
request to the passenger illustrates this point. While this request
raises a claim to normative validity, the passenger likely will not
get far by treating that claim as if it were readily criticizable. The
sanctions available to the flight attendant-even if never invoked,
or even referred to-likely will limit the extent to which the
normative claim, criticizable in principle, actually may be
criticized. This is not to deny the difference between the flight
attendant's normatively authorized request and the bank robber's
demand. But it is to suggest that, just as actual instances of
strategic action are not norm-free, so too are many actual instances
of communicative action far from power- or sanction-free.130
Habermas's point about the continuum of power relations suggests
a continuum between the "pure types" of communicative and
strategic action.
Habermas appears to have come to this conclusion. He now
describes interactions as "fall[ing] along a continuum" between
purely communicative and purely strategic action,' with most
actual situations presenting a "melange" of these types.'32 In fact,
Habermas's "discourse theory of law" preserves an important
place for action that reflects elements of both pure types: regulated
bargaining, and fair compromise. What Habermas insists upon is
not an on-or-off distinction among actual interactions in the world,
but a difference between two approaches to the dimensions of
130 Interactions in the workplace are a good example. As an instance of communicative
action, Habermas uses an instruction, by older and longer-serving construction workers to
a younger worker newly arrived at the site, to "fetch some beer." 2 THEORY OF
COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 3, at 121. While there may be a "normative
framework," id., authorizing such instructions to the less senior, that "framework" can be
seen also as a relation of power, with sanctions of various kinds at the disposal of senior
employees.
131 BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 14, at 139. In this passage Habermas
uses the terms "value-oriented" and "interest-governed" rather than "communicative"
and "strategic." But he associates the former pair of terms with the various concepts he
uses to distinguish communicative and strategic action. He explicates "value-oriented"
action in terms of an orientation toward reaching understanding, consensus, and the
"performative attitude" (discussed below in text); he analyzes "interest-governed" action
in terms of a balance of interests, "power positions," "threat potentials," and the
"objectivating attitude." See id. at 139-40. And just above he speaks of "mutual
understanding" and "influence" as the relevant mechanisms by which action is
coordinated. See id. at 139.
132 Id. at 139.
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validity he distinguishes. Habermas expresses this difference as
one between the "performative" attitude, constitutive for
communicative action, and the "objectivating" attitude that is
constitutive for strategic action.
By "performative," Habermas means (in this context)
something like "oriented toward validity." Within the
performative attitude, social norms are criticizable and in need of
justification.'33 By "objectivating," Habermas means that social
norms appear not so much as potentially justifiable or criticizable,
but simply as social facts, with more or less calculable
consequences attaching to their violation or obedience. Within
this objectivating attitude, norms are primarily conditions for, or
obstacles impeding, the success of the actor's self-interested
pursuits.34 (Think here of Holmes's "bad man."'35). Increasingly,
Habermas has come to rely on this opposition between
"performative" and "objectivating"-not just to distinguish
between communicative and strategic action, but also to mark the
difference between different methodological approaches to social
theory.'36 And the opposition between the corresponding
understandings of social norms-seen, respectively under the
aspects of "validity" [Geltung] and "facticity" [Faktizitait]-
underlies Habermas's theory of law and democracy."'
This distinction between the performative and objectivating
attitudes, like the other distinctions Habermas has invoked to
differentiate communicative and open strategic action, 38 does not
unequivocally and uncontroversially classify actual interactions as
purely communicative or purely strategic. The existence of
intermediate and borderline cases is unsurprising, however, and it
does not pose a fatal objection to Habermas's typology. The real
questions are whether Habermas's characterizations of
communicative and strategic action mark an intelligible
alternative-whether the pure types are sufficiently
distinguishable-and more important, whether the distinction and
133 See Toward a Critique of Meaning, supra note 100, at 80.
134 See BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 14, at 524 n.18 (noting that strategic
actors "encounter normative contexts, as well as other participants, only as social facts");
see also id. at 121, 448.
135 See Holmes, supra note 23.
136 See, e.g., Reconstruction and Interpretation in the Social Sciences, supra note 98, at
26-29.
137 The title of Habermas's recent book on law and democracy is Faktizitat und
Geltung-literally, "Facticity and Validity," but rendered in the English translation as
Between Facts and Norms.
138 Those other distinctions include: consensus and influence, validity and power,
reasons and sanctions, rational and empirical motivation, cooperation, and pursuit of self-
interest.
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typology mark useful differences for theoretical purposes.
This last question is the one I want to address. Habermas's
typology of rational action is not just an abstract classificatory
scheme for placing actual interactions in one box or the other, or
between boxes (though Habermas insists that it must be able to do
that too139). The distinction between communicative and strategic
action is designed with further purposes of social theory in mind.
2. Communicative Rationality and Discourse
One such purpose is to provide an account of the ways
modern societies manage conflict and dissensus. As will become
more clear below, a central premise of Habermas's theory of
modernity is that the risk of dissensus-disagreement as to plans
of action or as to claims about the world-increased with the
demise of traditional forms of authority and traditional world-
views." Habermas distinguishes three basic alternatives for
handling dissensus in simple interactions: attempting to resolve the
disagreement communicatively, continuing the interaction under
premises of striAtegic action, and breaking off the interaction
entirely.' Law, it will turn out, institutionalizes all three
possibilities. It creates spheres of action in which individuals may
pursue their interests without securing the agreement of others-
whether by refusing to interact, or by opting to interact
strategically. And law also establishes procedures through which
disagreements can be resolved more or less communicatively. The
mechanisms of action coordination Habermas distinguishes in his
typology of social action find analogues in his social theory of law.
A second purpose of Habermas's action theory is to rethink
and expand the idea of rationality. Most familiar accounts of
rationality-such as those found in economic theory, game theory,
decision theory and rational choice theory-are keyed toward the
problematics of instrumental or strategic action. Beginning from
the notion of communicative action, Habermas hopes to develop a
new conception of rationality, which he calls, unsurprisingly,
"communicative rationality." The idea of communicative
139 See, e.g., Toward a Critique of Meaning, supra note 100, at 81 (categories are "not
merely to be distinguished from each other analytically, but correspond to two different
interaction types").
140 See, e.g., BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, at 25-27.
141 See What is Universal Pragmatics?, supra note 106, at 3-4. Sometimes Habermas
mentions other possibilities, such as "carrying out straightforward repair work," or
continuing the interaction but avoiding the controversial issue. See BETWEEN FAcTS AND
NORMS, supra note 14, at 21.
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rationality, like the idea of communicative action, depends
centrally upon the notion of criticizability. Claims to validity are
essentially criticizable, and they may be supported or opposed with
reasons and argument. The criticizability of validity claims creates
the rational potential of communicative action-the possibility of
communicative rationality.
One way to develop the dimensions of Habermas's notion of
communicative rationality is to distinguish between everyday and
more reflective forms of communicative action. 42 Habermas's
example of the flight attendant's request to the passenger is an
example of everyday communicative action. If the passenger
responds to the request by demanding reasons, the flight attendant
likely will invoke the relevant federal regulation and explain that
he has authority to enforce it. Should the passenger demand more
justification than that-by, for example, questioning the FAA's
authority to pass such a regulation, or by invoking a putative
constitutional right to smoke at will-the flight attendant likely
will switch over to strategic action, mentioning the sanctions for
failure to comply and, if necessary, deploying those sanctions.
And so while the regulation offers a reason for compliance, and
one not entirely reducible to the mere fact of potential sanctions,
the role of rational criticism and justification is sharply
circumscribed. The fact that a claim is criticizable in principle does
not mean that criticisms and demands for justification always are
in place. In everyday contexts, the pressures of action often limit
the rational potential of communicative action.
When removed from the pressures of immediate action,
however, this rational potential may be developed more fully.
Habermas refers to various forms of "argumentation" or
"discourse," '143 in which participants pursue more methodically the
task of criticizing and defending the claims to validity Habermas
has identified. Here validity claims serve less as a means of
coordinating participants' goal-directed plans of action-as in
everyday communicative action-and more as an explicit theme of
communication and debate.
Habermas introduces the idea of discourse through various
142 See 1 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 5, at 25; J0rgen Habermas,
Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, in MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND
COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 98, at 116, 158; see also Reply to My Critics, supra
note 83, at 235 (distinguishing between "communicative action in the naive attitude" and
"reflectively achieved understanding").
143 Sometimes Habermas has given the term "discourse" a more narrow meaning than
"argumentation." See 1 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 5, at 23, 41-
42. In more recent writings, however, the terms seem to be synonymous. See COOKE,
supra note 98, at 31-32.
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"idealizations." Participants in discourse must have equal
opportunities to raise topics, arguments, and criticisms.1" The
situation must exclude all force "except the force of the better
argument," and it must exclude "all motives except that of a
cooperative search for the truth. 145  Habermas sometimes has
referred to these idealizations as describing an "ideal speech
situation, '  or alternatively, an "ideal communication
community." '47  While Habermas describes these conditions as
"general pragmatic presuppositions" of discourse,148 he is aware
that they are never completely fulfilled. Here it is a matter of
more and less, and Habermas is willing to speak of "discourse"
when these demanding conditions are "sufficiently fulfilled."'49
The ideal conditions are "presupposed" in actual communicative
practice to the extent that significant deviations are a prima facie
reason to question an apparent consensus that is reached-though
these deviations are of course not by themselves sufficient to
refute a claim upon which the participants have reached
agreement.
Discourses, Habermas says, are exceptional forms of
communicative action-"islands in the sea of practice.' 5 0
Nonetheless, Habermas claims, the institutionalization of
discursive practices-in contexts such as scientific research,
democratic procedure, and legal procedure-is a characteristic
feature of modern societies. These developments Habermas
interprets as a progressive realization of the rational potential
implicit in communicative action. In this way Habermas recasts
Max Weber's theory of "rationalization," focusing on the
realization-though only a partial and selective realization-of
14 See Juirgen Habermas, Wahrheitstheorien, in VORSTUDIEN UND ERGANZUNGEN
ZUR THEORIE DES KOMMUNIKATIVEN HANDELNS, supra note 111, at 177 [hereinafter
Wahrheitstheorien].
145 1 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 5, at 25. Habermas's
reference to "truth" should be read to consider the other "truth-analogous validity claims"
he identifies.
146 See, e.g., HABERMAS, Wahrheitstheorien, supra note 144, at 174-83; 1 THEORY OF
COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 5, at 25; JORGEN HABERMAS, Richard Rorty's
Pragmatic Turn, in ON THE PRAGMATICS OF COMMUNICATION 343, 365, 367 (Maeve
Cooke ed., 1998) [hereinafter Richard Rorty's Pragmatic Turn]; BETWEEN FACTS AND
NORMS, supra note 14, at 322-23; JURGEN HABERMAS, Remarks on Discourse Ethics, in
JUSTIFICATION AND APPLICATION: REMARKS ON DISCOURSE ETHICS 50 (Ciaran P.
Cronin trans., 1993).
147 See, e.g., Richard Rorty's Pragmatic Turn, supra note 146, at 365; BETWEEN FACTS
AND NORMS, supra note 14, at 323 (describing "ideal speech situation" and "ideal
communication community" as "equivalent").
148 1 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 5, at 25.
149 Id. at 25; BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 14, at 178.
150 Reply to My Critics, supra note 83, at 235.
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communicative rationality.
But for this task, Habermas needs a concept of society to
supplement his typology of social action. The first "level" of his
"two-level" theory presents society as the "lifeworld" of social
groups and communicative actors.
B. Lifeworld
One would not choose the ungainly term "lifeworld" unless
one wanted to mark a contrast with some other way of
understanding the world. The term originated in the later work of
the philosopher Edmund Husserl,5 ' who opposed it to the world as
constructed by the "objective sciences. "152 The lifeworld, for
Husserl, was the everyday, pretheoretical world of taken-for-
granted certainties. This "realm of original self-evidences"'' 3
provides the "grounding soil"'54 for all human activities, including
the scientific activity of constructing the "objective-scientific"
world."'55  Consistent with his method of transcendental
phenomenology, Husserl sought to map the "formal," "general,"
and "invariant" structures of the lifeworld as such. 56
This "ontology of the lifeworld,"'57 left largely unpublished at
Husserl's death in 1938,158 speaks more directly to the concerns of
transcendental phenomenology than to those of substantive social
theorizing. But it offered a starting point for the work of Alfred
Schutz, a social theorist and philosopher who was much influenced
by Max Weber as well as Husserl1 59  Schutz, who was more
interested than Husserl in the methodology of the social sciences-
and better informed as well'--attempted to describe the general
151 Alfred Schutz, who made the concept fruitful for social-scientific inquiry, "accepted
Husserl's authorship of this conception." HELMUT R. WAGNER, ALFRED SCHUTZ: AN
INTELLECTUAL BIOGRAPHY 288 (1983).
152 See EDMUND HUSSERL, THE CRISIS OF EUROPEAN SCIENCES AND
TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY (David Carr ed. & trans., 1970) (1937).
153 Id. at 127.
154 Id. at 131.
155 Id. at 130. See also id. at 121-35.
156 See id. at 135-89.
157 Id. at 173.
158 Husserl's analysis of the lifeworld occupies Part III of The Crisis of European
Sciences. This part remained unpublished until 1954, see David Carr, Translator's
Introduction, in HUSSERL, supra note 152, at xvi-xxi, though some scholars, including
Schutz, had access to it before publication.
159 See WAGNER, supra note 151, at 13-16, for a discussion of Weber's early influence
on Schutz.
160 See id. at 29; see generally id. at 287-327 (describing Schutz's critical appropriation
and transformation of Husserl's work).
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structures of the everyday, prescientific world in a way that would
be fruitful for social theory. Schutz, following Husserl, came to
call this world of everyday action and experience the "lifeworld. 161
1. The "Structural Components" of the Lifeworld
Habermas's initial presentation of the lifeworld concept
largely tracks Schutz's analysis. 62  The lifeworld is the
unproblematic, taken-for-granted setting163 in which actors are
located spatially, temporally, and socially." Actors encounter
both an objective or natural world of things and a social world of
other human beings.165 Their encounters with those worlds are
shaped by their past experiences. 66 But this lifeworld is essentially
shared or "intersubjective," not the creation or private preserve of
individual subjects.167  The "segment of the lifeworld" in which
particular actions or interactions take place is the "situation" of
action 68 The situation is a "context of relevance"69 circumscribed
161 1 say "came to call" because Schutz had published an important work that sounded
many of the same themes before Husserl's use of the term "lifeworld." See ALFRED
SCHUTZ, THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL WORLD (George Walsh & Frederick
Lehnert trans., 1967) (1932) (translation of Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt).
162 Habermas seems to rely in particular on a work Schutz left unpublished at his death
in 1959, entitled Strukturen der Lebenswelt [Structures of the Lifeworld]. Schutz's student,
Thomas Luckmann, has completed part of the work-using much of what Schutz had left
behind, but deleting some of it and adding some of his own material. See THOMAS
LUCKMANN, Preface to ALFRED SCHUTZ & THOMAS LUCKMANN, THE STRUCTURES OF
THE LIFEWORLD xvii-xviii, xxi-xxiv (Richard M. Zaner & H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr.
trans., 1973). Luckmann writes that although the final version is "not even the book I
think [Schutz] would have written," it is "as faithful as possible to the basic intention of the
project: the analysis of the structures of everyday life." For reasons of convenience, I refer
to "Schutz" rather than "Schutz and Luckmann" in the text.
I say Habermas "seems to rely" on this work because he cites it only after he has
sketched the concept of the lifeworld in Schutzian terms. See 2 THEORY OF
COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 3, at 126. As I observe in text accompanying notes
178-84, Habermas reads Schutz's account through his own theory of communicative
action.
163 See 2 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 3, at 124; SCHUTZ &
LuCKMANN, supra note 162, at 3-6.
164 See 2 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 3, at 123; SCHUTZ &
LUCKMANN, supra note 162, at 19, 35-92.
165 See 2 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 3, at 120, 122; SCHUTZ &
LUCKMANN, supra note 162, at 5-6.
166 See 2 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 3, at 121, 122 (describing
examples of misunderstanding that could arise if participants do not sufficiently share
common experiences); SCHUTZ & LUCKMANN, supra note 162, at 7-8.
167 2 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 3, at 125-26; SCHUTZ &
LUCKMANN, supra note 162, at 4-5, 15.
168 2 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 3, at 123; SCHUTZ &
LUCKMANN, supra note 162, at 113-18.
169 2 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 3, at 122; SCHUTZ &
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by a "horizon"'17 rather than by fixed boundaries: what is within
the horizon of relevance, and thus included in the situation of
action, depends upon the "theme"'7 ' of action and the actors'
"plans.'7 12  Actors interpret and define their situation,'73 and
formulate their plans, in reliance upon a "stock of knowledge"-
socially conditioned and transmitted, and differentially distributed
among a society's members.'74 Action, on this view, is the
"mastery of a situation,"'75 or, the realization of a plan.
But even in this preliminary sketch of the lifeworld concept,
Habermas introduces an important variation on Schutz's account.
Schutz links the lifeworld to the problematic of action in general-
in fact, to the problematic of "subjective experience" in general,
including (for example) imagining, dreaming, and fantasy as well
as action.'76 Habermas, by contrast, introduces the lifeworld as the
background not to experience in general, or even to action in
general, but as the background and "horizon" for specifically
communicative action.'77 The concept of the lifeworld, Habermas
says, is "complementary to that of communicative action."'78
Accordingly, Habermas develops his concept of the lifeworld
in terms familiar from his theory of communicative action. In
interpreting their situations and pursuing their plans, he says,
actors in "lifeworld" situations proceed consensually. Their
actions presuppose, or are directed toward establishing, "a
common definition of the situation."'79  On the basis of these
common situation definitions, they seek to harmonize their plans
LUCKMANN, supra note 162, at 19; id. at 182-228 (discussing the "relevance structures" of
the lifeworld).
170 2 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 3, at 121-23; SCHUTZ &
LUCKMANN, supra note 162, at 114-15.
17' 2 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 3, at 121-123; SCHUTZ &
LUCKMANN, supra note 162, at 186-95 (on "thematic relevance").
172 2 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 3, at 122-23; SCHUTZ &
LUCKMANN, supra note 162, at 19, 116-18.
173 See 2 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 3, at 122-23; SCHUTZ &
LUCKMANN, supra note 162, at 113-16.
174 2 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 3, at 124-25 (on the notion of
a "stock of knowledge"); id. at 122 (describing an example of locally or occupationally
shared custom unknown to an outsider); id. at 304-18 (distinguishing between "subjective"
stocks of knowledge and the "social" stock of knowledge, and analyzing the nonuniform
distribution of the social stock of knowledge).
'75 2 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 3, at 135, 149; SCHUTZ &
LUCKMANN, supra note 162, at 100, 113-18.
176 On fantasy, see SCHUTZ & LUCKMANN, supra note 162, at 28-32; on dreaming, see
id. at 32-35.
177 See 2 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 3, at 119 (explaining that
the lifeworld is "the horizon within which communicative actions are 'always already'
moving").
178 Id.; see also id. at 144, 204.
179 Id. at 121,127.
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of action." The mechanism for this cooperative process of
interpretation and action is the mechanism of communicative
action: mutual acceptance of claims to validity. With perhaps
unnecessary flourish, Habermas describes the lifeworld as "so to
speak, the transcendental site where speaker and hearer meet,
where they can reciprocally raise claims.., and where they can
criticize and confirm those validity claims, settle their
disagreements, and arrive at agreements."'81
This "communication-theoretical"'' 2  recasting of Schutz's
lifeworld concept leads Habermas to further revisions. A main
target is Schutz's notion of the "stock of knowledge," which
Habermas interprets as the "cultural patterns of interpretation,
evaluation, and expression" on which communicative actors rely
"to negotiate a common definition of a situation" and compatible
plans of action. 183 Even understood in this communication-
theoretical way, Habermas argues, the cultural "stock of
knowledge" cannot be the only resource on which communicative
actors rely. According to Habermas,
[t]he one-sidedness of the culturalistic concept of the lifeworld
becomes clear when we consider that communicative action is
not only a process of reaching understanding; in coming to an
understanding about something in the world, actors are at the
same time taking part in interactions through which they
develop, confirm, and renew their memberships in social groups
and their own identities. Communicative actions are not only
processes of interpretation in which cultural knowledge is
"tested against the world,"; they are at the same time processes
of social integration and of socialization."
Thus, the lifeworld resources on which communicative actors rely,
in interpreting their situations and harmonizing their plans, include
group memberships and personal identities, as well as the cultural
stock of knowledge. 85
180 See id. at 127.
181 Id. at 126.
182 Id. at 138.
183 Id. at 134.
184 Id. at 139; see also id. at 138 (Schutz's account of the lifeworld's resources is
"abridged in a culturalistic fashion").
185 See id. at 135:
Action, or mastery of situations, presents itself as a circular process in which the
actor is at once both the initiator of his accountable actions and the product of
the [cultural] tradition in which he stands, of the solidary groups to which he
belongs, of socialization and learning processes to which he is exposed.
The criticism of Schutz is not entirely fair. At the very least, he includes in the "stock of
knowledge" many of the skills, competences, and know-hows that Habermas places under
the heading of "personality."
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The items on this list are not drawn out of thin air. They
correspond to the culture/society/personality schema that Talcott
Parsons developed in American sociology.'86  According to
Habermas, culture, society, and personality are "the structural
components of the lifeworld."'87 He defines these "components"
as follows:
I use the term culture for the stock of knowledge from which
participants in communication supply themselves with
interpretations as they come to an understanding about
something in the world. I use the term society for the legitimate
orders through which participants regulate their memberships
in social groups and thereby secure solidarity. By personality I
understand the competences that make a subject capable of
speaking and acting, that put him in a position to take part in
processes of reaching understanding and thereby assert his ownidentity."
These initial definitions require some explication. First, with
respect to the "society" component, Habermas's terminological
choice is confusing. He is, at this point, analyzing society as
lifeworld, and thus it is peculiar to use the term "society" to
designate a mere component of the lifeworld. The term
"institutional component"'89 might better express Habermas's
intention. The component "society," Habermas says, is the system
of social institutions"9° that define group memberships and
coordinate interaction through binding norms and institutionalized
values. Generally Habermas includes within the societal
component items such as the constitutional framework of state
offices and central "legal institutions" like contract and property,'9'
as well as "the bases of constitutional law, the principles of
criminal law and penal procedure, and all regulation of punishable
1'86 See 1 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 5, at 158 (referring to the
"customary (since Parsons) division into.., society,.., culture, and.., personality"); see
also 2 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 3, at 133-34 (attributing the
schema to Durkheim).
187 2 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 3, at 134; see also id. at 135,
138,145,153,255,308, 356.
18 Id. at 138.
'19 See id. at 366 (referring to the lifeworld's "institutional components").
"90 See id. at 134 (referring to the societal component as "institutional orders"); id. at
141 (suggesting that "institutions" constitute the societal component); id. at 146 (referring
to the societal component as "the institutional system"); id. at 153; id. at 174 (referring to
"the societal component of the lifeworld-the system of institutions"); id. at 262 (referring
to the societal component as "institutional orders"); id. at 318 (referring to "the system of
institutions, that is,... the societal components of the lifeworld"); id. at 366 (referring to
"the institutional components of the lifeworld").
191 See id. at 266.
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offenses close to morality.119 2  We will see, however, that for
Habermas both the state and the law occupy a double status-he
analyzes each in "system" as well as "lifeworld" terms.'93
The "personality" component includes not just the speech-
and action-related competences that Habermas mentions in the
above definition, but also motivations.194 Habermas, of course, is
working at a high level of abstraction when he refers to
competences and motivations as a structural component of the
lifeworld, not just attributes of individual persons. What he has in
mind is something like a social stock of typical personal
competences and motivations, some subset of which individuals
develop through processes of socialization and continuing social
interaction. As with the distribution of knowledge, the
distribution of these competences and motivations is far from
uniform.
2. The Symbolic Reproduction of the Lifeworld
This account of culture, society, and personality as structural
components of the lifeworld is not just an abstract classification of
the resources on which communicative actors rely. Habermas uses
it to address the basic social-theoretical question of how a society
reproduces itself-how, that is, it maintains itself through time,
despite (or rather, through) changes in the content of cultural
tradition, institutional structure, and personal competences.1 5 He
distinguishes two aspects of social reproduction. The "symbolic
reproduction" of society as lifeworld is the reproduction of the
different components he has distinguished-culture, society, and
personality. The "material reproduction" of society as lifeworld
involves the "maintenance of the material substratum of the
lifeworld. 196  Material reproduction implicates the "purposive"
aspect of communicative action-"goal-directed interventions into
the objective world"197-while symbolic reproduction depends
more upon the aspect of mutual understanding.19 s
192 Id. at 365.
193 See infra text accompanying notes 426-37 (discussing THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE
ACTION); infra Part III.C (discussing the tension between Habermas's system/lifeworld
model and his more recent work on law and democracy).
194 See id. at 183, 276.
195 See id. at 136, 137 (stating that in order to develop a "theoretically fruitful"
conception of the lifeworld, we must "explain the reproduction of the lifeworld itself").
196 Id. at 138.
197 Id. at 232; see also id. at 138.
198 See id. at 140 (emphasis omitted).
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To each of the components of society-seen-as-lifeworld,
Habermas attributes a particular function in symbolic
reproduction. "Cultural reproduction" consists in the transmission
and renewal of cultural knowledge, so as to "secure[] a continuity
of tradition and coherence of knowledge sufficient for daily
practice."'" "Social integration" establishes social solidarity
through shared norms and institutionalized values. In so doing, it
coordinates interaction and "stabilizes the identity of groups to an
extent sufficient for everyday practice."20 "Socialization" operates
to develop personal identities, "secur[ing] for succeeding
generations the acquisition of generalized competences for action
and see[ing] to it that individual life histories are in harmony with
collective forms of life." 0' 1 Unsurprisingly-because Habermas
defines the lifeworld as the background for communicative
action-these reproductive processes operate primarily through
communicative action.202
Habermas's typology of reproductive processes makes clear
that the lifeworld components he distinguishes-culture, society,
and personality-are interrelated. The reproduction of any one
component, he says, contributes to the reproduction of the other
two as well. 03 And further, Habermas argues, any particular
communicative interaction both draws on, and helps reproduce,
each of the lifeworld's components:
In coming to an understanding with one another about their
situation, participants in interaction stand in a cultural tradition
that they at once use and renew; in coordinating their actions by
way of intersubjectively recognizing validity claims, they are at
once relying on membership in social groups and strengthening
the integration of those same groups; through participating in
interactions with competently acting reference persons, the
growing child internalizes the value orientations of his social
group and acquires generalized capacities for action." 4
Nothing guarantees that the reproduction of culture, society,
and personality will be successful. For that reason, Habermas's
typology addresses also the "manifestations of crisis" that appear
with "disturbances" in the various reproductive processes.0 ' Here,
199 Id. (emphasis omitted).
200 Id. at 141.
201 Id.
202 See id. at 86, 107, 137-38, 139, 142-43, 144 fig. 23, 232, 261, 266, 267, 288; see also A
Reply, supra note 87, at 227, 234, 268, 281 ("[I]t is ... a matter of definition that life-worlds
can be integrated only through communicative action (and norms and values).").
203 See 2 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 3, at 142 fig. 21.
204 Id. at 137.
205 Id. at 143 fig. 22.
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too, Habermas sees the various lifeworld components as
interrelated. Just as successful reproduction of one component
contributes to the reproduction of the other two, Habermas
argues, so does disturbance in any one of the reproductive
processes impinge upon the other two.20
6
More important than the names Habermas assigns these nine
crisis tendencies °7 is the place that they collectively occupy in his
critical social theory. They operate as indices for the
"pathological" developments he diagnoses in contemporary
societies. As we will see, the general thesis of Theory of
Communicative Action is that the "rationalization of the
lifeworld"-the realization of communicative rationality in culture,
society, and personality-makes possible and necessary the
development of economic and administrative systems that are
"uncoupled" from the action-coordinating, socially integrating
mechanism of communicative action. The "hypertrophic"
development of these systems, Habermas argues, causes "the
penetration of forms of economic and administrative rationality"2 "
into "communicatively structured areas of life, '"2°9 with resulting
disturbances in cultural reproduction, social integration, and
socialization. These crisis tendencies in the "symbolic
reproduction of the lifeworld," then, are the criteria by which
Habermas identifies social pathologies.
In subsequent sections of this article, I will suggest difficulties
in Habermas's argument for this thesis. For now, it is enough to
note why Habermas might be attracted to this strategy of
argument. The thesis's premises seem normatively minimalist: he
appeals not to freedom or justice or democracy or autonomy or
some other value, but to functional necessity.20 And who can
206 See id.
207 See id. for the list of names.
208 Id. at 330.
209 Id. at 304.
210 See id. at 285 (referring to "the deformations that inevitably turn up when forms of
economic and administrative rationality encroach upon areas of life whose internal
communicative structures cannot be rationalized according to those criteria"); id. at 305
("[I1n developed capitalist societies," the "mechanisms of system integration encroach
upon spheres of action that can fulfill their functions only under conditions of social
integration."); id. at 322 (system "media" of money and power "fail to work in domains of
cultura reproduction, social integration, and socialization; they cannot replace the action-
coordinating mechanism of mutual understanding in these functions"); id. at 369 (referring
to lifeworld "contexts of action that by functional necessity are based on mutual
understanding as a mechanism for coordinating action"); id. at 372-73 (if "areas of life that
are functionally dependent on social integration through values, norms, and consensus...
fall[] prey to the systemic imperatives of economic and administrative subsystems," then
they are "converted over.., to a principle of sociation that is, for them, dysfunctional");
id. at 403 (referring to the threat to "the symbolic structures of the lifeworld" when
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argue with functional necessity?
The answer is that everyone can. As Habermas pointed out
more than thirty years ago, against then-dominant biological
conceptions of social systems theory, it is extremely difficult to
define, in an uncontroversial way, the equilibrium state and
reproductive parameters for sociocultural systems."' This
observation calls into question whether Habermas's strategy can
be as normatively parsimonious as it first seems. To determine, for
example, whether a process of cultural reproduction has been
successful or pathological, one would have to decide (in
Habermas's terms) whether "the transmission and renewal of
cultural knowledge" has "secured a continuity of tradition and
coherence of knowledge sufficient for daily practice." And to
make this determination, one would have to take a position on
some of the normative issues that, at first glance, were avoided by
recourse to "functional necessity." For example: is a cultural
tradition best "continued" when it has been preserved without
"systemic imperatives" penetrate into "areas where the action-coordinating mechanism of
reaching understanding is functionally necessary").
211 After stating two "preconditions" prescribed for functional explanation-a
sufficiently clear distinction between system and environment, and identification of the
system's equilibrium state-Habermas wrote:
In biology, a functionalist explanation can generally satisfy the stated
preconditions without difficulty. A biological organism is by nature a delimited
system; and the state in which an organism reproduces its life can easily be
identified through a series of important life processes (metabolism). In
sociology, on the other hand, both preconditions are either difficult to fulfill or
cannot be fulfilled at all.... [While the first difficulty might not be
insuperable,] ... [t]he other difficulty, the need for an adequately reliable
identification of the equilibrium state, is fundamental in nature. The
reproduction of social life is not determined through values that can be grasped
descriptively, as is that of organic life. Physical survival is a necessary but in no
instance sufficient condition for the maintenance of social systems. No one can
find in social processes important life functions that suffice to define the
maintenance of the system in a state of equilibrium, as is the case with organic
functions in living creatures.
ON THE LOGIC OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES, supra note 7, at 82-83.
Habermas made similar observations in his 1973 work, Legitimation Crisis, though
this time referring to functionalist "systems theory" (Parsons, Luhmann) rather than
simply to functionalism. See LEGITIMATION CRISIS, supra note 4, at 2-3. He goes on to
say, of sociocultural rather than biological systems:
The same system modification can be conceived of equally well as a learning
process and change or as a dissolution process and collapse of the system. It
cannot be unambiguously determined whether a new system has been formed or
the old one has merely regenerated itself.
Id. at 3. To the same effect are his remarks in Theory of Communicative Action:
From his perspective as an observer, the systems analyst can judge whether...
disequilibria reach a critical point only if he can refer to clearly identifiable
survival limits, as he can with organisms. There is no comparably clear-cut
problem of death in the case of social systems.
2 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 3, at 292.
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substantial change, or when it has been subjected to rigorous
critical examination and transformation? One's answer to this
question will influence whether one sees, for example, revision of a
prevailing literary canon as consistent with successful cultural
reproduction or as pathological. Similarly, the question whether
knowledge has been transmitted to a degree "sufficient for daily
practice" may require the theorist to decide whose daily practice
matters, or matters most, and what that daily practice should look
like. How much does the ordinary citizen need to know about
politics? About high culture? Whether one sees the present
distribution of knowledge as normal or pathological is a matter of
political controversy. Similar observations would apply to the
other two reproductive processes Habermas identifies."'
Habermas, of course, is aware that diagnoses of social crisis
cannot be uncontroversial. He would resist the suggestion,
however, that the matter is simply a matter of the observing
theorist's politics. Instead, he suggests, one can speak of crisis to
the extent that-and only to the extent that-a society's members
experience their situation as such.213 As Habermas acknowledges,
this question of how members of a society experience social
change requires empirical research. 214  His own efforts, however,
tend in a more strongly theoretical direction-toward formulating
an hypothesis that could guide this empirical research.2 15  The
hypothesis is based on what he takes to be a tension between the
requirements of a "rationalized lifeworld" and the "imperatives"
of the economic and administrative "systems." Habermas's
argument thus depends on how he specifies the "rationalization of
the lifeworld."
212 With respect to social integration, for example, "liberals" and "republicans" would
differ as to necessary breadth and depth of a consensus about values. With respect to
socialization, egalitarians and elitists would differ as to the proper distribution of
competences.
213 See 2 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 3, at 292 ("The social
scientist can speak of crises only when relevant social groups experience systematically
induced structural changes as critical to their continued existence and feel their identities
threatened."); LEGITIMATION CRISIS, supra note 4, at 3 ("[O]nly when members of a
society experience structural alterations as critical for continued existence and feel their
social identity threatened can we speak of crises."); cf ON THE LOGIC OF THE SOCIAL
SCIENCES, supra note 7, at 82-83 ("[T]he criterion for historical life and survival is
dependent on the interpretations that have validity in a social system.").
214 See 2 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 3, at 375-76 (stating the
"assumption" (or rather, hypothesis) that crisis tendencies are to be expected "when
systemic imperatives force their way into domains of cultural reproduction, social
integration, and socialization," and noting that "this assumption needs to be tested
empirically"); id. at 391 ("The analysis of lifeworld pathologies calls for an (unbiased)
investigation of tendencies and contradictions.").
215 See id. at 356 (to combat the danger of theoretical "overgeneralization," one "must
be able to specify at least the type of empirical research that is appropriate").
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3. The Rationalization of the Lifeworld
In the history of social theory,216  the notion of
"rationalization" is most closely associated with Max Weber.
Weber's introduction to his studies of the world religions 217
mentions the following historical developments under the heading
of "Occidental rationalism": modern empirical and experimental
science; systematic theology; a systematized, formalized, and
predictable law; various developments in music, including Western
systems of harmony, written notation, and innovations in
instrumentation; the Gothic vault and dome in architecture; the
technique of perspective in painting; the development and market
circulation of printed literature; the modern university; specifically
Western forms of bureaucratic administration, with technically and
legally trained officials; periodically elected parliaments connected
to a party system; the capitalist enterprise with its rational
organization of wage labor; rationalized forms of economic
calculation and action; capital markets; technological employment
of scientific knowledge; and a rational vocational ethic (the
Protestant ethic).218  The breadth of this list indicates the
comprehensiveness of Weber's notion of rationalization. But it
raises questions as to how this list is to be ordered; and whether
"rationalization" bears the same sense throughout.19
Habermas imposes order upon this "confusing 20 list of
developments by reading Weber through Parsons's
culture/society/personality schema 221-the schema that organizes
216 As opposed to psychology, where the term "rationalization" has a very different
sense.
217 The essay appears as the Author's Introduction in MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT
ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM 13 (Talcott Parsons trans., 1958) (1902).
218 See id. at 13-27.
219 Weber himself raised this problem:
We have to remind ourselves in advance that 'rationalism' may mean very
different things. It means one thing if we think of the kind of rationalization the
systematic thinker performs on the image of the world: an increasing theoretical
mastery of reality by means of increasingly precise and abstract concepts.
Rationalism means another thing if we think of the methodical attainment of a
definitely given and practical end by means of an increasingly precise calculation
of adequate means. These types of rationalism are very different, in spite of the
fact that ultimately they belong inseparately together .... The rationalization of
life conduct with which we have to deal here can assume unusually varied forms.
MAX WEBER, The Social Psychology of the World Religions, in FROM MAX WEBER:
ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 267, 293 (H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds. and trans., 1946)
(1915) [hereinafter FROM MAX WEBER].
220 1 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 3, at 158.
221 Id.
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Habermas's own account of the structures of society as lifeworld.
He distinguishes, accordingly, among rationalization of the cultural
tradition, rationalization of basic social institutions, and the
rationality of personal motivations, competences, and dispositions.
Following Weber, Habermas sees the rationalization of
culture as a process of differentiation among "spheres of value":
science in the "cognitive" sphere, law and morality in the
"evaluative" dimension, and autonomous art in the "expressive"
dimension.222 This conception of the different cultural spheres
corresponds closely to Habermas's account of the various validity
claims raised in communicative action. The correspondence is
particularly apparent with respect to the cognitive and evaluative
spheres: science, Habermas notes, focuses on questions of
propositional truth, and law and morality focus on questions of
normative rightness. 2 3  With respect to art, the fit is looser.
Whereas the third validity-claim Habermas attributed to
communicative action was "sincerity," the value-standard he
connects to art is "authenticity. ' 224 By "authenticity," Habermas
seems to mean authenticity in the expression of an artist's
subjectivity.225 In this way there is at least an analogical connection
between the validity claims of "sincerity" and "authenticity."
Further, and again following Weber, Habermas finds in each of
these dimensions, at the transition to modernity, a "cultural system
of action" that institutionalizes discourse with respect to the
relevant claim. The "scientific enterprise," connected in large part
with universities, professionalizes scientific inquiry. The "artistic
enterprise" produces, distributes, and criticizes artistic and literary
works. Religious associations specialize in questions of morality.
Finally, with respect to legal questions, Habermas locates "the
legal system," which he understands to include "specialized
juridical training," professionalized scholarly discussion of legal
issues,226 as well as "public justice." In these ways, cultural
rationalization realizes the rational potential in communicative
action.
Habermas approaches more warily Weber's account of the
rationalization of personality and society. For Weber, what a
theory of rationalization must explain is the development of the
modern bureaucratic state and capitalist economy, together with
222 Id. at 167 fig. 3.
223 See id. at 180.
224 Id.
225 See id. at 161.
226 He refers here to "scientific jurisprudence." The German word "wissenschaftlich,"
translated as "scientific," has a broader connotation than its English counterpart, meaning
something like "systematic" and "professionalized."
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the methodically rational pattern of life conduct-the Protestant
ethic of labor in one's calling-that served the rationalizing
developments in state and economy. According to Habermas, this
explanatory strategy focuses too narrowly on the path
modernization actually took, and not enough on the rational
potential left unexhausted. One reason Weber took this tack
concerns his postulate of social-scientific value-freedom, which
prevents him from giving systematic significance to his occasional
comments that "rationalization," as it actually has played out, has
led to pathological and irrational consequences .22  Habermas, as a
critical social theorist, is not burdened by that postulate. The
other reason, according to Habermas, concerns limitations in
Weber's theory of action, and accordingly, in his theory of
rationality. Weber lacked a concept of communicative action and
communicative rationality. Both of these features of Weber's
approach, Habermas claims, lead Weber to miss some of the
senses in which modern societies have been rationalized and to
pass over the question whether the project of rationalization, as it
actually has unfolded, has been selective orincomplete 28
227 The classic instance is his closing to The Protestant Ethic:
The Puritan wanted to work in a calling; we are forced to do so. For when
asceticism was carried out of monastic cells into everyday life, and began to
dominate worldly morality, it did its part in building the tremendous cosmos of
the modern economic order. This order is now bound to the technical and
economic conditions of machine production which today determine the lives of
all the individuals who are born into this mechanism, not only those directly
concerned with economic acquisition, with irresistible force. Perhaps it will so
determine them until the last ton of fossilized coal is burnt. In [the Puritan
theologian] Baxter's view the care for external goods should only lie on the
shoulders of the 'saint like a light cloak, which can be thrown aside at any
moment.' But fate decreed that the cloak should become an iron cage.
Since asceticism undertook to remodel the world and to work out its ideals in
the world, material goods have gained .an increasing and finally an inexorable
power over the lives of men as at no previous period in history. Today the spirit
of religious asceticism-whether finally, who knows?-has escaped from the
cage. But victorious capitalism, since it rests on mechanical foundations, needs
its support no longer. The rosy blush of its laughing heir, the Enlightenment,
seems also to be irretrievably fading, and the idea of duty in one's calling prowls
about in our lives like the ghost of dead religious beliefs....
No one knows who will live in this cage in the future, or whether at the end
of this tremendous development entirely new prophets will arise, or there will be
a great rebirth of old ideas and ideals, or, if neither, mechanized petrification,
embellished with a sort of convulsive self-importance. For of the last stage of this
cultural development, it might well be truly said: "Specialists without spirit,
sensualists without heart; this nullity imagines that it has attained a level of
civilization never before achieved."
But this brings us to the world of judgments of value and of faith, with which
this purely historical discussion need not be burdened ....
WEBER, supra note 211, at 181-82.
228 See 1 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 5, at 216-22.
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Three conditions must be satisfied, according to Habermas,
before the reproduction of the lifeworld can be called its
rationalization. The first builds on the idea of differentiation with
which Weber approached the problem of cultural rationalization.
Habermas presents the initial point of this rationalization process
as one in which a mythically based cultural tradition reigns
supreme, not only underwriting the interpretive schemes of a
society's members, but determining social roles and group
memberships, fixing a relatively concrete moral code, prescribing
procedures and standards for political institutions, fixing the
division of labor and limiting the extent of individual economic
initiative, and determining from the outset who will be able to
acquire which competences and skills.229 Just as the rationalization
of culture involves the differentiation of three spheres of value, so
the rationalization of the lifeworld as a whole involves the
differentiation of the "components" culture, society, and
personality. Society, or, the institutional order, differentiates itself
from the cultural tradition through a "gradual uncoupling of the
institutional system from worldviews," with the result that "formal
procedures for positing and justifying norms," rather than mythic
tradition, establishes the legitimacy of social institutions.30 The
differentiation of the personality component appears in the
"extension of the scope of contingency for establishing
interpersonal relations"-that is, the greater possibilities for
individual initiative in establishing social relations and acquiring
competences and motivations.231 And to the extent that the
cultural tradition is disentangled from the operation of social
institutions, "the renewal of traditions depends more and more on
individuals' readiness to criticize and their ability to innovate. 232
What Habermas means with this sketchy account is that the
cultural tradition loses much of its prejudicial power over the
course of social interaction:
These trends can establish themselves only insofar as the yes/no
decisions that carry everyday communicative practice no longer
go back to an ascribed normative consensus, but issue from the
cooperative interpretation processes of participants themselves.
Thus they signal a release of the rationality potential inherent in
communicative action. 33
The other two conditions Habermas sets for the
229 See id. at 156-59.
230 2 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 3, at 146.
231 Id.
232 Id.
233 Id.
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rationalization of the lifeworld-a differentiation between form
and content, and an increasing "reflexivity" in the lifeworld's
symbolic reproduction-can be considered together in their effects
on each of the three lifeworld components. For culture, the
differentiation between form and content means that the "core,
identity-securing traditions" lose the concreteness of mythical
worldviews and develop into abstract basic values (such as
autonomy, liberty, and the like), as well as formal procedures and
structures for communication and argumentation.234 The increased
"reflexivity" of cultural reproduction arises with the
institutionalization of the cultural systems of action Weber
mentioned: 235 the academy and scientific laboratory, institutions of
professional legal training and scholarship, religious associations,
and the community of artistic creation and criticism. These
institutions and practices subject the cultural tradition to ongoing
criticism and revision. Culture is not merely reproduced, in the
sense of being carried forward unchanged; it is critically
appropriated and discursively transformed.
In the institutional order, the trend toward a differentiation
between form and content brings general moral and legal
principles that are "less and less tailored to concrete forms of
life. ' 236 Here Habermas might have in mind conceptions of the
moral agent and legal person that increasingly abstract from
particular characteristics, such as status, class, religious affiliation,
ancestry, and eventually race and sex, as well as the sense that
particular norms need to be justified not just traditionally but in
terms of more general principles. Here, too, Habermas
emphasizes the development of formal procedures for creating and
justifying norms, with democratic procedures figuring as
particularly important. With an implicit contrast to Weber's more
sober assessment of modern democracy,3 Habermas writes:
Mead and Durkheim... stress the evolutionary significance of
democracy: democratic forms of political will-formation are not
only the result of a power shift in favor of the carrier strata of
the capitalist economic system; forms of discursive will-
formation are established in them. And these affect the quasi-
naturalness of traditionally legitimated domination in a similar
way, even as modern natural science, jurisprudence with
234 Id.
235 Id.
236 Id.
237 Weber is said to have remarked of democracy: "In a democracy the people choose a
leader in whom they trust. Then the chosen leader says, 'Now shut up and obey me.'
People and party are no longer free to interfere in his business .. " H.H. Gerth & C.
Wright Mills, Introduction, in FROM MAX WEBER, supra note 219, at 3, 42.
[Vol. 23:2
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specialized training, and autonomous art break down the quasi-
naturalness of ecclesiastical traditions.38
The democratic process is "reflexive," in two senses. First, the
creation and justification of norms is itself normatively regulated.
Second, the democratic institutionalization of political discourse
allows for a reflective, or critical, attitude toward traditional norms
and institutions.
In the "personality" component of the lifeworld, the
separation between form ,and content brings an increasing
emphasis on "formal competences. ' '239 With the universalization of
at least basic formal education, individuals acquire generalized
competences-reading and quantitative skills, for example-that
are applicable in many different settings, not just in a particular
task or craft.24 The professionalization of formal education,
together with the development of social-scientific disciplines
surrounding child-rearing and education, counts as an increased
"reflexivity" in the socialization process. Here, too, traditional
patterns increasingly are subjected to critical scrutiny and
211revision.
In all these ways, according to Habermas, the symbolic
reproduction of the lifeworld's "structural components" has
brought a communicative rationalization, or, the "release of the
rationality potential in communicative action. '4 2 Running through
this account is an emphasis on three related points. First, with the
communicative rationalization of the lifeworld, social interaction
comes to depend more on communicatively achieved consensus, as
opposed to consensus prescribed in advance by tradition. Second,
this rationalization has meant an increasing importance of
discourse, and not just naive or unreflective communicative action.
Third, the rationalization of the lifeworld has brought the
institutionalization of discourse, not just its episodic eruption.
4. The Material Reproduction of the Lifeworld and
the Limits of the Lifeworld Perspective
Habermas's account of society as lifeworld is not yet
238 2 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 3,-at 146-47.
239 Id. at 146.
240 See id. ("the cognitive structures acquired in the socialization process are
increasingly detached from the content of cultural knowledge with which they were at first
integrated," and "[tihe objects in connection with which formal competences can be
exercised become increasingly variable").
241 See id. at 147.
242 Id. at 77; see also id. at 88, 146, 180, 288.
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complete. The notion of communicative rationalization is part of
the more general notion of the lifeworld's "symbolic
reproduction." In introducing the notion of symbolic
reproduction, however, I mentioned that Habermas distinguishes
it from the "material reproduction" of society viewed as lifeworld.
By the latter, Habermas means chiefly the organized production,
distribution, and consumption of goods and services, as well as the
society's external and internal defense.243 He has argued that
symbolic reproduction operates through communicative action,
and particularly, through the "communicative acts" that
coordinate communicative action-paradigmatically, speech acts
that raise, criticize, defend, accept, or reject claims to truth,
rightness, or truthfulness. Material reproduction, he says,
implicates the "purposiveness"-the realization of plans through
interventions in the world-that is the other aspect of
communicative action, beyond reaching mutual understanding.244
Material reproduction, then, may involve communicative action,
particularly in the form of coordinated, cooperative social labor.245
But not necessarily or exclusively. It may involve, also, the
success-oriented conduct he called "strategic action. 246
This connection between strategic action and material
reproduction raises an obvious question. Habermas, we saw, has
defined the lifeworld in terms of specifically communicative
action.247 Thus to the extent that material reproduction depends
upon strategic action, it would seem to be inaccessible, as a matter
of definition, from the "lifeworld" perspective Habermas has been
developing.
Habermas, however, does not move quite so quickly. The
theoretical approach that sees society as lifeworld does not "simply
filter[] out" questions concerning material reproduction.248
Further, despite Habermas's definition of the lifeworld in terms of
communicative action, he allows in a number of passages-albeit
usually in the form of an afterthought or an admission-that
strategic action, too, can be analyzed in "lifeworld" terms.2 49 The
243 See id. at 160.
244 Id. at 232.
245 See id. at 138.
246 See Remarks on the Concept of Communicative Action, supra note 87, at 174 ("Both
strategic and communicative actions participate in the material reproduction of the
lifeworld which occurs via the medium of purposive activity.").
247 See supra text accompanying notes 176-88.
248 2 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 3, at 151. However, in Mead's
work, "[t]he material reproduction of society-securing its physical maintenance both
externally and internally-is blended out of the picture of society understood as a
communicatively structured lifeworld." Id. at 110.
249 Id. at 148 ("From the internal perspective of the lifeworld, society is represented as a
[Vol. 23:2
HeinOnline -- 23 Cardozo L. Rev. 526 2001-2002
SYSTEM AND LIFE WORLD
concession is wise, although underplayed. Strategic action draws
on the same "lifeworld" resources as does communicative action.
As Habermas has acknowledged, except for the "limit case" of a
criminal demand, even strategic interaction presupposes the
parties' acceptance of legal norms that exclude some strategies or
tactics and permit others, and often strategic competitors
recognize extralegal norms as well." ° "[S]elf-interested action,"
Habermas says, "has always been fused with, or limited by, a
normative order" 251 -the normative order that Habermas calls the
"societal component" of the lifeworld. Equally evident is the fact
that in interpreting their situations and formulating their plans,
strategic actors rely on the "stock of knowledge" that Habermas
describes as the cultural tradition. Certainly, also, strategic action
both relies upon and develops the competences and motivations
Habermas analyzes under the heading of "personality." None of
this is surprising. As Schutz suggested, the "lifeworld perspective"
refers us to the problematic of action in general-even if
Habermas is right that communicative action carries the main
burden in reproducing what he calls the symbolic structures of the
lifeworld.
Habermas ultimately does conclude that the analysis of
material reproduction calls for a different kind of approach, based
on a modified version of Talcott Parsons's social systems theory.2
But the argument is not simply a matter of drawing a conclusion
from a definition of the lifeworld that excludes strategic action.
Habermas in fact presents two sets of arguments for why the
"lifeworld" or action-theoretical perspective must be
supplemented with a systems-theoretical approach. The first
concerns what he calls the "fictions" of "hermeneutic idealism";2 53
the second (and more persuasive) addresses more directly the
network of communicatively mediated cooperation, with strategic relations and ruptures
inserted into it."); id. at 150 (linking the "lifeworld" perspective to communicative action,
but "leaving space, of course, for the alternative of acting strategically when consensus
breaks down"); id. at 154 ("[a]ctors have always been able to she[a]r off from an
orientation to mutual understanding, adopt a strategic attitude, and objectify normative
contexts into something in the objective world"); BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra
note 14, at 21 (possibility of strategic action in the context of the lifeworld when consensus
breaks down); id. at 524 n.18 (strategic action is possible "in the lifeworld," but the
lifeworld "background" is here "neutralized in its normative force"); cf 2 THEORY OF
COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 3, at 121 (referring to the possibility of "draw[ing]
upon the means of strategic action, [though] with an orientation toward coming to a
mutual understanding," when participants in communicative action do not share sufficient
assumptions to make direct communication possible in the first instance).
250 See supra text accompanying notes 122-29.
251 BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 14, at 25.
252 See infra Parts II.C.1-2.
253 2 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 3, at 148, 149.
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organization and operation of modern complex societies.
A theoretical approach that confines itself to the lifeworld
concept, Habermas says, falls prey to three "fictions." The first is
the idea that actors are autonomous in a (very) strong sense: that
they control their situations of action and the consequences of
their actions. In this picture, society consists in relations fashioned
"with the will and consciousness of adult members," and fashioned
in that way only.254 The second fiction is that "culture is
independent of external constraints." From the perspective of a
"member[]" of a lifeworld, Habermas says, culture is so
fundamental to the interpretation of situations and the
formulation of plans that "it is strictly meaningless ... to inquire
whether the culture in whose light they deal... is empirically
dependent on anything else." '255  The third fiction is that
communicative actors "encounter one another in a horizon of
unrestricted possibilities of mutual understanding," '256 assuming
necessarily "that they could, in principle, arrive at an
understanding about anything and everything." '257 From this
perspective-"the internal perspective of participants [in] a
sociocultural lifeworld"-the process of reaching understanding is
"basically transparent," and "no force can gain a footing.""25 These
three "fictions"-the autonomy of actors, the independence of
culture, and the transparency of communication-are according to
Habermas built into the self-understanding of both everyday
actors and social theorists who examine the world from everyday
actors' perspective. And because they are fictions, some approach
must be developed to supplement the action-theoretical analysis of
society as lifeworld.
Perhaps these arguments might be telling against some
versions of interpretive sociology, but not against the approach
Habermas has developed. The idea that actors are purely
autonomous and fashion their own world conflicts with
Habermas's initial account of the lifeworld as the taken-for-
granted, pregiven background of action that remains largely
invisible to social actors. 9 It conflicts also with his admissions
elsewhere that we can comprehend unintended consequences
within the "lifeworld" approach.26 The idea that culture is
254 Id. at 149.
255 Id.
256 Id.
257 Id. at 150.
258 Id.
219 See supra text accompanying notes 162-65.
260 2 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 3, at 148 (Although the
lifeworld perspective presents society "as a network of communicatively mediated
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independent of everything else conflicts with Habermas's account
of the way in which the three "structural components" of the
lifeworld are interrelated, both in their capacity as resources for
social action and in their reproduction.2 61 And finally, the idea that
communication is transparent and forceless conflicts with
Habermas's account of strategic action-particularly his account of
the deception or self-deception he classifies as concealed strategic
action-together with his admission that strategic action is not
excluded from the lifeworld.262 Habermas's account of these
"fictions of hermeneutic idealism" suggests a thinker eager to
move on with a systems-theoretical approach-for reasons we still
have not discovered-not real difficulties in the theoretical
approach we have considered so far.
The other set of arguments for supplementing the lifeworld
approach centers around the problem of social complexity. The
communicative rationalization of the lifeworld is part of a trend
toward greater complexity. If agreement is not secured in advance
by tradition, but depends upon the interpretive and discursive
achievements of participants, then the possibility of agreement
becomes more burdensome and risky.2 63 And the problem of
coordinating action becomes more difficult. One way in which
modern societies have managed this greater risk of dissensus,
according to Habermas, is through the development of generalized
"media" such as money and power."6 The systems that develop
around these media, Habermas argues, coordinate action and
integrate society in a way fundamentally different from the way
those functions are fulfilled through communicative action and
consensus concerning validity claims.
The usual way Habermas introduces this difference is through
the distinction between action orientations and action
consequences. 65 Communicative action, with its "mechanism of
mutual understanding[,] harmonizes the action orientations of
participants."' 66 By this he means that communicative actors are
cooperation, with strategic relations and ruptures inserted into it[, ... ]" "[t]his is not to say
that every contingency, every unintended consequence, every unsuccessful coordination,
every conflict is expunged from this view."); A Reply, supra note 87, at 253 ("The problem
of unintended action consequences can, of course.... be treated from the perspective of
the lifeworld."); cf Thomas McCarthy, Complexity and Democracy, in COMMUNICATIVE
ACTION: ESSAYS, supra note 82, at 137 ("we do not need the paraphernalia of social
systems theory to identify unintended consequences.").
261 See supra text accompanying notes 203-06.
262 See supra text accompanying notes 111-39.
263 See 2 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 3, at 182-83, 262.
264 See id. at 180-81, 183, 261-63, 272, 276, 281.
265 See id. at 117, 150, 186-87.
266 Id. at 150; see also id. at 233.
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oriented toward reaching agreement with each other, or (if an
agreement already has been reached) they are oriented toward
that agreement. The interaction is coordinated through this
agreement. And at a more encompassing level, society itself is
integrated through a general consensus about institutionalized
norms and values. So it appears, at least, from the perspective of a
theory of communicative action.
According to Habermas, interactions steered by the "media"
around which the economic and administrative systems develop-
money and power-are coordinated through action consequences.
By this he means that actors in, for example, a monetary
transaction may be indifferent whether they share some mutual
commitment to norms or values. Each participant is oriented
toward her own success. In that sense, then, the actors'
orientations are not, as in the case of communicative action,
congruent or even necessarily complementary. What coordinates
interaction in this situation, and particularly what binds together a
network of market transactions, is the "functional[] intermeshing
[of] action consequences." '267 Habermas calls this form of societal
cohesion "system integration," as opposed to the "social
integration" that binds a social lifeworld together through
normative consensus." To understand the way in which system
integration operates through "nonintended interconnections" of
action, 69 Habermas argues, we need some version of systems
theory.
Surely Habermas is right that we cannot understand the
operations of a complex society if we see it entirely from the
perspective of actors, their intentions, and their orientations. As
he suggests, markets, and perhaps other mechanisms as well,
coordinate interaction and integrate a society in a way irreducible
to communicative agreement and a consensus about norms and
values. Two difficulties remain, however.
First, even at this point, an abstractly polarizing tendency
appears in Habermas's conception of the relation between the
lifeworld, on one hand, and the "media-steered" economic and
administrative systems, on the other. He describes the market as
"norm-free,""27 as contrasted with the normatively dense contexts
267 Id.
268 See id. at 117-18, 150-51, 186-87.
269 Id. at 117.
270 Id. at 150 (in the context of introducing the idea of system integration); see also id.
(referring to "nonnormative steering"); id. at 154 (systems as "norm-free structures"); id.
at 171 (economic system as "a block of more or less norm-free sociality"); id. at 172
(economy and administrative system as "norm-free subsystems"); id. at 173 ("norm-free
sociality" of economic and administrative systems); id. at 185 (systems as "norm-free social
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of the lifeworld. In the market, to be sure, one is free of various
normative restrictions that would be binding in a friendship or
family relation. But the idea that markets (and also, we will see,
the "administrative system") are norm-free is simply wrong-as
Habermas implicitly acknowledges when he describes market
relations, and the market as a sphere of interaction, as "first
generated by '27' or "first constituted in ' 272 formal law. Habermas
will try to incorporate this acknowledgement by arguing that the
media of money and power must be "anchored in the lifeworld"-
secured, that is, by positive law. But this solution understates the
extent to which economic and political processes are not
describable, on their own terms, as "norm-free." This difficulty, I
will argue, undermines Habermas's model of the system/lifeworld
relation that he takes to characterize modern societies.
Second, the fact that Habermas's "lifeworld" model needs to
be supplemented does not determine what approach should
supplement it. It is hardly obvious that social systems theory,
rather than more standard approaches in economic theory and
political science, offers the key that can unlock the workings of the
economic and administrative systems. For purposes of presenting
Habermas's basic concepts, however, I will concede that point.
Still, this concession settles very little. Habermas sometimes
understands the term "systems theory" very broadly, to the point
of classifying Marx, Adam Smith, and even Hobbes as systems
theorists.2 3  Neither are matters settled if we focus on more
contemporary versions of social systems theory. Habermas relies
upon the version articulated by Talcott Parsons, the dominant
figure in American sociology from at least the 1950s until his death
in 1978. As I will suggest in the final section, however, another
and more powerful variant of social systems theory recently has
been developed-Niklas Luhmann's "autopoietic" theory. 4
Habermas's development of a systems-theoretical approach is thus
structures"); id. at 242 ("norm-free sociality"); id. at 307 (systems as "formally organized
domains of action" that "congeal into a kind of norm-free sociality"); id. at 327 (systems as
"a norm-free reality beyond the horizon of the lifeworld").
271 Id. at 309 (emphasis omitted).
272 Id. at 357; see also id. at 361 (economic system is "an area of action that is already
constituted by law"); id. at 366 (economic and administrative systems are "directly
constituted in the forms of bourgeois formal law"); id. at 367 (law as systems medium "is
tailored to domains of action that are first constituted in legal forms of organization and
that can be held together only by systemic mechanisms"); id. at 369 ("formally organized
spheres of action," i.e., the economic and administrative systems, are "already constituted
in legal form").
273 See id. at 185, 313, 334-38 (re Marx); 358 (re Hobbes); BETWEEN FACTS AND
NORMS, supra note 14, at 39-40 (re Smith).
274 See Baxter, supra note 29, for an account of Luhmann's autopoietic theory in its
application to law.
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selective, and I will argue in concluding this article that he could
have avoided some of the difficulties in which his reliance on
Parsons places him.
C. System
1. Open Systems Theory and Parsons's "Interchange Paradigm"
The best-known version of social systems theory-and the
one from which Habermas borrows-is the "open systems"
approach, first developed during the 1960s under the influence of
advances in cybernetics and information theory. This approach
conceives of systems as adaptive and open to their changing
environments. System and environment are engaged in ongoing
"exchange" or "interchange," '275 through which the system receives
inputs from its environment, processes them, and converts them
into outputs that are fed back to the environment. Information
about the outputs' effects on the environment and the system
flows back into the system, completing the "feedback loop. '" 276
This model becomes more complex when we consider that a
system's environment typically includes other organized systems.
The functionalist sociological systems theories of the 1960s and
early 1970s incorporated this insight, presenting modern societies
as differentiated into a plurality of subsystems277 -such as the
political system or the economic system-each of which performs
some particular social function. Accounting for the input and
output relations among the various social subsystems has been a
basic problem for functionalist systems theory.
The most highly developed and influential version of this
approach appears in the later work of Talcott Parsons. Parsons
argues that any system of action must fulfill precisely four
functions: "adaptation" (A), "goal-attainment" (G), "integration"
(I), and "latent pattern-maintenance" (L).278 The functions listed
in this "four-function paradigm," or "AGIL" schema, correspond
275 See, e.g., DAVID EASTON, A SYSTEMS ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL LIFE 25-26 (1965);
WALTER BUCKLEY, SOCIOLOGY AND MODERN SYSTEMS THEORY 50 (1967).
276 See EASTON, supra note 275, at 29-32. The model becomes more complicated once
one recognizes that a system has more than one "feedback loop." See id. at 372-76.
277 "Subsystem" is always a relative term, used to signal that the system under
discussion is part of a larger system. Whether one speaks of "system" or "subsystem"
depends upon the intended level of analysis.
278 See TALCOTr PARSONS, On Building Social System Theory, in SOCIAL SYSTEMS
AND THE EVOLUTION OF ACTION THEORY 43 & n.34 (1977) [hereinafter On Building
Social System Theory].
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to what Parsons's earlier work had characterized as the four basic
elements of action: means or resources, goals, norms, and values,
respectively.279 To each of the four functions corresponds a social
subsystem. The economy, on Parsons's account, serves the
adaptive function (A); the "polity" serves the goal-attainment
function (G); the "societal community" serves the integrative
function (I); and (for lack of a better term) the "pattern
maintenance subsystem" serves the function that its name suggests
(L) .s0
Parsons's "interchange paradigm" addresses the issue of how
these functional subsystems are interrelated. To each subsystem
he attributes a "generalized medium of interchange '28 1 that both
structures the subsystem's "internal" operations and controls its
input/output relations with other subsystems. Parsons's strategy
was to begin with the idea of money as the medium for the
economy. Then, working largely by analogy to the case of money,
he identified media for the other three social subsystems: "power"
for the polity, "influence" for the societal community, and "value-
commitment" for the pattern-maintenance subsystem.2  Each
interchange between subsystems involves, according to Parsons, a
"double" exchange, with an input and an output accomplished
through each of the two system's respective media. 283 Thus, for
example, the interchange between economy and polity involves
four boundary-crossing inputs and outputs, two mediated by
money and two by power.2' The same pattern obtains with respect
to the other five intersystem relations, generating a total of twenty-
four media-controlled interchanges. 5
This interchange model of functional subsystems and media-
controlled exchange is not, to most, an intuitive way of looking at
the social world. In particular, it is not a map of society, as if seen
from the air, on which we could locate particular organizations or
institutions by placing them securely in one subsystem or another.
Particular organizations, like business firms, may be specialized
with respect to one of the four functions. But none belongs
exclusively to any one subsystem. As the Parsons-influenced
279 See 2 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 3, at 235, 242, 243 fig. 32,
244 fig. 33.
280 See TALCOTT PARSONS, On the Concept of Political Power, in SOCIOLOGICAL
THEORY AND MODERN SOCIETY 348 (1967) [hereinafter On the Concept of Political
Power].
281 For Parsons's overview of this project, see TALCOTr PARSONS, SOCIAL SYSTEMS
AND THE EVOLUTION OF ACTION THEORY, supra note 278, at 43-48, 59-60, 204-69 (1977).
282 See On the Concept of Political Power, supra note 280, at 348.
283 See id. at 349.
284 See id. at 350 fig. 1, 351.
285 See id. at 348 fig. 1, 350 fig. 2.
2002]
HeinOnline -- 23 Cardozo L. Rev. 533 2001-2002
CARDOZO LA W REVIEW
theorist Jeffrey Alexander puts it, "[t]here are economic aspects of
churches and political aspects of factories." '286 The same point
holds at the level of the subsystems themselves. The political
system, on Parsons's scheme, is specialized with respect to the
function of realizing collective goals.287  But in fulfilling this
function, it draws on "inputs" from the other social subsystems.
What the interchange paradigm is designed to convey is the
"dimensional pressures" that societies face and the functions they
must fulfill. Understood in that way, Alexander concludes, the
model "encompasses the full multidimensional complexity of real
social causality" because "[t]he analysis of any single subsystem...
cannot be isolated from the analysis of any other."2
Parsons's further development of the interchange model was
still more ambitious in scope. The account considered so far
covers only the interchange among subsystems of the social
system. The social system, however, is itself a subsystem of a more
encompassing system that Parsons calls the "general action
system." An obvious question is whether the same principles
developed at the level of the social system apply at the level of the
general action system. Parsons concludes that they do. According
to Parsons, the four-function paradigm, connected as it is to the
elements of action in general, applies to any system of action. In
fact, Parsons generalizes the four-function paradigm still more
ambitiously. Properly understood, he argues, a system of action is
just a special case of a living system.289 And according to Parsons,
the four-function, "AGIL" paradigm is grounded in "the essential
nature of living systems at all levels of organization and
evolutionary development, from the unicellular organism to the
highest human civilization. '29° On that basis, Parsons came to
consider the four-function paradigm, as well as the interchange
paradigm that accompanies it, wholly general in its application.
Parsons and his followers set about applying the four-function
paradigm at various levels of generality. The subsystems of the
"general action system" include, besides the social system (I), the
cultural system (L), the personality system (G), and the (oddly
named) "behavioral organism" (A). 291 At this level, too, Parsons
286 4 JEFFREY C. ALEXANDER, THEORETICAL LOGIC IN SOCIOLOGY 84 (1983).
2S7 See On the Concept of Political Power, supra note 280, at 354.
288 4 ALEXANDER, supra note 286, at 82.
289 See TALCOTr PARSONS, Some Problems of General Theory in Sociology, in SOCIAL
SYSTEMS AND THE EVOLUTION OF ACTION THEORY, supra note 278, at 230 [hereinafter
Some Problems of General Theory] ("Action systems.., are a subclass of a broader set,
which may be called living systems....").
290 Id. at 236.
291 See On Building Social Systems Theory, supra note 278, at 46-48 (1977); Some
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gave names to the various media, charted the various double
interchanges, and blocked out the other categories that the four-
function paradigm requires.2 " In his last years, Parsons ascended
another level of generality to address the so-called "human
condition," where the general action system (I) takes its place
alongside the "physico-chemical system" (A), the "human organic
system" (G), and the (cryptically named) "telic system" (L).293
Here too, Parsons named the media, charted the "double
interchanges," and so forth.294 But if the four-function paradigm is
wholly general in its application, then it must operate in the other
direction as well-at the level of subsystems for the social system's
subsystems, and then at the level of the subsystems of those
subsystems, and so on. The AGIL schema is endlessly self-
replicating, and the project of naming functional subsystems,
generalized interchange media, and media-controlled interchange
relations could go on forever .2  At some point, however, it
becomes a senseless exercise-as even some of those strongly
influenced by Parsons have concluded.2 6 And one has to wonder
about the formalism of a theory in which the same four-part
differentiation appears, and the same principles apply, whatever
the level of analysis.
Problems of General Theory, supra note 289, at 244-45.
292 See Some Problems of General Theory, supra note 289, at 262-69.
293 See TALCOTT PARSONS, ACTION THEORY AND THE HUMAN CONDITION 361
(1978).
294 See id. at 393 fig. 4, 407 fig. 5.
295 A two-volume Festschrift for Parsons provides good examples of the way some of
Parsons's followers sought to deploy the AGIL schema at various levels of generality. See,
e.g., Thomas J. Fararo, Science as a Cultural System, in 1 EXPLORATIONS IN GENERAL
THEORY IN SOCIAL SCIENCE 182 (J. Loubser et al. eds., 1976) (applying the four-function
paradigm to name 16 subsystems of the scientific system, four levels removed from
Parsons's original level of the social system); Victor Meyer Lidz, Appendix to Charles W.
Lidz & Victor Meyer Lidz, Piaget's Psychology of Intelligence and the Theory of Action, in
1 EXPLORATIONS IN GENERAL THEORY IN SOCIAL SCIENCE, supra, at 231-36 (naming
generalized communications media for the "adaptive" subsystem of the general action
system); Guy Rocher, Toward a Psychosociological Theory of Aspirations, in 1
EXPLORATIONS IN GENERAL THEORY IN SOCIAL SCIENCE, supra, at 404 (using the four-
function paradigm to name .16 kinds of aspiration); Mark Gould, Systems Analysis,
Macrosociology, and the Generalized Media of Social Action, in 2 EXPLORATIONS IN
GENERAL THEORY IN SOCIAL SCIENCE, supra, at 470-78 (suggesting a "refined version of
the interchange paradigm").
296 Niklas Luhmann, the prominent German systems theorist, has observed:
At every level of system-building there is a subsystem that displays the whole
schema once again.... But how far can this process be repeated? Is there a
point past which it gives out? Does it become senseless after the second
repetition, like the process of reflection? And, especially, is this the way to
represent the structure of functional differentiation? Does this theoretical
schema yield not structural complexity but only structural complications?
NIKLAS LUHMANN, Talcott Parsons: The Future of a Theory, in THE DIFFERENTIATION
OF SOCIETY 47, 58 (Stephen Holmes & Charles Larmore trans., 1982) (1979).
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Habermas's response to Parsons's systems theory is generally
critical. He has no particular use for the AGIL schema,297 nor does
he follow Parsons in his ascent from the social system to the
general system of action-let alone the level of the "human
condition." '298 The problem with Parsons's "general system of
action," according to Habermas, is that it presents culture, society,
and personality-Habermas's "structural components of the
lifeworld"-as media-steered, boundary-maintaining systems,
analogous in structure to state and economy. Parsons totalizes
systems theory. Habermas argues that its explanatory potential is
limited. The question for him is how to determine the relative
rights of the systems-theoretical and "lifeworld" perspectives.
Habermas pursues this question by examining Parsons's
theory of "generalized interchange media." He focuses on
Parsons's discussion of the four media at the level of the social
system-money, power, influence, and value-commitment.
Habermas follows Parsons in taking money to be the exemplary
case of a medium, and in then considering whether the other
proposed media are sufficiently similar in their structure and
operation. For reasons we will soon explore, Habermas ultimately
concludes that only money and power are genuine interchange
media-or, to use his preferred (if peculiar) term, genuine
"steering media" [Steurungsmedien].299 For this reason, he will
297 See 2 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 3, at 256 (referring to the
"paradoxes" that the AGIL "cross-tabulation" technique creates).
298 See id. at 250-56.
299 The German word "Steurung" can be translated either as "steering" or "control." In
some of Habermas's writings, the term Steurungsmedium has been rendered as either
"steering medium" or "control medium." See Thomas McCarthy, Translator's Note, in
LEGITIMATION CRISIS, supra note 4, at 148 n.l. I prefer "control medium," but in
deference to McCarthy's choice in his translation of Theory of Communicative Action, and
William Rehg's choice in his translation of Between Facts and Norms, I use "steering
medium."
So far as I have been able to see, Parsons does not use either term-"steering
medium" or "control medium." Habermas may have developed the term
Steurungsmedium through his encounter in the early 1970s with the systems theorist Niklas
Luhmann. (This encounter led to a joint book, Theorie der Gesellschaft oder
Sozialtechologie, supra note 4, and to much greater sympathy on Habermas's part for
systems theory. For his part, Luhmann seems to have been unaffected by the encounter.).
At that time, Luhmann, first trained in sociology by Parsons, was much under Parsons's
influence. He was developing Parsons's notion of a "generalized interchange medium"
into the concept of a "symbolically generalized communications medium." Luhmann
described such a medium as a way to "steer" or "control" [steurn] the selections of a
rational counterpart in interaction. NIKLAS LUHMANN, MACHT 7, 9 (1975). Parsons, too,
sees media as-from the point of view of actors-a means of exerting strategic influence
over others.
One difficulty with this explanation is that both Parsons and Luhmann-until the
early 1980s, after the publication of Theory of Communicative Action-also examine the
operation of these "media" from the perspective of social subsystems, not just actors. Still,
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conclude that only the economic and administrative systems are
"media-steered" systems.
This will leave him with the question of how to understand the
relation between the open, adaptive, media-steered, functionally
differentiated economic and administrative systems, on one hand,
and the lifeworld, on the other. That will be the most serious
difficulty in Habermas's "two-level" theory of society.
2. "Steering Media"
Parsons first developed the idea of money as the economy's
interchange medium in his collaborative work with Neil Smelser,
Economy and Society (1956). In a series of essays published
between 1963 and 1968, he extended the notion to the other three
subsystems of the social system.3°°  Throughout these essays,
money remained the paradigmatic interchange medium, with
language emerging as a point of further comparison. Habermas's
account of Parsons's medium concept distills from these essays
four aspects of the money medium that Parsons emphasizes: its
"structural features," its "structure of claim and redemption," its
"qualitative properties," and its "system-forming effects."
Habermas takes these aspects of money to be defining criteria for
his notion -of a "steering medium"-his version of Parsons's
"generalized interchange medium." For our immediate purposes,
the first two features are most relevant.
By the "structural features" of a medium, Habermas is
referring, in the first instance, to what Parsons calls the medium's
"code." Parsons conceives of media codes by analogy to ordinary
language: they allow the transmission of semantic content,
governed by syntactical rules for the medium's use.30 1 In fact,
Parsons says, money as a medium "is a very specialized
language."302 A medium's code symbolizes a "generalized value"
that can be presumed meaningful for all who will deal with the
one could speak of the economic system (and Habermas does) as "steering" or
"controlling" itself through the medium of money.
300 See On the Concept of Political Power, supra note 280, at 297; TALCOTr PARSONS,
On the Concept of Influence, in SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY AND MODERN SOCIETY, supra
note 280, at 355 [hereinafter On the Concept of Influence]; Talcott Parsons, On the
Concept of Value-Commitments, 38 SOCIOLOGICAL INQUIRY 135 (1968), reprinted in
TALCOT-r PARSONS, POLITICS AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE 439 (1969).
301 See On the Concept of Influence, supra note 300, at 357 (noting that "language is
perhaps the prototype" for generalized media and distinguishing between "message
transmission" and the "code" that is what gives meaning to the symbols in a message).
302 Id.; see also Some Problems of General Theory, supra note 288, at 241.
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medium in "standard situations.3 3  For money, the standard
situation is the buying and selling of economic goods, with actors
pursuing their own interests."4 The generalized value, of which
money is both expression and measure, is "utility.""3 5  Parsons
conceives of money's circulation as the sending of "messages,"
meaningful in terms of the medium's code, that are designed to
motivate the recipient to accept an "offer." The motivating force
is the prospect of sanctions, whether positive or negative, that will
affect the recipient's relevant interest. Money, Parsons says,
operates through "inducement," 3°6-the prospect of positive
sanctions connected to the generalized value of utility. 7
Like ordinary language as a medium, Parsons observes,
money as a medium has no intrinsic value."8 Instead, it presents a
"nominal" value (exchange-value) that can be "redeemed" for a
"real" value or "intrinsic satisfier" (typically, the use-value of a
good or service).3 9 Ultimately the monetary medium is "backed
by reserves "-whether by gold or other precious metals, as in
bygone days, or by other means, as at present.310  Similarly,
Habermas notes, linguistic utterances may "express knowledge,"
but they are not themselves "knowledge." They are the medium
through which participants reach communicative agreement, and
the claims raised in utterances are the "measure" of achieved
agreements.31 ' Likewise, Habermas contends, communicative
agreements are "backed by potential reasons"3 '2 that can be
adduced, if necessary, to "redeem" claims raised in communicative
action.313
303 2 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 3, at 264.
304 See id.
305 On the Concept of Influence, supra note 300, at 358.
306 See id. at 363.
307 Id. at 358, 363. That money operates through positive sanctions only is not obvious.
Robert Hale describes the process of exchanging labor-power for wages, or money for
goods, as a process of reciprocal coercion that involves threats to withhold the desired
money or commodity. See Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly
Non-Coercive State, POL. Sci. Q. 470, 472-79 (1923). The process can be described in
terms of either offers to provide or to withhold, and in terms or either positive or negative
sanctions.
308 See 2 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 3, at 265.
309 See id. at 266.
310 Id. The translation refers to "money or drawing rights on the world bank." The
term "Geld" in the original should have been rendered as "gold" rather than "money."
See id. at 274 fig. 37.
311 See id. at 265-66.
312 Id. at 266 (emphasis omitted).
313 Id. at 265. The parallel is forced. Reasons-or at least particular reasons-do not
"back" the medium of language itself, just particular claims. And certainly one does not
wait for a communicative "panic" to ask for reasons in communicative action. Drawing on
the "reserve" of reasons is not such an extraordinary occurrence in everyday
HeinOnline -- 23 Cardozo L. Rev. 538 2001-2002
SYSTEM AND LIFE WORLD
Habermas emphasizes, however, the differences between
ordinary language and money as media. Two are particularly
important for his further argument. First, the redemption of a
claim in communicative action involves the giving of reasons that
can withstand rational criticism. The redemption of a monetary
claim or offer does not. The acceptance of a claim in
communicative action, therefore, may be "rationally motivated"-
in the sense of "communicatively rationally motivated"-whereas
the acceptance of a claim or offer in a money-mediated interaction
is motivated, in Habermas's terminology, only "empirically," by
the desire for a positive sanction.314 Money thus allows actors to
circumvent the process of reaching agreement about contested
claims to validity. Their interaction is coordinated not by
communicative consensus, but by the consequences of their
respective success-oriented calculations and their mutual strategic
influence. Habermas relies on the distinction between rational
and empirical motivation, and the notion of media as "replacing"
the process of reaching understanding, as his main criteria for
"steering medium" status. And the idea that steering media
replace communicative consensus-formation will be part of his
argument that system and lifeworld in modern societies are
"uncoupled." '315
Second, as Parsons notes, money and the process of exchange
must be "institutionalized" if they are to enjoy a secure basis of
trust. The "backing" of the monetary medium itself occurs
through the guarantees of national and international governmental
and financial institutions. Contract law and property law
institutionalize and regulate the process of exchange.316 No such
institutional or legal guarantees are necessary for the medium of
ordinary language. Habermas sees this difference as indicating
that while ordinary-language communication is always already
located in a lifeworld context, the medium of money must be
institutionally "anchored in the lifeworld" 317-specifically in the
institutional and legal complex Habermas calls the "society"
component of the lifeworld. This point also will be significant to
Habermas's understanding of the relation between system and
lifeworld.
The other "features" Habermas discerns in Parsons's account
communicative action, and it is established practice where discourse is institutionalized.
314 See supra text accompanying notes 118-21.
315 See infra text accompanying notes 348-49, 364-79.
316 See 2 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 3, at 266.
317 Id. at 154, 309, 312, 344; see also id. at 266 (money must be "institutionally anchored"
through "the basic institutions of civil law (property and contract)").
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of money concern its "qualitative properties" and its "system-
building effects." Money's relevant qualitative properties are that
it is precisely measurable, alienable in specific amounts, and
capable of being stored. The first two properties allow money to
operate as an objective, context-independent measure of value in
rationally calculated action. Money's alienability allows it to serve
as a circulating medium.3"8 Its capacity for being stored increases
actors' freedom to pursue their economic interests rationally by
shopping around, waiting for favorable terms, and saving or
investing.39  Under the heading of "system-building effects,"
Habermas has in mind Parsons's remarks about media inflation
and deflation-changes in the relation between nominal and real
value-and money's "self-referential extension," in the form of
markets for money (i.e. capital markets).32°
The question Habermas now poses is whether, based on the
model of money as medium, any of Parsons's other candidates-
power, influence, or value-commitment-qualify as genuine
"steering media." According to Habermas, power qualifies, but
the others do not.
With the concept of power, as with the concept of money,
Habermas follows Parsons's lead in the first instance. Parsons sees
parallels between power and money in terms of their "structural
features." Like the money code, the power code represents a
"generalized value," which Parsons calls "effectiveness" in
attaining collective goals.32' It operates in a "standard situation" of
"following imperatives." As with the parties to a monetary
transaction, the issuer of the imperative and the person to whom it
is directed are understood to take an "objectivating" or "success-
oriented" attitude toward one another.322 The "message" or
"offer" associated with power is, as was the case with money,
connected to a characteristic sanction that is to motivate alter in
the interaction. The difference here is that while the sanction
associated with money's "inducement" was positive, the sanction
associated with power's "deterrence" is negative-the threat of
unpleasant consequences in case of disobedience.3 23
318 See id. at 265.
319 See id. at 427 n.56.
320 Id. at 266.
321 Id. at 268.
322 Id.
323 Here, as with Parsons' account of money, see supra note 307, one could describe the
relevant sanctions in the opposite way. Compliance with commands may bring pleasant
consequences, particularly if the addressee is located in a bureaucratic organization that
rewards dutiful order-followers. The main point here is that for Parsons, power-mediated
interaction, as with money, is coordinated by potential sanctions rather than by agreement
about validity claims.
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Habermas sees parallels also in the "structure of claim and
redemption" associated with the two media. Like money, Parsons
says, power has no intrinsic value.3 24 The real value for which the
power code stands is the attainment of collective goals.32 The
ultimate "backing" for power is disposal over the means of force.326
In these respects, Habermas claims, Parsons is right to see power
and money as analogous.
In other respects, Habermas acknowledges dissimilarities
between power and money. Power is less calculable than money.
There simply is no power-related equivalent for the price system,
and in fact, Habermas allows, "[ilt is not possible to quantifypower. ' '121 Although power can circulate, it "cannot circulate in so
unrestricted a manner as money."3 Habermas thinks this is so
because power, which in a modern political system is supposed to
attach to offices rather than persons, nevertheless tends to "get
bound up symbiotically with the person of the powerful"-thus,
for example, the advantage of incumbency.3 29 Actually, and more
to the point, even if power attaches only to offices rather than
persons, it is in that respect also considerably less alienable than
money. Political power may not be sold or disposed of or given
away, in the same way that one may sell a piece of property. Nor,
Habermas points out, is there a reliable way to deposit power-
even if we can interpret an election as, in some sense, a deposit of
power from which the incoming administration may draw. Power
cannot be stored, without use, to the same extent and with the
same security as money.3 0 Nor can one speak of power inflation or
deflation to the same degree, or with the same precision, as with
respect to the money medium.3 '
Habermas emphasizes, finally, a relevant difference between
the ways in which money and power are, as he puts it, "anchored
in the lifeworld." Like money, power must be legally
institutionalized, although through public law rather than private
law.332 Public law organizes a hierarchy of offices that prescribes
324 One might object that power often seems to be enjoyed for its own sake, or for other
selfish purposes, rather than for its capacity to attain "collective goals." Parsons's point,
which Habermas will amplify, see infra text accompanying notes 333-39, is that in modern
societies (at least) a stable political system requires that power generally be directed
toward collective goals.
325 See 2 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 3, at 268.
326'See id. at 269.
327 Id.
328 Id. (emphasis omitted).
329 Id.
330 See id.
331 See id. at 269-70.
332 See id. at 271.
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the terms of access to political power and channels the flow of
political decisions. The difference, according to Habermas, is that
for power, something more than this legal institutionalization and
the "backing" of physical force is required. Power must be
"legitimated," and that means that its exercise remains connected
to "the recognition of normative validity claims." '333  This
"anchoring" of the power medium is "more demanding" than the
anchoring of money, which needs no legitimation beyond its legal
institutionalization.'34
The reason for this asymmetry in "normative anchoring,"
according to Habermas, concerns a difference in the "standard
situations" of the two media. In the case of money, parties in the
"ideal-typical exchange relation" '335 meet each other on equal
terms. Neither has the power of command over the other, and
neither can insist upon the other's participation. In the case of
power, by contrast, the standard situation is one in which one party
both commands and has disposal over the means necessary to
enforce compliance.336 Parsons sees that for power to serve as a
stable medium, it must be directed toward collective goals. And
yet, Habermas observes, if the powerholder is able to define
"which goals are going to count as collective," that determination
must be contestable by those subject to power. Seemingly on the
verge of declaring that the medium of power implies democracy,
Habermas pulls back, allowing for the possibility that a tradition-
based consensus rather than democratic procedures might provide
the requisite legitimation.337 Still, Habermas sees the significance
of his insistence that power must be legitimated. He invokes the
distinction between "simple imperatives" and "normatively
authorized requests" that he made in differentiating
communicative from strategic action.33 s And, aware that he has
classified "normatively authorized requests" as cases of
communicative action,339 Habermas nevertheless suggests that
''power as a medium evidently retains something of" the
normatively authorized request. Here Habermas comes very close
to describing "power-mediated" interaction as communicative
333 Id.
334 Id. at 271.
335 Id. (emphasis omitted).
336 See id.
337 See id. at 272 (stating that the question whether a goal is in the collective interest
"calls for a consensus among the members of a collectivity, no matter whether this
normative consensus is secured in advance by tradition or has first to be brought about by
democratic processes of bargaining and reaching understanding.").
338 See supra text accompanying notes 116-21.
339 See supra text accompanying note 116.
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action.
But Habermas stops short of this description. And despite the
fact that so many of his comparisons between money and power
produce more differences than similarities, he pronounces power a
"steering medium" alongside money.3 40  This judgment is
somewhat surprising. What it indicates is that the various factors
Habermas mentions as criteria for media status are not equal in
importance.
Habermas seems to rely most heavily on two general
similarities between money and power. The first is that power,
like money, needs to be legally institutionalized for the medium to
enjoy a secure basis of trust. That factor was the reason he
resisted describing language as a "medium" in the sense that
money is a medium, and as noted below, it is one of the main
reasons he rejects Parsons's two other proposed media, influence
and value-commitment.
The second parallel between money and power on which
Habermas relies concerns the "standard situations" for each
medium's operation. In both cases, Habermas describes the
standard situation as involving more or less calculating, success-
oriented interaction that allows actors to circumvent the process of
reaching consensus over contested validity claims. In the standard
situation of power's exercise, the directly relevant reasons for
compliance are the potential sanctions over which the
powerholder has disposal.31 The fact that power ultimately refers
back to a legitimating consensus does not mean that the
motivation for compliance, in particular instances of power's
exercise, is "rational" rather than "empirical." The system as a
whole must be legitimate for power to be a stable medium. The
actual exercise of power, however, often operates without detailed
normative justification being given or requested.
Habermas's classification of power as "steering medium"
seems to me doubtful. But rather than belabor the similarities and
differences between money and power, it makes sense to see what
he can make of his decision to classify power as medium, and to
see what effects his reservations about this decision have on his
account of the system that develops around the power medium.
These matters will become apparent when I turn to Habermas's
model of the relation between system and lifeworld.
Parsons's remaining two media for the subsystems of the
social system-influence and value-commitment can be handled
more briefly. Habermas concedes that we can find names for
340 2 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 3, at 272-73.
341 See id. at 268.
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these proposed media's "standard situations," "generalized
values," "nominal claims," "real values," "reserve backing," and
the like, that formally will parallel the account Parsons gives of
money and power.342 But the dissimilarities to money, and also to
power, weigh against conceiving influence and value-commitment
as "steering media." Both influence and value-commitment are
less susceptible than either money or power to calculation,
alienation, and storing 43 Both "remain strongly tied to persons
and particular contexts," and thus neither seems well described as
a circulating medium.3 44 Further, the "reserve backing" Parsons
designates for these proposed media-cultural tradition and
values-are, in Habermas's view, better understood from a
"lifeworld" perspective than from a systems-theoretical angle. 35
Habermas, in fact, has classified the cultural tradition as a
component of the lifeworld, and he has described values as
relevant to both the culture and personality components of the
lifeworld.346 The same is true of the "real values" that Parsons
nominates for influence and value commitment: "reasons for
convictions" and "justifications for obligations. 347
Habermas, in short, argues that both influence and value-
commitment are better analyzed through a theory of
communicative action rather than through systems theory. Unlike
money and power, influence and value-commitment do not replace
the coordinating mechanism of communicative consensus. Both
influence and value-commitment, on Parsons's account, implicate
reasons and justifications, not just sanctions, and thus for each we
can speak of (communicatively) rational rather than empirical
motivation. Finally, Habermas notes, the forms of
institutionalization Parsons proposes-"prestige orderings" and
"moral leadership "34 8-are not legally secured, and in fact, they are
not really institutions at all.349  For these reasons, Habermas
42 See id. at 273.
341 See 2 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note at 275-76.
Id. at 275.
45 See id. at 276-77.
346 See id. at 276.
347 Id. at 274 fig. 37.
3 8 Id.
'49 See id. at 275:
Obviously we have no institutions that, in analogy to property and offices, would
permit a well-circumscribed normative anchoring of influence or value
commitment. The concepts invoked for that purpose-prestige ordering and
moral leadership-are more an expression of embarrassment, for they scarcely
allow a differentiation between the media themselves and their
institutionalizations: "influence" can be more or less translated as "prestige" or
"reputation," "value commitment" as "moral authority."
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maintains, we have no reason to posit either influence or value-
commitment as "steering media."
Still, Habermas allows, both influence and value-commitment
represent "special cases of consensus formation in language."350 In
the standard situation of each-giving "advice" and "moral
appeals," respectively351-one party has special competence or
authority. The other party trusts that the specially competent or
authoritative party could provide reasons sufficient to justify the
relevant claim, without demanding the reasons or subjecting them
to criticism. In this way, "influence and value commitment are ...
forms of generalized communication that bring about a reduction
in the expenditure of energy and in the risks attending mutual
understanding." '352 They do not replace mutual understanding in
its coordinating role, "but only provide it with relief through
abstraction from lifeworld complexity. 353
Such is Habermas's account of "steering media." Money and
power, and these only, are media around which "systems," in
Habermas's sense, can be differentiated. It should be clear,
however, that we still do not know what "systems" are "in
Habermas's sense." We need to know more about the "internal"
structure of the systems he identifies, as well as much more about
how Habermas hopes to link his "lifeworld" account of society and
his systems-theoretical account. He addresses both issues in his
account of the "uncoupling of system and lifeworld," to which I
now turn.
3. Uncoupling of System and Lifeworld
Each of the two methodological approaches I have considered
so far describes the development of modern societies as a process
of differentiation. From the perspective of the theory of
communicative action, Habermas sees the differentiation of the
lifeworld's "structural components" as an essential aspect of the
lifeworld's rationalization. From the perspective of systems
theory, Habermas describes the operation of two "steering media"
around which the economic and administrative systems
differentiate. But from what do these systems "differentiate,"
other than from each other? Habermas describes the "anchoring"
of the steering media "in the lifeworld," and so presumably system
350 See id. at 276.
351 Id. at 274 fig. 37.
352 Id. at 276.
353 Id. at 277.
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and lifeworld are differentiated. But beyond this vague notion of
"anchoring," what relation might obtain between society seen as
lifeworld and society seen from the point of view of systems
theory?
So far I have presented the two methodological approaches
almost entirely separately. Each, in Habermas's view, accounts for
some aspects of a modern society, but if we try to think of either as
a model of society as a whole, we see that in each account
Habermas leaves a blank spot that needs to be filled in by the
other approach. The "lifeworld" perspective, Habermas says, is
inadequate to account for society's "material reproduction," which
he sees as carried out through the economic and administrative
systems. To understand the structure and operation of these
systems, Habermas claims, we need a systems-theoretical
approach.354 But that systems-theoretical approach, Habermas
maintains, cannot adequately grasp the "symbolic structures of the
lifeworld." To understand those symbolic structures, we need the
notion of communicative action and its complementary concept of
the lifeworld. Habermas has set up his accounts of the two
approaches so that they appear to be mutually complementing.
With the notion of the "uncoupling of system and lifeworld," he
tries to bring them together into a single model of society.
Habermas describes the "uncoupling of system and lifeworld"
as a "second-order process of differentiation." '355 By this he means
that his account of this uncoupling treats the differentiation of the
economic and administrative systems, and the differentiation of
the lifeworld's structural components, as at the same time a further
process of differentiation-the differentiation of system from
lifeworld.35 6 This notion of differentiation of system from lifeworld
may seem an obvious consequence of characterizing state and
economy as "systems" that, qua systems, are differentiated from
their environments. And as I suggested, it seems to bring together
two different but complementing theoretical paradigms. But what
Habermas accomplishes through his notion of "uncoupling" is not
so much the integration of the two paradigms as the marking of a
boundary between system and lifeworld that gives each approach
its own turf. To the systems-theoretical approach, Habermas
assigns the domains he calls "systems"-the economy, and also the
state administration. To the approach that is based in a theory of
communicative action, he grants the domain that he calls "the
lifeworld." And finally, it will become clear, Habermas analyzes
354 See supra text accompanying notes 252-74.
355 Id. at 155 (emphasis omitted).
356 See id. at 153.
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the relations between these domains within a systems-theoretical
frame of reference.
Habermas locates the uncoupling of system and lifeworld
within an ambitious theory of social evolution. His sketch of this
theory traces the development of exchange and power relations
from simple "tribal" societies to modern societies."' At the initial
point of this evolutionary process-"small, prestate societies," in
which kinship is "something like a total institution"359-Habermas
discerns an "interweaving of system integration and social
integration."3" As we travel along the social-evolutionary path,
however, the two forms of integration pull apart. Described
systems-theoretically, each stage is marked by a new "mechanism
of system differentiation" that increases the society's complexity.361
Described in "lifeworld" terms, the transition to each stage
depends upon the institutionalization of these mechanisms of
systems differentiation.362  Particularly important in this
evolutionary process is the development of law and morality,
which Habermas analyzes as a transition from "preconventional"
to "conventional" to "post-conventional levels." '363
The details of this evolutionary theory are not important for
my purposes. What matters is the account Habermas gives of
modern society, in which, he claims, system and lifeworld are
largely "uncoupled." Two features of this account are particularly
important. The first concerns the relations between systems, and
the relations between system and lifeworld. The second concerns
the "internal" structure of system and lifeworld.
Habermas has described the economic and administrative
systems as differentiated out around the steering media of money
357 See infra Part ll.D.
358 See 2 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 3, at 156-97.
359 Id. at 156, 157.
360 Id. at 163.
361 See id. at 156-72. The four mechanisms Habermas identifies are: (1)
"segmentation," or, the linking of similarly structured units (as in an association of equal
families); (2) "stratification," or, the ranking of similarly structured units (as in an
association of families with different degrees of status); (3) "state organization," or the
development of a functionally specified political organization largely independent of the
kinship system; and (4) "steering media," through which first the capitalist economy, and
then the modern bureaucratic state, are differentiated.
362 See id. at 172-79.
363 Id. at 173-79. The distinctions among "preconventional," "conventional," and
"postconventional" come from Lawrence Kohlberg's work in moral psychology.
Habermas defines the three levels as "the preconventional level, on which only the
consequences of action are judged, the conventional level, on which the orientation to
norms and the intentional violation of them are already judged, and finally the
postconventional level, on which norms themselves are judged in the light of principles."
Id. at 174; see also id. at 174-78 (applying Kohlberg's schema to types of ethic and types of
law).
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and power. Following Parsons's account of a generalized
interchange medium, Habermas takes steering media to operate in
two ways: they both coordinate interaction within the relevant
system and regulate the system's "external" interchange with its
environments. Money and power were hardly unknown in
precapitalist societies, Habermas allows, but neither operated as a
genuine "steering medium."3" What is decisive for the formation
of "media-steered" subsystems, Habermas maintains, is that the
medium comes to control the relations between system and
environment.365 In the case of money, Habermas argues, this
occurred with the widespread institutionalization of wage labor
and the development of markets for consumer goods. With these
developments, the relations between the economic system and its
environment of "private households" came to be mediated by
money.366 I point to Habermas's account of this relation because,
for him, it is a relation between system and lifeworld: the "private
household"-that is, the family, viewed from the perspective of the
economic system36 7 -belongs to the societal component of the
lifeworld.36 s
This point has more general significance. Habermas's account
of the "uncoupling of system and lifeworld" presents system and
lifeworld as social spheres that are in actual interrelation with one
another, not just as one-sided or partial constructions of society
seen from two different theoretical perspectives. And the
interrelation is regulated by steering media-at least from the side
of the economic and administrative subsystems.3 69 The framework
in which Habermas locates this interchange between system and
lifeworld is thus systems-theoretical. And within this framework
the lifeworld becomes "one subsystem among others"-albeit the
-64 See id. at 165 (re money); id. at 169-71, 167 fig. 25, 166 fig. 24 (re power).
365 For Habermas's statement of this point with respect to money, see id. at 171:
Traditional societies already allow for internal and external markets; it is only
with capitalism, however, that we have an economic system such that both the
internal commerce among business enterprises and the interchange with
noneconomic environments, private households, and the state are carried out
through monetary channels .... Money has structure-forming effects only when
it becomes an intersystemic medium of interchange. The economy can be
constituted as a monetarily steered subsystem only to the degree that it regulates
its interchanges with its social environments via the medium of money.
366 Id. at 319.
367 Id.
368 See id. at 318-19 ("The institutional core" of lifeworld's "private sphere" is "the
nuclear family," which "from the systemic perspective of the economy" appears as the
"private household[]."); id. at 320 fig. 39 (identifying the "private sphere" as an
"institutional order[] of the lifeworld").
369 The structural components of the lifeworld do not have steering media. This
difficulty appears in Habermas's general model of system/lifeworld interchange.
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one in which "systemic mechanisms need to be anchored.""37
The second aspect of Habermas's account of the uncoupling
of system and lifeworld concerns the "internal" structure of both
domains. Habermas has described money and power as media that
address a basic problem created by the rationalization of society as
lifeworld: the greater danger of dissensus, to the extent consensus
is no longer prescribed in advance by tradition, and the resulting
burden on interpretive energies required to reach agreement
communicatively. Money and power, he has said, address this
problem by circumventing the process of reaching communicative
understanding.371
With his account of system and lifeworld as uncoupled,
however, Habermas goes further. To his notion of steering media
as regulators of systems' internal operations, he adds the notion of
"formal organizations." By "formal organizations" Habermas
means, essentially, bureaucratic organizations, whether
governmental agencies or business firms, with hierarchical
structures of command, defined roles and tasks, and defined
behavioral expectations whose fulfillment is a condition for
membership.372 Formal organizations are first constituted in
positive law.373 Habermas speaks also of "formally organized
domains of action [Handlungsbereiche]," by which he sometimes
means "formal organizations" and sometimes means entire
systems of action-the economic and administrative systems.374
The two terms go together: he tends to conceive of the economic
and administrative systems as networks of formal organizations.
Habermas presents formally organized domains of action as
coordinated and integrated by money and power only. In these
domains, Habermas claims, system and lifeworld are "uncoupled"
not just in the sense that new mechanisms for coordinating action
370 Id. at 154; see also id. at 173 ("In a differentiated social system the lifeworld seems to
shrink to a subsystem.").
371 See text accompanying notes 263-64; see also 2 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE
ACTION, supra note 3, at 183.
372 2 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 3, at 172 (re conditions of
membership).
373 See id. at 309 ("'[F]ormally organized"' ... social relations [are] "all social relations
located in media-steered subsystems, so far as [they] are first generated by positive law,"
including "exchange and power relations constituted by private and public law but going
beyond the boundaries of organizations."); id. at 357 ("The social relations we call
'formally organized' are those that are first constituted in forms of modern law."); id. at
366 (referring to "formally organized domains of action that, as such, are directly
constituted in the forms of bourgeois formal law").
374 See id. at 305 (state and economy as "formally organized domains of action"); id. at
307 (leaving unclear whether "formally organized domains of action" refers to systems,
formal organizations, or both); id. at 318 (systems as "formally organized domains of
action").
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develop that are irreducible to the mechanism of communicative
understanding. Rather, system and lifeworld are uncoupled in the
further sense that the lifeworld's resources become essentially
irrelevant for the operation of the economic and administrative
systems. These formally organized, media-steered subsystems,
Habermas writes,
are consolidated and objectified into norm-free structures.
Members behave toward formally organized action systems,
steered via processes of exchange and power, as toward a block
of quasi-natural reality; within these media-steered subsystems
society congeals into a second nature. Actors have always been
able to shear off from an orientation to mutual understanding,
adopt a strategic attitude, and objectify normative contexts into
something in the objective world, but in modern societies,
economic and bureaucratic spheres emerge in which social
relations are regulated only via money and power. Norm-
conformative attitudes and identity-forming social memberships
are neither necessary nor possible in these spheres; they are
made peripheral instead.75
Habermas goes on to argue even more explicitly that "formal
organizations" in both subsystems have become indifferent to each
of the structures of the lifeworld-personality, culture, and society.
Through their ability to prescribe membership conditions, formal
organizations manage the personal dispositions, capacities, and
motivations of their members.376 Further, Habermas maintains,
with more than a little hyperbole: "[j]ust as persons are, as
members, stripped of personality structures and neutralized into
bearers of certain performances, so too cultural traditions.., are
robbed of their binding power and converted into raw material for
purposes of ideology planning, that is, for an administrative
processing of meaning constellations." '377 Finally, with respect to
the society component, organizations "make themselves
independent from lifeworld contexts" by "neutralizing the
normative background of informal, customary, morally regulated
contexts of action. "378
System and lifeworld are thus uncoupled in a radical sense.
The development of money and power as media, together with the
rise of formal organizations, fundamentally transforms the nature
of interaction in the spheres of action that become differentiated
economic and administrative systems. Habermas refers in this
connection to "an uncoupling of interaction from lifeworld
375 Id. at 154.
376 See id. at 308.
377 Id. at 308-09.
378 Id. at 309.
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contexts." In these formally organized, media-steered systems,
"the lifeworld contexts in which processes of reaching
understanding are always embedded are devalued in favor of
media-steered interactions; the lifeworld is no longer needed for
the coordination of action." '379 Taken literally, this would mean
that all of the lifeworld resources Habermas has identified-
norms, values, institutions, interpretive schemes, personal
competences and motivations-are irrelevant for the coordination
of interaction in the economic and administrative spheres.
This claim is plainly false. I have argued above that strategic
action, not just communicative action, draws on what Habermas
calls the lifeworld's resources. The same is true of the subtype of
strategic action called "media-steered" interaction, and it is true
also of interaction within formal organizations. Interaction in
general, not just communicative action in particular, is informed
and channeled by the interpretive schemes Habermas associates
with culture, the legal (at least) institutions and norms he
associates with society, and the personal competences and
motivations he associates with personality. To be sure, monetary
transactions, for example, are less moralized than interaction with
one's friends or family. And further, the norms and behavioral
expectations imposed by formal organizations may be
organization-specific, not general social norms. Finally, formal
organizations may not permit discursive challenges to their rules or
expectations. But only if we equate "norms" with "informal
norms" and "moral norms"-excluding legal norms and
organizationally imposed norms-do either of Habermas's two
systems, or formal organizations, appear to be norm-free.
In one sense, the problem is the same one I have been noting
in analyzing each of Habermas's basic concepts. His initial
account of communicative action, before the amendments I
discussed, tended toward an indefensibly sharp opposition
between communicative and strategic action.38 His account of
"lifeworld" interaction focuses almost exclusively on
communicative action, with strategic action appearing only as an
afterthought.3"' And in the course of arguing that a systems-
theoretical perspective must supplement his lifeworld perspective,
he presented a polarizing account of the lifeworld as normatively
dense and systems as "norm-free." At these points, Habermas
stylizes his distinctions between communicative and strategic,
validity and power, lifeworld and system.
379 Id. at 183.
380 See supra text accompanying notes 122-32.
381 See supra text accompanying notes 247-51.
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The problem becomes more acute, however, with Habermas's
account of the uncoupling of system and lifeworld. There the
notion of lifeworld as the resources on which actors rely shifts to a
conception of the lifeworld as itself a domain of action-as the
informally organized and communicatively structured contexts of
action382 that stand opposed to the formally organized and media-
steered spheres of action Habermas calls "systems." This shift in
the concept of the lifeworld is essential to Habermas's
"uncoupling" thesis, and it is the source of a good bit of his
difficulties. It is a baffling shift as well. While perhaps the
institutional complex at the core of the lifeworld's "societal"
component can be seen as a domain of action, the cultural
tradition and the social stock of motivations and competences
cannot. Habermas simply does not explain how the lifeworld, with
these "structural components," constitutes a system or network of
action that can be placed in a systems-theoretical interchange
model opposite the economic and administrative systems. In his
model of the system/lifeworld relation, Habermas implicitly
acknowledges this point by presenting the interchange between
system and lifeworld as channeled through the institutional
component only.383 As a result, however, he has no way to explain
how interaction in the economic and administrative systems might
draw upon the interpretive schemes of culture and the motivations
and competences of personality. The ultimate consequence of
Habermas's shifting conception of the lifeworld is an untenably
stylized account: the lifeworld is the informal, customary,
normatively rich home of communicative action, and systems are
the strategic, calculating, formalized, normatively empty worlds of
money and power.
In various passages of Theory of Communicative Action
unrelated to the uncoupling thesis, Habermas recognizes the
points I am making. For example, as I have noted, he
382 See 2 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACIION, supra note 3, at 185 (treating
"communicatively structured contexts of action" as a synonym for "lifeworld"); id. at 309
("spheres of action constituted as the lifeworld" are "communicatively structured"); id.
(equating "lifeworld contexts" with "informal, customary, morally regulated contexts of
action"); id. at 311 ("lifeworld contexts" as the "informal organization" underlying
"formal organization"); id. at 333 (lifeworld as "communicatively structured life-
contexts"); id. at 349 (lifeworld as "communicatively structured domains of action"); id. at
356 (lifeworld as "communicatively structured spheres of action"); id. at 366 (suggesting
an equation between the lifeworld, on one hand, and "informally constituted domains of
action" and "communicatively structured areas of action," on the other); id. at 367
(discussing penetration of law as medium into "informal lifeworld contexts" and
"communicatively structured areas of action"); id. at 368 (referring to "informally
regulated spheres of the lifeworld"); id. at 371 (lifeworld as "communicatively structured
areas of action").
383 See id. at 320.
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acknowledges that the media of money and power must be
institutionalized, and that means, in Habermas's terminology, a
"recoupling" of system and lifeworld. The domains of economic
and administrative action are legally constituted, and the processes
of exchange and command are legally regulated through the basic
"legal institutions" of private and public law. Formal
organizations impose normative requirements and behavioral
expectations on their members-not, perhaps, informal or moral
requirements, but normative requirements notwithstanding.
These points, of which Habermas is well aware, are obscured by
the shift in his notion of the lifeworld and his hyperbolic notion of
''uncoupling."
Further, Habermas acknowledges the stylization of his
conception of formal organizations as steered only by money and
power. Underneath the formal organization, he argues, is an
informal organization,3" and organizations could not attain their
goals if communicative action were entirely set out of play."' This
recognition is consistent with his statement that the "material
reproduction of the lifeworld" is accomplished through
communicative as well as strategic action.3 The original reason
for adopting a systems-theoretical perspective was not that
interaction in the systems responsible for material reproduction is
entirely strategic (or, by extension, media-steered). Instead, the
reason had to do with the counterintuitive consequences of
economic and administrative processes that are irreducible to the
actor's intentions or plans, and inaccessible to a theory that
confines itself to an interpretive perspective. Here, too,
Habermas's decision to see system differentiation as an uncoupling
from the lifeworld-and the polarizing sense he gives this notion
of "uncoupling"-has obscured insights available elsewhere in his
work.
Unfortunately, the model he develops to analyze the
system/lifeworld relation reproduces the errors of his "uncoupling"
analysis. That model is the topic of the next section.
D. The System/Lifeworld Model in Theory
of Communicative Action
Habermas's working model of the relation between system
3s4 See id. at 311 (referring to "the informal organization upon which all formal
organization relies").
385 See id. at 310.
3 See supra text accompanying notes 244-46.
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and lifeworld is systems-theoretical: it presents media-steered
interchange processes between the economic and administrative
systems, on one side, and the lifeworld on the other. As I
mentioned, Habermas conceives of this interchange as channeled,
on the side of the lifeworld, through the institutional component.
He distinguishes two "institutional orders" of the lifeworld that
participate in this interchange. The, "private sphere" is in
interchange with the economic system, and the "public sphere" is
in interchange with the administrative system. He presents these
private and public spheres from a double perspective-first from
the perspective of the lifeworld, and then from the perspective of
the relevant system. (Below I present in tabular form most of the
information contained in the next few paragraphs.)
According to Habermas, the "institutional core" of the private
sphere is the "nuclear family." Oddly, given its location in the
societal component rather than personality, Habermas describes
the primary function of the family as socialization."7 From the
perspective of the economic system, the family, as private-sphere
environment, appears as the "private household. 3 s8 Habermas
focuses on two "roles" that have "crystallized" around the
interchange relation between private sphere and economic system:
the roles of employee and consumer.3 9 The employee role, he
says, is "organization-dependent" and arises in legal form.390 The
consumer role is not legally constituted, and although it may be
"defined with reference to formally organized domains of action,"
it is not "dependent upon them."39' These are the channels through
which the interchange between economy and private sphere
operates.
Habermas follows this same pattern in describing the
interchange between public sphere and administrative system.
The "institutional core" of the public sphere consists in
"communicative networks amplified by a cultural complex, a press,
and later, mass media."3 92 Habermas notes that the public sphere is
really two public spheres-an artistic/literary sphere and a political
public sphere.3 93 Only the latter enters the model. In this political
public sphere, Habermas maintains, "a public of citizens" engages
387 See 2 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 3, at 319. Habermas has
attributed the socialization function to the personality component rather than the societal
component of the lifeworld. See supra text accompanying notes 195-202.
388 2 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 3, at 319.
389 Id.
390 Id. at 319.
391 Id. at 321 (emphasis omitted).
392 Id. at 319.
393 See id.
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in political participation.394 Viewed from the perspective of the
administrative system, however, the public sphere is "the
environment relevant to generating legitimation." The relevant
roles are "client" of government services and "citizen[] of the
state. 395 The client role, like the employee role, is "organization-
dependent." The citizen role, like the consumer role, is defined
with respect to, but is not "dependent upon," the formally
organized domain of the state administration.396
Because Habermas has selected a systems-theoretical
interchange model, he presents the relations between system and
lifeworld as regulated by steering media. Parsons presented the
relation between systems as involving a "double interchange,"
mediated by both media proper to the related systems. Habermas,
however, has to improvise here. The only media he has identified
are money and power, and so the interchange between system and
lifeworld can be regulated only by these two media. This puts
Habermas in a difficult position. On one hand, he cannot
consistently attribute either the money or the power medium to
the lifeworld. On the other, hand, the model of interchange he
borrows from Parsons requires him to do just that.
The interchange relations Habermas identifies are as follows.
The private sphere, via the employee role and the power medium,
contributes labor power to the economic system. In exchange, the
economic system provides income via the money medium. The
private sphere, via the consumer role and the money medium,
contributes demand for goods and services. In exchange, the
economic system provides those goods and services by the money
medium.397
In the interchange between public sphere and administrative
system, the public sphere, via the client role and the money
medium, contributes taxes to the administrative system. In
exchange, the administrative system provides "organizational
accomplishments" via the power medium. The public sphere, via
the citizen's role and the power medium, contributes "mass
loyalty" to the administrative system. In exchange that system
provides political decisions via the power medium.398
The model,399 presented schematically, looks like this:
394 Id.
395 Id.
396 Id. at 321.
397 See id. at 320 fig. 39.
398 See id.
399 See id. In the following table, "M" = money medium; "P" = power medium. The
apostrophes following the "P" or "M" that designate contributions from the lifeworld are
Habermas's; they acknowledge that neither the money medium nor the power medium is
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Habermas's Model of System/Lifeworld Interchange
Lifeworld ie ol"institutional role Factor/product Medium System
order"
1) employee Labor power - P' --
Private Income
sphere from employment
2) consumer Goods and
services
Demand -M' 4
la) client Taxes - M' 4
Organizational -P- AdministrativePublic sphere accomplishments
2a) citizen Political decisions -- P -
Mass loyalty - P' 4
Habermas describes the process by which lifeworld processes
become cognizable in terms of steering media as "real
abstractions." This term, which Habermas attributes to Marx,4" is
significant in both its parts. With the word "abstraction,"
Habermas means to highlight a certain conversion process of
concrete "lifeworld" values into abstract "system" values that will
be comprehensible within the system's code. Following Marx,
Habermas describes, as one of the processes of abstraction, the
commodification of wage labor-the conversion of concrete,
individual capacities for labor into quantities of abstract labor-
power, comparable along the scale of money prices.401 A similar
process of abstraction operates through the consumer role, in the
conversion of "use-value orientations" into abstract demand,
expressed in terms of willingness and ability to pay.402 So, too, with
the conversion, in the citizen's role, of "publicly articulated
opinions and collective expressions of will" into "mass loyalty. 43
By the word "real" in the expression "real abstractions,"
Habermas means to signal that these processes are not
"abstractions" in a purely intellectual sense but are real social
processes.
Habermas sees his project in Theory of Communicative
Action as a reformulation of the critique of capitalist societies, as
presented first by Marx, then by Georg Lukacs, and then by
proper to the lifeworld.
" See id. at 322.
401 See id. at 335-36.
402 Id. at 322.
401 Id.
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Habermas's "Frankfurt School" predecessors (principally Max
Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno). 4 One significant distinction
between Habermas's approach and the approaches of his various
predecessors is that Habermas believes these processes of "real
abstraction" are not necessarily pathological. Neither the
organization of media-steered subsystems as such, nor the
processes of "abstraction" as such, count as social pathologies.4 5
But Habermas designs his model as a framework for analyzing
developments that would count as crises or social pathologies.
Habermas identifies a number of different types of crisis or
social pathology. Two to which he pays little attention in Theory
of Communicative Action are what he calls "steering crises"-
"internal" crises of the two media-steered subsystems, whether in
the form of "economic" crisis or "planning crisis. ' '4°" In contrast to
orthodox marxist approaches, Habermas maintains that, with
welfare-state attempts to regulate the business cycle, tendencies
toward economic crisis largely, have been displaced into the
administrative system.4 °7 Of greater interest to Habermas are
crises in symbolic reproduction. He mentions the possibility that
these may be "internally" induced: for example, the "cultural
impoverishment of everyday communicative practice" may arise
with the "elitist splitting-off of expert cultures from contexts of
communicative action in daily life. ' 40 8  But he focuses more
intensively on the crises of symbolic reproduction that are
"externally" induced, through incompatibility between the forms
of organization and rationality proper to system and lifeworld.
Habermas refers to this last kind of crisis as "inner
404 See 1 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 5, at 399; 2 THEORY OF
COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 3, at 302. For Habermas's interpretation and
critique of Lukacs and the Frankfurt School, see 1 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE
ACTION, supra note 5, at 339-99; 2 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 3,
at 332-34, 389-91.
40- See 2 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 3, at 322-23 (describing
development of media-controlled relations between system and lifeworld as "real
abstraction"); id. at 330-31 (uncoupling of system and lifeworld not necessarily
pathological).
406 Id. at 385. Habermas's brief discussion of this kind of crisis is not altogether clear.
He seems first to suggest that serious "disequilibria" in either subsystem can constitute a
"steering crisis," but then he suggests that systems disequilibria become "crises" only
when system performance remains substandard and, as a consequence, the lifeworld's
symbolic reproduction is impaired. See id. The latter formulation is more consistent with
Habermas's usual position. See LEGITIMATION CRISIS, supra note 4, at 3 ("[O]nly when
members of a society experience structural alterations as critical for continued existence
and feel their social identity threatened can we speak of crises.").
407 See 2 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 3, at 385; see also
LEGITIMATION CRISIS, supra note 4, at 61-68, 93.
408 2 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 3, at 330; see also id. at 327,
355.
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colonization," or, the "colonization of the lifeworld."4 °9 This social
pathology arises when crises in the economic and administrative
systems "can be avoided only at the cost of disturbances in the
symbolic reproduction of the lifeworld."410  Or, in Habermas's
more colorful description of this social pathology: "the imperatives
of autonomous subsystems make their way into the lifeworld from
the outside-like colonial masters coming into a tribal society-
and force a process of assimilation upon it."'"' Thus, the term
"colonization." Habermas's idea is that "colonization" occurs
when the informally organized, communicatively structured
domains of action that Habermas has come to call the lifeworld-
the domains of action that are primarily responsible for cultural
reproduction, social integration, and socialization-are disrupted
by the penetration of "alien," systemic forms of organization and
rationality. 2
According to Habermas, tendencies toward colonization are
channeled through the interchange relations his model has
identified. The roles of employee, consumer, citizen, and client are
the points of incursion.413 Habermas is particularly interested in
two of those roles: consumer and client. The reason for focusing
on these roles, according to Habermas, is that with the pacification
of class conflict and the depoliticization of the citizen's role, the
consumer and client roles are the more likely sites of conflict.414
These roles, Habermas claims, have been "upgraded" '415 under
recent conditions, as a sort of "compensation" for employees'
relative lack of power in the workplace and the "neutralized"
citizen's role. 6 And thus in these roles, Habermas maintains, the
"privatized hopes for self-actualization and self-determination are
primarily located." '417
Of these two roles, Habermas spends most of his energy on
the "client" role. He calls the colonization tendency in the relation
between administrative system and client of welfare-state services
409 Sometimes "colonization" appears in the translations as "colonialization."
410 2 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 3, at 305. In an alternative
and less clear formulation, Habermas writes that we can speak of colonization when "the
destruction of traditional forms of life can no longer be offset by more effectively fulfilling
the functions of society as a whole." Id. at 322.
411 Id. at 355.
412 See id. at 330-31.
413 See id. at 349.
414 See id. at 348-51.
415 Id. at 350.
416 Id. at 349-50. Habermas is not altogether clear about the employee role. He notes
that compensation and security against risk have improved, but that work remains
"heteronomously determined."
417 Id. at 356.
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"juridification"-the extension of formal law to areas previously
regulated only informally, and the increasing density of legal
regulation. s18 The term "juridification" does not by itself signify
pathological tendencies, Habermas cautions. The development of
the constitutional state (as in the nineteenth-century German
Rechtsstaat), and the institution of the democratic constitutional
state also count as "juridification," and the institutions established
then were, compared to their predecessor institutions,
"unambiguously freedom-guaranteeing. "419
With respect to these criteria of "freedom-guaranteeing" and
"freedom-depriving," however, Habermas discerns an
ambivalence in the most recent "wave" of juridification. On one
hand, welfare-state programs compensate for risks by creating
legal entitlements to income in case of need or inability to work.
But on the other hand, this "historical progress '420 has costs that
Habermas emphasizes. The bureaucratic structure of the
administrative system requires "a centralized and computerized
handling of social exigencies by large, distant organizations. 421
The individualizing and bureaucratic form in which assistance is
offered affects the "self-image of the person concerned,"
Habermas maintains, and the availability of governmental aid
weakens the "readiness of solidaric communities to provide
subsidiary assistance. "422 Government-provided therapeutic
procedures only reproduce "the contradictions of welfare-state
intervention.., at a higher level": the bureaucratic form of aid,
Habermas claims, is inconsistent with the therapeutic aim of
establishing "independence and self-reliance. ' 423 Habermas thus
identifies a "dilemmatic structure" to welfare-state juridification:
[W]hile the welfare-state guarantees are intended to serve the
goal of social integration, they nevertheless promote the
disintegration of life-relations when these are separated,
through legalized social intervention, from the consensual
mechanisms that coordinate action and are transferred over to
media such as power and money.4 24
Habermas sketches the lines of this thesis through examination of
418 Id. at 357.
419 But cf John Tweedy & Alan Hunt, The Future of the Welfare State and Social Rights:
Reflections on Habermas, 21 J.L. & SOC. 288, 300, 307 (1994) (suggesting that the
institutionalization of civil and social rights were not unambiguously freedom-
guaranteeing because the former rights are connected with the development of a capitalist
economy and the latter rights required state "surveillance and normalization").
420 2 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 3, at 362.
421 Id. at 363.
422 Id. at 362.
423 Id.at363.
424 Id. at 364.
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(then) recent empirical research in social-welfare law, school law,
and family law.425
This research, however, is by now dated, and it was directed
more to a German than an American audience. And in any event,
for present purposes the details of Habermas's argument are less
interesting than the position he assigns to law in this process of
juridification. A legally oriented reader will have detected that my
account of Habermas's basic concepts, as they stood prior to
Habermas's most recent work, says little directly about law. We
know that developments in law are, for Habermas, important to
the rationalization of the lifeworld and the development of media-
steered systems. Law is one of the "cultural systems of action"
established, in early modernity, with the rationalization of
culture .1 6 The basic "legal institutions" of private and public law
institutionalize the media of money and power.427 And the media-
steered subsystems, as well as their constitutive "formal
organizations," are created and regulated by law.428 But law is, in
Habermas's scheme, neither its own subsystem nor a structural
component of the lifeworld. The position it occupies with respect
to the system/lifeworld division is thus unclear.
In his account of "juridification," Habermas suggests that law
may operate as a steering medium. In "[m]ost areas of economic,
commercial, business, and administrative law," he says, "the law is
combined with the media of power and money in such a way that it
takes on the role of a steering medium itself. 4 29 Like the other
steering media, he says, law-as-steering-medium must be secured
by the basic "legal institutions" he has identified.430 But because of
its connection to the media of money and power, law as medium is
"technicized and de-moralized," and it can be evaluated not
substantively but only according to its functionality or
instrumental success.43' Further, as concerns the juridification
thesis, Habermas argues that law, as a steering medium, has been
an instrument of the welfare-state project of taming "modern
relations of power and dependence that arose with the capitalist
enterprise [and] the bureaucratic apparatus of domination." '432 His
classification of law as a steering medium in this project, too, is
part of his diagnosis that welfare-state interventionism has tended
425 See id. at 363-64, 368-73.
426 See supra text accompanying note 226.
427 See supra text accompanying notes 316-17.
428 See supra text accompanying notes 372-74.
429 2 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 3, at 365.
430 See id.
431 Id. at 366.
432 Id.
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to disrupt the communicatively structured, informally organized
domains it regulates.
Habermas did not work out the concept of law as a medium in
the way that his system/lifeworld model would demand-with a
separate system it steers, and an account of its code, standard
situation, generalized value, and other medium-defining
characteristics. And in his most recent work, Habermas repudiates
the idea of law as steering medium.433 We are still left, then, with
the question of law's position in Habermas's system/lifeworld
model. The account he has given suggests that law is relevant to
both system and lifeworld, and that in that respect its significance
is ambivalent. But law finds no particular place in Habermas's
model. It appears, variously, as a "cultural system of action"
alongside science and art,434 as part of the societal component of
the lifeworld (or, at least, the fundamental principles of private
and public law appear there as "legal institutions"), and as a
mechanism that regulates media-steered interaction in the
economic and administrative systems. In Habermas's recent work
on law, he retains the mood of ambivalence, but with a much fuller
and more coherent treatment of law's structure and operation.
The problems in Theory of Communicative Action's treatment
of law are paralleled in its treatment of politics. As with his
account of law, Habermas's account of political institutions and
processes stretches across the divide between system and lifeworld.
One would think, at first, that the state would count as part of the
"institutional complex" that Habermas calls the societal
component of the lifeworld. And Habermas does describe the
constitutionally established framework of state offices as part of
the societal component-though he does not make clear whether
he means the legal framework that organizes those offices, or the
political framework of offices themselves. Habermas notes also
that the exercise of political power must be legitimated, and by
"legitimated" he means not only legally institutionalized but also
normatively justified.435 But once Habermas has introduced the
systems-theoretical conception of political power, he analyzes
what one might call the "political system" almost exclusively as the
formally organized, media-steered "administrative system" that
stands on the "system" side of the system/lifeworld divide.
No doubt this classification of political institutions as both
system and lifeworld, like Habermas's similar treatment of law,
reflects his ambivalence about the state. It reflects, also, his
433 See Between FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 14, at 562 n.48.
434 See supra text accompanying notes 222-26.
435 See supra text accompanying notes 332-39.
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determination to think about democracy in a way that takes
account of modern complexity. Yet Habermas's discussion of
political institutions, rather than genuinely reconciling complexity
and democracy, puts democracy on one side of the divide and
complexity on the other. Habermas's account of the lifeworld's
rationalization presents democracy, and the idea of the discursive
production and justification of political and legal norms, as one of
the West's foremost accomplishments. But his systems-theoretical
account presents an administration that operates through the
steering medium of power, with the "standard situation" of
power's operation described as the "following of imperatives."
And the model of the relation between public sphere and
administrative system describes a process of abstraction-not
necessarily pathological-in which democratic impulses are
transformed, via the power medium, into "mass loyalty."
Habermas's more recent work, we will see, relies on a more
complex notion of power that is not reducible, in its entirety, to
imperative command. 36 And this more recent work, also, is more
attentive to what Habermas calls the political public sphere, as
well as the relations between that sphere and formal governmental
institutions. These changes mark a substantial improvement over
the account given in Theory of Communicative Action.
I have suggested that Habermas's analysis of the uncoupling
of system and lifeworld unnecessarily stylizes and polarizes what
he wants to describe under the two aspects. The interchange
model Habermas uses to bring together the two stylized accounts
does not correct this problem. And the problem is not just that the
model is incomplete-addressing, as Habermas acknowledges,
only the relation between the societal component of the lifeworld
and the two media-steered subsystems.437 The problem is one of
principle, not just coverage. The interchange model is systems-
theoretical, not neutral between the systems and lifeworld
perspectives. On that model's premises, the interchange among
social spheres can be understood only as media-steered. Thus,
Habermas's difficulty in accounting for the relation between
system and lifeworld: the model demands media for the various
lifeworld components, and Habermas denies that any are to be
found. And thus, Habermas's unconvincing imputation of money
436 Habermas had developed the beginnings of this notion in an essay published in 1979.
See Jurgen Habermas, Hannah Arendt's Communications Concept of Power, SOCIAL
RESEARCH, Spring 1977, at 3. But in Theory of Communicative Action, published just
four years later, this "communications concept of power" gives way to the concept of
power as steering medium.
437 See 2 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 3, at 319.
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and power to the public and private spheres in their interchange
with the administrative and economic systems, respectively. This
ad hoc solution leads Habermas to claim, for example, that the
input of labor power to the economic system operates through the
power medium. Power is the more plausible choice, given the
alternative between money and power, but the sale of one's labor
power is not best understood as the giving of a command. These
apparently technical slips and inconsistencies are symptoms of a
more serious problem: the failure to reconcile Habermas's
"lifeworld" approach with his Parsons-inspired notions of systems
theory.
In the following sections I turn to Habermas's recent work on
law, with an emphasis on how he reformulates the system/lifeworld
model to make it more useful in the understanding of law and
politics.
III. SYSTEM, LIFEWORLD, AND HABERMAS'S
"COMMUNICATION THEORY OF SOCIETY"
At the very outset of Between Facts and Norms, Habermas
declares that "the theory of communicative action.., constitutes a
suitable context for a discourse theory of law." '438 He does not so
much explain the basic concepts of his earlier theory as invoke
them. But as I explain in Part III.A below, such conceptual
explication as he provides is generally consistent with the analysis
provided in Theory of Communicative Action.
Still, in developing the "communication theory of society" in
which his "discourse theory of law" is to be situated, Habermas
departs from his earlier understanding of the relation between
system and lifeworld. One reason is that Habermas, for the first
time, is giving systematic attention to law, and it turns out that law
does not fit neatly into either the "system" or "lifeworld" category.
To some extent this was true even in Theory of Communicative
Action-recall Habermas's distinction between "law as medium"
(system) and "law as institution" (lifeworld).439 But Between Facts
and Norms repudiates that distinction. And in placing law on
center stage, the question of law's relation to the system/lifeworld
distinction becomes more pressing. Habermas's initial solution to
438 BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 14, at 7 ("I pursue the dual goal of
explaining how the theory of communicative action accords central importance to the
category of law and why this theory in turn constitutes a suitable context for a discourse
theory of law.").
439 See supra text accompanying notes 429-34.
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this difficulty is a proliferation of metaphors: law, he says,
"mediates" between system and lifeworld or operates as a
"transformer" or "hinge" between system and lifeworld.
In Part III.B, I discuss Habermas's attempt to give these
metaphors more precise content. As I noted in introducing this
Article, Habermas's general aim in the "communication theory of
society" is to explain how the "communicative power" developed
in citizens' public-sphere discussion might influence and check
state "administrative power"-and also how it might not. The
theoretical construction Habermas develops here is the "model of
the circulation of political power."44°
To some extent, I argue, the model of the circulation of power
can be understood as consistent with the distinction between
system and lifeworld. The model provides greater detail
concerning the political public sphere, the "lifeworld
environment" to the administrative system in Theory of
Communicative Action. It presents, also, the idea of "civil society"
as an elaboration of the lifeworld's "private sphere." Many of the
innovations in Between Facts and Norms, then, can be understood
as attempts to flesh out, or to adjust, the framework presented in
Theory of Communicative Action.
But despite Habermas's continued allegiance to the
system/lifeworld distinction, I argue in Part III.C, the model of the
circulation of power in fact reworks the notions of system and
lifeworld so substantially that Habermas's official conceptions no
longer apply. Power, even as it operates in the political system's
core, no longer can be understood as simply the "steering
medium" Habermas described. The relation Habermas describes
as one between "system" and "lifeworld" no longer is channeled
exclusively through steering media, as the old interchange model
prescribes. Law (or, the legal system) straddles the distinction that
was supposed to constitute the theory's axis. And on the
"lifeworld" side, Habermas's continued reference to the three
"structural components" (culture, society, and personality) does
no work for him. As the reader might guess, I think these
developments in Habermas's model of society are for the best, but
in moving away from the older notions of system and lifeworld,
Habermas leaves basic conceptions in his model essentially
untheorized.
I argue that Habermas's revised model can be shored up on
both the "system" and "lifeworld" side of his basic distinction. On
the system side, I suggest in Part IV that Habermas's conception in
440 See BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 14, at 341.
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fact approaches the post-Parsons "autopoietic" systems theory of
Niklas Luhmann-even as Habermas generally polemicizes
against that theory. Further (but selective) appropriation of
autopoietic concepts, I argue, would improve Habermas's social
theory. On the other side of Habermas's basic distinction, I argue
that the concept of lifeworld as separate social sphere should be
rejected entirely.
A. The Official Account of "Lifeworld" and "System"
Habermas's explication of the lifeworld concept, though
abbreviated, tracks the account given in Theory of Communicative
Action. As before, he presents the lifeworld first in Husserlian and
Schutzian terms, as the unproblematic, taken-for-granted
background of human action.441 But also as before, the idea of the
"rationalization of the lifeworld" leads Habermas quickly to a
different conception. In the course of that rationalization,
Habermas claims, the lifeworld's "structural components," still
fused in "archaic" societies,442 differentiate into culture, society,
and personality. 43  And with that rationalization, social
formations' "symbolic reproduction"-cultural reproduction,
social integration and socialization-comes to depend more
heavily upon participants' communicative achievements.4"
This account, like the parallel account in Theory of
Communicative Action, works two changes on the original
phenomenological conception of the lifeworld. First, Habermas's
emphasis on communicative action as mechanism for symbolic
reproduction leads him to see the lifeworld as centered around
specifically communicative action, not so much as the background
to all social action. "The lifeworld," Habermas writes in Between
Facts and Norms, "is constituted from a network of communicative
actions ...... 4 Second, Habermas's discussion of the lifeworld's
44, See BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 14, at 22, 23 (lifeworld as
"unmediated certainty," "all-penetrating yet latent and unnoticed presence," "background
knowledge," and "resource" that resists being "thematized").
442 Id. at 23.
443 See id. at 26 (referring to "differentiated ... lifeworlds"); id. at 55 ("culture, society,
personality structures" as "components" of the lifeworld). See also id. at 353 (noting the
three components and their functions of symbolic reproduction).
44 See id. at 324 (describing reproduction of modern lifeworlds as occurring "only
through communicative action, and that means through processes of reaching
understanding that depend on the actors' responding with yes or no to criticizable validity
claims").
"5 Id. at 80. See also id. at 354 ("The lifeworld forms, as a whole, a network composed
of communicative actions."). Habermas allows that strategic action, not just
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rationalization turns the notion into a concept of society-a
concept that takes on substantive theoretical significance. Social
formations, conceived as lifeworlds, have "structural
components." '446 In the course of historical development, they have
been "rationalized," in the sense that their cultural traditions,
social institutions, and patterns of socialization have come to
depend increasingly on specifically communicative action, and
particularly on rational criticism. This revised conception of the
lifeworld is, in the first instance, a conception of whole social
formations as lifeworlds.
But again following the path marked in Theory of
Communicative Action, the term "lifeworld" soon comes to refer
not to whole social formations but to only certain social spheres.
As before, this redefinition depends on two premises: the
centering of the lifeworld concept around communicative action,
and the idea that system and lifeworld have become uncoupled.
Habermas's account of the uncoupling of system and lifeworld
is consistent with his account in Theory of Communicative Action.
With the rationalization of society as lifeworld, he argues, "the risk
of dissension increases with the scope for taking yes/no positions
on criticizable validity claims.""' At the same time, the potential
for social conflict increases with the differentiation of interest
positions and the "unshackl[ing]" of "self-interested pursuit of
one's own success." '448 The burden of social integration, then, shifts
to the achievements of communicative action, while at the ,same
time that very integration is endangered by the strategic pursuit of
individual interests.449
Money and power, Habermas confirms, operate as "'steering
media" that can relieve the burden on communicative action.
They are mechanisms of "system integration," not (as with
"values, norms, and mutual understandings") "social
communicative action, is possible "in the lifeworld." Id. at 524 n.18. But while the
lifeworld provides a "background" for strategic action, it is "neutralized in its action-
coordinating force." Id. By this cryptic phrase Habermas means that to strategic actors,
norms are just "social facts," not normatively obligatory.
446 Habermas's continued use of the "components" idea is in tension with his claim that
"[t]he communicative concept of the lifeworld breaks with the idea of a whole composed
of parts." Id. at 80. The discussion following this quotation, however, suggests that he
means that the lifeworld's "components" are not separate but interrelated, see id., or as he
puts it elsewhere, "intertwined." Id. at 55.
The idea of culture, society, and personality as "components" is in tension, also, with
Habermas's statement that "[tihe lifeworld forms, as a whole, a network composed of
communicative actions." Id. at 354 (stating both ideas in the same paragraph).
447 Id. at 25.
448 Id.
449 See id. at 26.
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integration.""45 These media deploy "special codes" that abstract
from ordinary language45' and permit users to circumvent the
process of reaching communicative agreement (i.e., consensus over
claims to validity). Although Habermas omits the lengthy
discussion of system differentiation he provided in Theory of
Communicative Action,452 he characterizes the end result of that
process in the same terms. The economic and administrative
system differentiate out from the lifeworld's societal component453
and "separate[] from the lifeworld."454  These systems, which
operate through "markets and governmental bodies,"
respectively,455 "become "independent vis-A-vis socially integrated
spheres of action, that is, spheres integrated through values,
norms, and mutual understanding." '456
Thus for Habermas, the lifeworld concept ultimately is a
partial conception of society, referring to "socially integrated
spheres of action" that are distinct from the economic and
administrative systems. As in Theory of Communicative Action,
the methodological distinction between systems theory and action
theory becomes a substantive distinction that divides the social
turf. And as before, the question arises: what is the relation
between system and lifeworld?
A complete answer to this question will require examination
of Habermas's "circulation of power" model. The preliminary
answer, however, begins with Habermas's claim, consistent with
Theory of Communicative Action, that the "steering media" of
money and power must be "anchored in the society component of
the lifeworld" through "legal institutionalization." '457 Habermas
embellishes on this "anchoring" idea by describing law as a "hinge
between system and lifeworld,"458  or alternatively, as a
"transformer in the society-wide communication circulating
between system and lifeworld."459
What Habermas means by these catchphrases is two things.
First, modern law can be analyzed in both system and lifeworld
450 Id. at 39. As before, the term Habermas uses to include both system and social
integration is "societal integration"-gesellschaftlich rather than sozial.
451 See id. at 56, 354.
452 See supra text accompanying notes 356-79.
453 See BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 14, at 55-56; see also id. at 354.
454 Id. at 40.
455 Id.
456 Id. at 354.
457 Id.; see also id. at 40.
458 Id. at 56.
459 Id. at 81; see also id. at 56 (describing law as a "'transformer' that first guarantees
that the socially integrating network of communication stretched across society as a whole
holds together").
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terms. Viewed from the "system" side of the system/lifeworld
distinction, law institutionalizes the power medium by establishing
the framework of offices and specifying rules of official command.
It institutionalizes the money medium-not just in the sense of
establishing a currency, but also in the sense of establishing and
enforcing private-law rules for money-mediated transactions."
From the "lifeworld" side, legal rules and legal institutions
"belong[] to the societal component of the lifeworld."46  In
developing his "discourse theory of law," with its emphasis on
participatory democratic lawmaking as the source of legal
legitimacy, Habermas makes clear that law, to the extent that it is
accepted as legitimate, is a source of social integration.462 The
production and reproduction of legitimate law, then, is part of the
symbolic reproduction of the lifeworld. Finally, in Habermas's
analysis of the democratic lawmaking process, the production of
legitimate law connects the "communicative power" of citizens'
public-sphere discussion with the "administrative power" that
operates within the differentiated administrative system. In these
ways, law operates as "hinge" between system and lifeworld.
The second sense of Habermas's metaphors is signaled more
clearly in the "transformer" than the "hinge" metaphor.
Habermas, both in Theory of Communicative Action and in
Between Facts and Norms, presents the media of money and power
as specialized languages, differentiated from ordinary language.
To the extent that the democratic lawmaking process successfully
produces valid law, Habermas suggests, it mediates between the
ordinary-language communication of the political public sphere
and the specialized languages of (administrative) power and
money.463 Habermas's idea here is that legal validity has two sides.
On one hand, modern law claims to be legitimate-that is, to be
worthy of citizens' rational assent-and to that extent it is related
to the "[n]ormatively substantive messages" of citizens' political
communication in the public sphere. 46 On the other hand, modern
law leaves open the possibility of a different attitude-obedience
rooted not in normative conviction, but in the fear of sanctions for
non-compliance. According to Habermas, this second aspect of
legal validity is tailored to the strategic pursuit of economic
46) The account of this "institutionalization" is thin in Between Facts and Norms. He
refers to the "legal institutionalization of markets," id. at 75, but without further analysis.
461 Id. at 80. Habermas adds that "legal symbolism," as a body of knowledge, is
"represented" in the cultural component, and that "competences acquired via legal
socialization" are "represented" in the personality component. Id. at 81.
462 See id. at 38-39, 386.
463 See id. at 55-56, 81, 302, 354.
464 Id. at 56.
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interests and the exercise of administrative power (which is,
essentially, the power of command). In this sense, Habermas
claims, law "accepts" the normative "messages" that originate in
lifeworld political communication among citizens and "puts these
into a form that is comprehensible to the special codes of the
power-steered administration and the money-steered economy. "465
And thus "the language of law.., can function as a transformer in
the society-wide communication circulating between system and
lifeworld."6
I will consider in the next section Habermas's attempt, with
his "model of the circulation of power," to give the "hinge" and
"transformer" metaphors more precise content. For the moment,
it's enough to note that the image of law as "hinge" or
"transformer" raises questions for Habermas's understanding of
the system/lifeworld relation. The first question concerns
Habermas's location of "legal institutions" in the lifeworld's
societal component. In Theory of Communicative Action,
Habermas seemed to understand "legal institutions" as basic legal
principles, especially those of contract and property law.4 67 But
what of "legal institutions" such as courts? How are they to be
understood? Do they have a double status, such that they belong
to both system and lifeworld? Or, as the "hinge" and
"transformer" metaphors suggest, are they somehow intermediate
between system and lifeworld, or astride the system/lifeworld
distinction?
Second, how is it that a lifeworld sphere-the political public
sphere--can send "normatively substantive messages" to the
administrative system? The system/lifeworld model developed in
Theory of Communicative Action required that interchange
between system and lifeworld be channeled by system "steering
media." Habermas's idea of "administrative power" conforms to
the conception of a "steering medium," but "communicative
power" does not. How, then, does this communication between
system and lifeworld occur? The question is difficult because
Habermas's conceptual explication of "lifeworld," "system," and
"steering medium" tracks without explicitly revising the accounts
given in Theory of Communicative Action.
465 Id.
4 Id.; see also id. at 56 (describing law as a "'transformer' that first guarantees that the
socially integrating network of communication stretched across society as a whole holds
together").
467 See supra text accompanying notes 190-93, 314-17, 426-34.
2002] 569
HeinOnline -- 23 Cardozo L. Rev. 569 2001-2002
CARDOZO LA W REVIEW
B. The Model of the Circulation of Power
In attempting to situate his discourse theory of democracy
social-theoretically, Habermas introduces what he calls a model of
the "constitutionally regulated circulation of power." '468 In some
ways, this model can be understood as specifying more precisely
Theory of Communicative Action's account of "interchange"
between lifeworld and administrative system. Habermas prefaces
his introduction of the model with a quick run-through of the
distinction between system and lifeworld,4 69 and he provides' an
expanded analysis of the public sphere and "private sphere"-the
lifeworld environments to the administrative system in Theory of
Communicative Action.
But Habermas borrows the model from Bernhard Peters,47
and Peters is critical of the "dualistic conception of system and
lifeworld."47' Unsurprisingly, then, the new model conceives of the
"circulation of power" in a way that avoids some of the difficulties
of Habermas's earlier system/lifeworld model. The changes are
necessary, given the objectives Habermas pursues in his work on
law and democracy-objectives that are fundamentally different
from those pursued in Theory of Communicative Action.
Habermas's earlier system/lifeworld model was the
centerpiece of a politically defensive crisis theory. Apparently
skeptical about the possibility of genuine democracy, Habermas
argued in Theory of Communicative Action that the "colonizing"
tendencies of the economic and (especially) administrative systems
face structural limits: limits rooted in the functional necessities of
symbolic reproduction. Between Facts and Norms, by contrast,
pursues a more "offensive" strategy. The "reconstructive" part of
Habermas's discourse theory of law and democracy investigates
not so much the functional necessities of "symbolic reproduction"
as the explicitly normative principles of the constitutional state.
The leading principle, according to Habermas, is that the state's
exercise of "administrative power" must be linked to citizens'
articulation of communicative power in the political public sphere.
And thus, rather than see the role of the political public sphere as
the production of only "mass loyalty"-the picture developed in
Theory of Communicative Action's system/lifeworld interchange
468 The model is set out in BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 14, at 354-59.
469 See id. at 353-54.
470 See id. at 354 (citing BERNHARD PETERS, DIE INTEGRATION MODERNER
GESELLSCHAFTEN (1993)).
471 Bernhard Peters, On Reconstructive Legal and Political Theory, 20 PHIL. & SOC.
CRITICISM 101, 125 (1994). For the full set of criticisms, see id. at 120-26.
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model-Habermas now sees the political public sphere as
normatively influencing the course of official decision and as
productive of law. To be sure, the point of the "communication
theory of society" is to discover the "inertial moments" that resist
the realization of democratic ideals.4 But the emphatically pro-
democratic thrust of Habermas's project makes the old
system/lifeworld model inappropriate.
The idea of the new "circulation of power" model, then, is to
show more precisely how citizens' communicative power may be
converted into administrative power-power as a steering
medium-and how the latter can be checked by the former. At the
very outset, four changes from the older system/lifeworld model
are apparent (the significance of which will be discussed below).
First, Habermas now refers to "the political system" rather than to
"the administrative system." Second, only the political system,
and not the economic system, appears in the model. (To be sure,
Theory of Communicative Action is not exactly exemplary in its
analysis of the economic system, 473 but it does include that system
in the model.) Third, Habermas presents the political system not
as a single administrative apparatus, but as internally
differentiated into regions of "center" (or "core"), "inner
periphery," and "outer periphery. 47 4 And fourth, in his account of
these regions, Habermas refers much more forthrightly to political
institutions and associations-such as legislatures, courts, and
political parties-in partial replacement of more shadowy
references to anonymous workings of the system.
Habermas's model is easiest to understand if we approach it
first through the center/periphery map.
472 BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 14, at 321; see also id. at 326 (referring to
"the unavoidable inertial features of societal complexity"); id. at 327-28 (contrasting
"unavoidable inertial features" with "illegitimate power complexes").
473 The account of "colonization" focuses entirely on the relation between
administrative system and lifeworld. See supra text accompanying notes 409-32. William
Forbath has perceptively pointed out the deficiencies in Habermas's analysis of the
economic system, both in Theory of Communicative Action and in Between Facts and
Norms. See William E. Forbath, Habermas's Constitution: A History, Guide, and Critique,
23 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 969, 1001-07 (1998) [hereinafter Forbath, Habermas's Constitution];
see also William E. Forbath, Short-Circuit: A Critique of Habermas's Understanding of
Law, Politics, and Economic Life, in HABERMAS ON LAW AND DEMOCRACY: CRITICAL
EXCHANGES 279-86 (Michael Rosenfeld and Andrew Arato eds., 1998) [hereinafter
Forbath, Short Circuit].
474 Likely Peters borrowed this center/periphery schema from the German systems
theorist, Niklas Luhmann. For an account of how Luhmann uses the center/periphery
schema to analyze the legal system, see Baxter, supra note 29, at 2014-24.
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1. The Political System's Center
The "center" or "core area" of the political system, Habermas
explains, is "formed by the familiar complexes of administration."
Each of the three branches of government is represented here.
Habermas mentions "the incumbent Government," by which
presumably he means the executive branch. Included, also, are
"parliamentary bodies," understood in their connection with a
party system that organizes competition for election. More
generally, Habermas refers here to "democratic opinion- and will-
formation," which "includes" parliaments, elections, and party
competition. Finally, Habermas includes the "judicial system" in
the center or "core area" of the political system.75
Inclusion of the executive branch is unsurprising. Habermas's
account of the other two branches, however, requires comment.
First, Habermas's location of "democratic opinion- and will-
formation," through processes of election and legislation, marks a
significant change in his conception of "systems." One prominent
characteristic of "systems," as defined in Theory of Communicative
Action, was that their internal operations (as well as their relations
to their environment) are steered by "media" that circumvent the
process of reaching understanding through communicative
action.476 For the administrative system (now known as the
political system), the medium was power, understood as command.
But Habermas now speaks of "democratic opinion- and will-
formation" in the "core area" of the political system. The political
system's internal operations, then, seem to be communicatively
organized and dependent upon the rational discourse that
Habermas connects to communicative action. Already at this
point, then, the distinction between system and lifeworld is
attenuated in the new model.
The second aspect of the political system's center that
requires comment is Habermas's inclusion of the judicial system.
In some respects, this choice is not surprising. Courts are (at least
typically) state-organized, staffed by state personnel, and (as
Habermas notes in his general account of law) their decisions
presuppose and rely on state enforcement.77 Further, Habermas's
earlier account of the lifeworld's "colonization" saw family and
juvenile courts as part of the administrative system. 8
475 BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 14, at 354-55.
476 See supra text accompanying notes 364-76.
477 See supra text accompanying notes 20-26.
471 See supra text accompanying notes 420-25; see also 2 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE
ACTION, supra note 3, at 367-73.
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But Habermas since has repudiated the idea of "law as
medium" that underwrote his treatment of family and juvenile
courts as part of the welfare-state bureaucracy. And various
passages in Between Facts and Norms affirmatively suggest a
distinction between legal and political systems. Some of these
passages seem to use the term "legal system" to refer to what
Habermas's model calls "the political system." '479 But others seem
to point more strongly toward positing the legal system as a
distinct system-though one linked to the operations of the
political system.
In some of these passages, Habermas flirts with the ideas of
Niklas Luhmann, the late (but still preeminent) systems theorist.
This flirtation is surprising, given Habermas's frequent polemics,
in Between Facts and Norms and elsewhere, against Luhmann's
work. As Habermas notes, Luhmann's brand of systems theory-
the theory of "autopoietic" systems 4"-relies on the idea of a
system's "code" as the basis for the system's identity and unity
(and thus also the system's distinction from its environment). A
code, for Luhmann, is a binary distinction basic to the system's
communications-for the legal system, the distinction between
legal and illegal.4 81 Habermas picks up this idea of the binary legal
code,48 and he suggests also that the political system has its own
binary code. While Habermas, like Luhmann, does not make
entirely clear what this latter binary code is, it appears to be the
479 For example, in one passage Habermas defines "the legal system in the narrow
sense" as including "all interactions that are not only oriented to law, but are also geared
to produce new law and reproduce law as law." BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra
note 14, at 195 (emphasis omitted). He goes on to explain that courts, legislatures,
"Government leaders," and administrative agencies, as well as "political parties, [and]
electorates," are part of the process that produces and reproduces law. Id. at 195-96. That
list corresponds to the list of players that Habermas's model puts in the political system's
center.
480 The term "autopoiesis" means "self-making," "self-creation," or "self-production."
The central idea is that modern societies are differentiated into different systems of
communication-e.g., science, art, politics, law, economy-and that these systems are
"self-referential" and "autonomous." By "autonomous," however, Luhmann does not
mean "independent of 'external' influences," and by "self-referential" he does not mean
that systems do not refer to other systems. His claim, however, is that the conditions for
their external reference are determined internally, through standards, criteria, and
procedures produced in the referring system's own communication.
The terms "autonomous" and "self-referential" have invited much criticism-and in
my view, much confusion. One way of understanding what Luhmann plausibly could
mean by "autonomous" is to think of "autonomy" as a methodological rather than a
substantive principle: to understand the operation of a differentiated system of
communication, begin "internally," with the system's own practices, procedures, and
standards.
481 See id. at 143; see also Baxter, supra note 29, at 2004-09 (introducing Luhmann's
general notion of binary coding and the legal system's legal/illegal code in particular).
4'2 See BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 14, at 143.
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distinction between command and obedience.4 83  Habermas's
positing of separate system codes would seem to commit him to a
distinction between the legal and political systems.4
Despite Habermas's flirtation with the idea of binary codes,
however, he seems content to understand the judicial system as
part of a more comprehensive political system.485 One reason,
likely, is that he still sees "systems" as defined through steering
media, not so much through binary codes. And law, he has now
decided, is not a steering medium. Further, Habermas's discourse
theory of law accounts for the distinctiveness of judicial
communication-its differences from legislative or administrative
communication-through the notion of separation of powers. The
different branches of government represented in the political
system's "center," Habermas claims, have access to different kinds
of reasons and are permitted different sorts of discourse.486
Habermas, then, can place the judicial system within a more
general "political system" without denying the differences that
make argumentation in the judicial system distinctive. Finally-
and this is a point yet to be developed-Habermas's "circulation
of power" model distinguishes between center and periphery
483 See id. at 55, 143. This conception would fit Habermas's idea that the system's
medium is "power," with power understood in terms of command. See supra text
accompanying notes 322-23, 335-39. For his part, Luhmann equivocates, positing two
different codes for the political system. See Baxter, supra note 29, at 2040, 2067-68
(describing and criticizing Luhmann's equivocation between "government/opposition"
and "governing/governed" as the code).
1m One might think that Habermas's discussion of how law and politics mutually
establish one another's codes, see BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 14, at 143-44,
together with his more general emphasis on the "internal connection" between law and
political power, see id. at 133-51, would establish that law and politics are not separate
systems. But Habermas's discussion tracks Luhmann's analysis of the functions that law
and politics perform for one another, see Baxter, supra note 29, at 2039-45, and Luhmann
concludes that law and politics are separate but "structurally coupled" systems. See
Baxter, supra note 29, at 2036-45. Further, to describe law and politics as "internally
linked" is simply to say that they are conceptually related, or that they mutually
presuppose another. The term "link" implies a distinctness even as it implies relation.
Compare BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 14, at 79 ("I would like to distinguish
law and morality from the start"), with id. at 118 (stating that law and morality are
"internally coupled").
485 For example, Habermas relies on state organization and enforcement to suggest, in a
passage separate from the "circulation of power" model, that the legal system, even if
considered to be centered around courts, should be understood as part of the political
system:
Because the specific features of a legal system first appear in state-sanctioned
law, there is a certain plausibility to Weber's theoretical strategy of conceiving
law as part of the political system. Less plausible is Luhmann's further step of
taking modern law out of politics again and giving it independent status as its
own subsystem alongside the administration, economy, family, and the like.
Id. at 74.
486 See id. at 168-93, 238-86.
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according to the degree of formal organization and
institutionalization. The "center" of the political system is formally
organized, i.e., created by positive law, and whether one looks at
courts, legislatures or agencies, the center is the locus of official
decision. Habermas identifies the periphery, by contrast, in terms
of informal organization and separation from official channels of
decision.
2. The Political System's Periphery
Beyond the political system's "center" of decisionmaking
institutions, Habermas identifies an "inner periphery" and an
"outer periphery." 7 The inner periphery, he suggests, includes
self-governing institutions with "rights of self-governance or...
other kinds of oversight and lawmaking functions delegated by the
state" (e.g. "universities, public insurance systems, professional
agencies and associations, charitable organizations, foundations,
etc."). 488 This assemblage of groups is an odd collection. Public
insurance systems would seem more naturally to fit into the state
administration, particularly given Habermas's prior treatment of
welfare bureaucracies as power-wielding, "lifeworld-colonizing"
arms of the state apparatus. 89 At first glance, whether universities
should be seen as exercising powers "delegated by the state"
would seem to depend upon whether they are public or private
institutions. Presumably, however, Habermas is thinking of, for
example, the extensive government sponsorship of university-
based scientific research, especially in the medical and defense
sectors. And so even private universities might be seen as quasi-
state institutions, though generally not ones that make official
governmental decisions. Professional associations-such as, in this
country, the AMA and ABA-perform regulatory functions that
might well have been considered the province of official
government institutions. While "charitable associations and
foundations" fit less naturally into this picture, the "inner
periphery" thus seems to consist mostly in institutions and
associations that perform quasi-state functions without exercising
official state decisionmaking power.
Habermas gives much more attention to the political system's
"outer periphery." In classifying the organizations and
associations one finds there, Habermas distinguishes between
"customers" and "suppliers." By "customers," Habermas means
487 Id. at 355.
488 Id.
489 See supra text accompanying notes 418-32.
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various organizations, such as "business associations, labor unions,
[and] interest groups," which are linked in a network of ongoing
communication with "public agencies."" 9  Habermas seems to see
these "customers" as representatives, of a sort, of the economic
system.49' With respect to the political system, their activity seems
to consist largely in bargaining on behalf of their respective
constituencies.492 They are "customers" in the sense that their
encounters with the political system are directed primarily toward
obtaining governmental largesse and favors for their clients.
The "suppliers" are driven less by directly economic interests
and more by ideological objectives. They are "associations, and
organizations, that, before parliaments and through the courts,
give voice to social problems, make broad demands, articulate
public interests or needs, and thus attempt to influence the
political process more from normative points of view than from
the standpoint of particular interests." '493 These groups include: (1)
"organizations representing clearly defined group interests"; (2)
associations with "goals recognizably defined by party politics"; (3)
"cultural establishments" (such as "academics, writers'
associations, and 'radical professionals"'); and (4) "public-interest
groups" (e.g. environmentalist groups and animal-protection
associations, but also "churches or charitable organizations"). 94
As Habermas is aware, the distinction between customers and
suppliers is not entirely easy to draw.495 Labor unions and industry
associations, for example, seem to be both customers and
suppliers: they seek both to lobby official decisionmakers for
economically favorable outcomes and also to participate more
generally in public debate. But in any event, to the extent that a
group counts as "supplier," it appears in three places in
491 BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 14, at 355.
491 Habermas says that these organizations "fulfill certain coordination functions in
more or less opaque social sectors." Id. "Opacity" sometimes is Habermas-code for
"functional systems." See id. at 321 (referring to "the complexity of opaque and
recalcitrant functional systems"). Further, unions and trade associations both represent
economic interests and (could be said to) "fulfill coordination functions" in the economic
sphere.
492 Habermas refers to "clientele bargaining." Id. at 355.
493 Id.
494 Id. "Charitable organizations" thus appear both in the inner and outer periphery.
Presumably this is not mere inadvertence on Habermas's part; he must have a distinction
in mind between different kinds of charities-one whose primary function is provision of
welfare services, and the other whose primary function is advocacy. Or he may be
recognizing that many charities perform both functions.
495 See id. (referring to the outer periphery "that, roughly speaking, branches into
'customers' and suppliers"'); id. at 356 ("[A]s the debate over corporatist bargaining
shows, the distinction between output-oriented 'customers' and input-oriented 'suppliers'
is not a sharp one.").
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Habermas's topography of the "circulation of power." Besides
populating the political system's outer periphery, "suppliers" are
key players in the public sphere of political discussion, and they
help constitute the network of voluntary associations that
Habermas calls "civil society. ' 4%
3. The Public Sphere and Civil Society
The public sphere, Habermas tells us, is not a system,
institution, organization, or "framework of norms."4 97 His positive
descriptions tend to be highly metaphorical-and the metaphors
sometimes mix indiscriminately. It is a "network 4 98  of
communications with respect to public issues. The political public
sphere is a "sounding board for problems,' 49  a "warning system
with sensors that, though unspecialized, are sensitive throughout
society."5°° The political public sphere "filter[s], 501
"synthesize[s], '"512  and "bundle[s] '"503  "streams of
communication."5°4 Reviewing the usual metaphors of space and
stage and forum-"architectural metaphors of structured
spaces"-Habermas argues that they do not adequately convey the
nature of the political public sphere.505 While these metaphors may
describe limited publics, the political public sphere is detached
from physical presence and simple interactions; it becomes
"extend[ed] to the virtual presence of scattered readers, listeners,
or viewers linked by public media."506  And as detached from
concrete presences and interactions, the political public sphere is,
in Habermas's formulation, a circuit of "as it were, 'subjectless'
496 See infra text accompanying notes 516-29. Habermas notes that these "opinion-
forming associations ... belong to the civil-social infrastructure" of the public sphere.
BETWEEN FAcrS AND NORMS, supra note 14, at 354.
497 Id. at 360.
498 Id.; see also id. at 298 ("peripheral networks of the political public sphere,"
"communicative network of public spheres"); id. at 302 ("networks of the public sphere");
id. at 307 ("an open and inclusive network of overlapping, subcultural publics having fluid
temporal, social, and substantive boundaries"); id. at 359 ("peripheral networks of the
political public sphere"); id. at 373 ("highly complex network").
499 Id. at 359; see also id. at 343 (criticizing autopoietic theory for failing to see the
political public sphere as a "sounding board" for "society-wide problems").
o Id. at 359; see also id. at 300 (describing a "far-flung network of sensors that react to
the pressure of society-wide problems and stimulate influential opinions").
501 Id. at 360; see also id. at 302 (political public sphere and "deliberatively filtered
political communications").
502 Id. at 360.
503 Id. at 362.
5 Id. at 360.
505 See id. at 361.
506 Id.
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forms of communication"'5 7-or, in an alternative formulation, an
"anonymous circuit[] of communication."5"
This array of metaphors may be daunting,"9 but what
Habermas is trying to do with them can be made reasonably clear.
One aim is to characterize the relation between the public sphere
and the political system's center-the sphere of official
decisionmaking (and lawmaking in particular). The other is to
account for the relation between the political public sphere and
the "private sphere" of the lifeworld.
Consider, first, the relation between political public sphere
and political center. The political public sphere is the source of
citizens' "communicative power"-the power of common
convictions that arises through rational debate.t 0  Deliberative
decisionmaking in the political system's "center" is another locus
of communicative power. The idea of the constitutional state,
Habermas has argued, is that citizens' communicative power must
influence the communicative power developed in officials'
deliberations. Or to use another of Habermas's favorite
metaphors: citizens' communicative power must be able to pass
through the "sluice" of official deliberative procedures and
"penetrate[] the constitutionally organized political system.""51
Habermas's reconstruction of the constitutional state notes
that democracy cannot, under modern conditions, mean the
assembly of all the citizens. 12 And thus the political public sphere,
for Habermas, is not a physical space in which the citizenry as a
whole is present and interacts. Instead, the political public sphere
relies on mass-communications media that establish "virtual"
5w Id. at 136; see also id. at 299 ("subjectless communications"); id. at 301 ("subjectless
forms of communication").
508 Id. at 171; see also id. at 136 ("anonymous form" of popular sovereignty through
"'subjectless' forms of communication").
509 Or one might think simply that they, or some of them, are ill-chosen and
symptomatic of weaknesses in Habermas's theory. William Forbath criticizes Habermas's
"electronics metaphors"-not just the "sensors" of the political public sphere, but also the
"transformer" metaphor of law. Forbath reads these metaphors to be "anxious"-
connected with a defensive politics aimed at preventing colonization of the lifeworld. See
Forbath, Habermas's Constitution, supra note 473, at 999; see also Forbath, Short-Circuit,
supra note 473, at 276-77. 1 agree with Forbath that Theory of Communicative Action has
that defensive quality, and I agree also that the system/lifeworld distinction both reflects
and confirms Habermas's defensiveness. See Forbath, Habermas's Constitution, supra
note 473, at 999; Forbath, Short-Circuit, supra note 473, at 276-77. My view, however, is
that Habermas's revised model moves away from the rigidity of the system/lifeworld
conception, even if elsewhere in Between Facts and Norms Habermas recites his earlier
formulations of "system" and "lifeworld."
510 See supra text accompanying notes 49-50.
5t1 BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 14, at 327. For other uses of the "sluice"
metaphor, see id. at 170, 300, 354, 356, 358.
512 See, e.g., id. at 135-36.
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presence-communication among those who never will meet face-
to-face and know nothing or very little of one another's lives. That
is the meaning of his emphasis on "anonymous" and "subjectless
circuits of communication."
The various contributions in these circuits of opinion
influence official decisionmaking only if they are "bundled" to
form what Habermas calls "public opinion." Habermas resists the
usual idea that public opinion is the statistical average of what
people think. Nor does he simply weight the average to reflect the
likelihood of voting, the degree of influence of the respective
opinionholders, or anything of the sort. Oddly-since his concern
here seems to be mainly whether public opinion will influence
decisionmaking in the political system's center-Habermas insists
on a qualitative appraisal of public opinion. And so opinion polls,
on Habermas's view, reflect public opinion "only if they have been
preceded by a focused public debate and a corresponding opinion-
formation in a mobilized public sphere." '513 Relevant factors here
include the "discursive level of opinion-formation" and its
inclusiveness-or, more generally, the "procedural properties of its
process of generation. "114
As a descriptive definition of public opinion, or even the
influence of public opinion, this conception seems inapt. But it
may be more plausible if understood as a "basis for measuring the
legitimacy of the influence that public opinion has on the political
system."" 5 Viewed in this way, Habermas is suggesting that public
discussion has an appropriate democratic influence only to the
extent that the conditions of public debate meet certain discursive
criteria. I will discuss below Habermas's account of the obstacles
that may prevent the public sphere from producing the requisite
"influence" on the political system's center.
The second aim of Habermas's account of the public sphere-
captured in the "sounding board" and "sensors" metaphor-is to
explain how problems and issues make it onto the agenda of public
discussion. The connection is through the lifeworld sphere he calls
"civil society."
The appearance of civil society in Habermas's model is
connected with the shift in his theoretical and political objectives
since Theory of Communicative Action.516 The place that civil
513 Id. at 362.
514 Id. (emphasis omitted).
515 Id. (emphasis added).
516 The term "civil society" is not new to Habermas's work, but he gives it a new
meaning. In prior work, Habermas used the term "civil society" in more or less the same
sense that Marx used it: "a sphere of legally domesticated, incessant competition between
strategically acting private persons." 2 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra
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society now occupies is the lifeworld's "private sphere."5"7  In
Theory of Communicative Action, Habermas saw the private
sphere as centered around the nuclear family-or, from the
perspective of the economic system, to which it was "lifeworld
environment," centered around the "private household." The
roles of "employee" and "consumer," Habermas said, were the
relevant roles for money-steered interchange between the
economic system and private sphere. Habermas did not consider
in Theory of Communicative Action the relation between the
private sphere and the political system. 18
In Between Facts and Norms, by contrast, Habermas is
interested precisely in the relation between private sphere and the
political system. Habermas's focus on "civil society," rather than
the employee and consumer roles, reflects this new interest. What
he is investigating is the political significance of the private sphere.
How, he asks, is it related to the public sphere of political
discussion, and how in turn is it related to formal political
decisionmaking?
Habermas's understanding of "civil society" is consistent with
that term's common usage in recent political discussion. His most
usual definition presents civil society as a "network of voluntary
associations," ' although he includes also family relations."' The
voluntary associations that constitute civil society, Habermas
emphasizes, are "noneconomic," '52 "informal," '522 and generally
egalitarian. 23 Civil society, so conceived, is thus distinct from both
the economic and political systems. 24 Habermas makes clear that
civil society is a "lifeworld" sphere.2
Civil society's "lifeworld" location is the source of its strategic
role in Habermas's theory. The problems, concerns and issues of
note 3, at 178. In that sense, the term "civil society" referred essentially to the sphere of
economic relations. Habermas now disavows that usage. See BETWEEN FACTS AND
NORMS, supra note 14, at 366.
517 See BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 14, at 354 (civil society as "core
private spheres of the lifeworld").
518 See 2 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 3, at 320, fig.39.
519 BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 14, at 175; see also id. at 358, 366-67.
520 See id. at 354, 365; see also id. (mentioning friendships and neighborly relations).
521 Id. at 366.
522 See, e.g., id. at 352 (referring to "the informal contexts of communication found
in... civil society").
523 Id. at 367. Parent/child relations presumably do not count as fully egalitarian.
524 See id. at 299 ("[C]ivil society, as the social basis of autonomous public spheres," is
distinguished "from both the economic system and public administration."); id. at 301
(referring to "the associations of a civil society quite distinct from both state and economy
alike"); id. at 366 (The "institutional core" of civil society "comprises . .
nongovernmental and non-economic connections and voluntary associations.").
525 See id. at 302, 335, 352, 366-67, 382.
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everyday life, he suggests, are discussed in civil-social associations
before they become items of public-sphere discussion. 26
Participants in public-sphere discussion are, Habermas says,
"recruited" from civil society's voluntary associations . 2  And so
these associations may "distill and transmit" responses to lifeworld
problems "in amplified form to the public sphere. 5 28 Civil society,
to the extent that it is autonomous from both the state and
political systems, is in this way a source of "counterknowledge"-
counter, that is, to official conceptions in the political system's
formal decisionmaking institutions.29
Together, then, civil society and the political public sphere
establish a link between system and lifeworld. This link, on
Habermas's view, is what makes genuine democracy possible. At
the same time, Habermas emphasizes a number of preconditions.
4. The Circulation of Power and the Possibility of Democracy
One set of preconditions for democracy, according to
Habermas, has to do with the "culture" and "personality"
components of the lifeworld-not just the "society" component in
which voluntary associations are rooted. Democracy, he claims,
presupposes "a liberal political culture supported by
corresponding patterns of political socialization.""53  In other
words, the -society in question must have a tradition of inclusive
and broad political participation, and individuals must be both
able and disposed to take advantage of the possibilities that the
culture presents. "Otherwise," Habermas suggests at one point,
doubtless with an eye on Eastern Europe and Russia, "populist
movements arise that blindly defend the frozen traditions of a
lifeworld endangered by capitalist modernization." '531  More
generally: public debate otherwise would cordon off some topics
from rational discussion, or it would fail to include all whose
interests are potentially affected, or both. And either possibility
526 See, e.g., id. at 367 ("Civil society is composed of those more or less spontaneously
emergent associations, organizations, and movements that, attuned to how societal
problems resonate in the private life spheres, distill and transmit such reactions in
amplified form to the public sphere.").
527 Id. at 354.
528 Id. at 367.
529 Id. at 372.
530 Id. at 317; see also id. at 131 ("liberal political culture"); id. at 302 ("a liberal political
culture ... an enlightened political socialization"); id. at 371 ("liberal political culture and
the corresponding patterns of socialization"); id. at 437 ("liberal political culture and
corresponding socialization patterns").
531 Id. at 371.
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would offend the principle of democracy, as Habermas
understands it.
Second, both civil society and the political public sphere must
be legally protected to ensure their autonomy. Basic rights of free
speech, press, association, and assembly are necessary not just for
the political public sphere, but for civil society as well.532 In fact,
Habermas claims, civil society is constituted through these basic
rights, as well as through legal protections of "privacy"-where
this last is understood as the protection of autonomous choice in
matters of lifestyle and judgment.5 3   These legal protections, if
effective, safeguard both the political public sphere and civil
society from state domination. 34
Third, both civil society and the political public sphere must
be insulated also from the effects of unequal "social power"-that
is, unequal "possibilities ... in social relationships to assert [one's]
own will and interests, even against the opposition of others. 5 35
While the power to assert one's will and interests is essential to
political participation,536 gross inequalities in the distribution of
social power mean that some may "influence the political process
in such a way that their interests acquire a priority not in accord
with equal civil rights." '537 Habermas suggests that the egalitarian
structures of voluntary associations may, to some extent, "absorb
and neutralize" differences in social power. But at the same time,
the democratic potential of civil society itself depends upon a more
or less equal distribution of power. 38 And so does the democratic
potential of the political public sphere.539 Of course the problem is
that the redistribution of unequal social power is extraordinarily
unlikely if that very inequality renders civil society and the
political public sphere democratically ineffective. Perhaps in
confession of the difficulty of this dilemma, Habermas suggests at
one point that genuine democracy would be possible "[o]nly in an
egalitarian public of citizens that has emerged from the confines of
class and thrown off the millennia-old shackles of social
532 See id. at 368.
533 Id.
534 See id. at 368-69.
535 Id. at 175.
536 Habermas distinguishes between facilitative and restrictive effects of social power.
In order to participate at all, one must be in a position to assert one's will and interests.
But a grossly unequal di'stribution of social power threatens to restrict the communicative
freedom of the comparatively disempowered. See id. at 175.
537 Id.
538 See id. (noting that democracy requires, inter alia, a "civil society ... and a political
culture that are sufficiently detached from class structures").
539 See, e.g., id. at 307 (referring to the dangers that "unequally distributed social
power" poses to the political public sphere).
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stratification and exploitation. '"540 That does not seem to be our
situation.
Fourth, a precondition for modern democracy is an
appropriate role for the mass communications media. As
Habermas recognizes, the modern political public sphere requires
these media, if political communication and debate is to extend
beyond simple (and generally ineffective) face-to-face interaction.
But at the same time, the expense of many forms of
communication, together with dominance of print and television
by powerful organizations, means a centralization of "control"
over the selection of "topics, contributions, and authors into the
mass-media-dominated public sphere." '541 Habermas notes also the
economic incentives toward dumbing-down of political reporting
and commentary542 (or, for that matter, minimizing it in favor of
purer forms of entertainment).
Habermas noted these dangers in 1992, and so he was unable
to consider whether the Internet could, in some measure, counter
the trends toward centralized control. (There is, of course, a
literature on this subject that reaches varying conclusions.) The
diagnosis he presents in Between Facts and Norms is three-fold.
First, he notes studies that find readers not so passive as the
sharpest media critics believe. 43 Second, he presents a normative
argument that "the mass media ought to understand themselves as
the mandatary of an enlightened public whose willingness to learn
and capacity, for criticism they at once presuppose, demand, and
reinforce."'5" Third, he suggests that government regulate the mass
media to require broader access and presentation of non-centrist
points of view . 45 The obvious difficulty with this last idea-and
one that Habermas acknowledges-is that using state
administrative power to select among speakers raises substantial
free-speech concerns.
Habermas notes, also, an additional obstacle to genuine
democracy: the tendency of governmental institutions in the
political system's center to shortcircuit the "official" or
"constitutional" circulation of power. The "official" pattern of
circulation, reconstructed in Habermas's discourse theory of
democracy, prescribes that legislative initiatives are to come from
the citizens' exercise of "communicative power." Set out social-
540 Id. at 308.
541 Id. at 376.
542 See id. at 378.
543 See id.
544 Id.
545 See id.
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theoretically, in terms of Habermas's center/periphery model of
the political system, communicative power, emerging in the public
sphere as a response to the impulses from civil society, must flow
through the "sluices of democratic and constitutional procedures
situated at the entrance to the parliamentary complex." '546 But in
practice, Habermas acknowledges, much "normal business"
crosscuts this official flow. And this, he says, is unavoidable. Most
operations of the core "proceed according to routines" that are not
necessarily linked to popular initiatives.
From a normative standpoint, the only decisive question
concerns which power constellations these patterns reflect and
how the latter can be changed. This in turn depends on whether
the settled routines remain open to renovative impulses from
the periphery. In cases of conflict, that is, processing matters
according to the usual conventions is eclipsed by another mode
of operation. 47
Habermas calls this other mode "problematization." Here "the
attention span of the citizenry enlarges," and "[t]he pressure of
public opinion" compels the core institutions to switch over to
"constitutional channels for the circulation of power." '48
Habermas is not altogether optimistic about the possibilities
here. "[U]nder certain circumstances," he says, "civil society can
acquire influence in the public sphere, have an effect on the
parliamentary complex (and the courts) through its own public
opinions, and compel the political system to switch over to the
official circulation of power." '549 But in addition to the obstacles
noted above-the effects of unequal social power and the
normalizing power of the mass media-Habermas acknowledges
that political parties and leaders, too, have ways of managing
public opinion.5" While political parties are essential to the
operation of the political system's center,551 their function of
recruiting and disciplining officeholders may well interfere with
the development of sufficiently discursive public debate. 52
Habermas does note, however, that many of the important
movements in the last two decades-antinuclear movements,
environmental movements, feminism, and multiculturalism, to
546 Id. at 356. Habermas writes "parliamentary complex or the courts," but at the
moment my interest is only in the legislative process.
141 Id. at 357.
548 Id.
549 Id. at 373 (emphasis omitted).
550 See id. at 367, 443.
551 See id. at 354-55.
552 See id. at 367 (referring to "a public sphere.., inundated by the public relations
work, propaganda, and advertising of political parties and groups").
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name a few of his examples-have originated in civil society,
eventually making it onto the "agenda" of the public sphere. And
only much later, after a long period of public opinion-formation,
did they gain official attention.553 Civil society, then, has for
Habermas an innovating role in the democratic lawmaking
process.
C. The Status of the System/Lifeworld Model
With the above sketch of Habermas's "circulation of power"
model in mind, the question becomes: what has happened to the
system/lifeworld model that Habermas defended earlier? As I
showed in Part III.A above, Between Facts and Norms officially
presents the concepts of system and lifeworld more or less as
Habermas developed them in Theory of Communicative Action.
But immediately after concluding one of these official
presentations,554 Habermas presents the "circulation of power"
model, and that model on its face expresses differences from
Habermas's earlier system/lifeworld theory. In this part of the
Article, I will be considering whether or not Habermas's new
model effectively abandons many of the central assumptions of the
earlier system/lifeworld scheme. I look at this matter as someone
who believes-as argued in Part II above-that the original
system/lifeworld model is untenable.
1. Mapping Center/Periphery Against System/Lifeworld
Habermas's "circulation of power" model speaks more of the
political system's "center" and "periphery" than it speaks of
system and lifeworld. Habermas does not make clear how the
center/periphery schema maps out against the distinction between
system and lifeworld. Does the periphery-especially the "outer
periphery"-belong to system or lifeworld? And what effect does
the notion of "periphery" have? If, as it seems, the concept of
"periphery" blurs the boundary between system and lifeworld,
then does the distinction between system and lifeworld still have
significance?
The changes that the notion of "periphery" might effect are
-53 See id. at 381.
554 See id. at 354 (outlining the concepts of system and lifeworld, and explaining the
"uncoupled but anchored" relation of system to lifeworld, but then turning to the new
model).
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easiest to see when one examines the position the two models
assign to the political public sphere. Habermas's earlier
system/lifeworld model made clear that the political public sphere
belongs to the "societal component" of the lifeworld, as the
administrative system's environment.5 The public sphere was not
"in" the administrative system; instead, it was related externally to
that system through media-steered, input/output interchange
relations.
The newer model, however, speaks of "the political system"
rather than the administrative system, and it presents the relevant
system as differentiated into center and periphery. One would
think that the "center" of the political system might be the same as
the old, undifferentiated administrative system. Not so. While
"the incumbent Government" seems to correspond at least
roughly to the old administrative system, Habermas includes at the
political system's center legislative bodies and courts-institutions
not clearly accounted for in the old system/lifeworld model, and
difficult (as Habermas now acknowledges) to see entirely in terms
of administrative power (or, the steering medium of "power as
command"). Even the "center" of the new "political" system
seems more expansive than the old administrative system, and
Habermas makes clear that its workings cannot be accounted for
solely in terms of "power as command."
Introduction of the political system's "periphery" complicates
matters further. The term "periphery" is ambiguous. Does it
include the public sphere? Civil society? Does it refer to the outer
reaches of the political system-distant regions that still are within
the system's boundaries? Or does it refer instead only to those
"peripheral" regions that are beyond the system's perimeter?
Much of Habermas's initial account of the periphery is a list
and description of the various players that populate that region-
the quasi-state organizations and associations of the "inner
periphery," and the "customers" and "suppliers" of the outer
periphery.556  The public sphere is emphatically not an
organization, association, or system. For that reason, it is difficult
to place on the system's "periphery." Habermas, however, states
that the political public sphere is the political system's "real
periphery." '557 Other statements are to similar effect.5 Still other
515 See supra text accompanying notes 392-96.
556 1 leave aside here the question whether the public-spirited "suppliers" of the "outer
periphery" are among the voluntary associations Habermas takes to constitute civil
society. The answer seems to be "yes," unless Habermas is distinguishing between
relatively informal associations (civil society) and the more formally organized
organizations he calls "suppliers."
557 BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 14, at 355-56 ("with its informal, highly
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statements are more equivocal, 59 but on balance, Habermas seems
to suggest that the political system's "periphery" includes the
political public sphere. In fact, Habermas suggests that the political
system's periphery includes also the sphere he calls "civil
society.'"6
That leaves the question whether the periphery is part of the
political system-i.e., within the system's boundaries-or whether,
instead, it is a region "peripheral" to the system in the sense of
lying beyond the system's outer limit. Habermas cannot avoid the
question, because the system/lifeworld distinction, even as
formulated in Between Facts and Norms, sees systems as
differentiated and separate from their environments. Systems
theory depends upon the distinction between system and
environment. And so if systems-theoretical concepts still have
meaning to Habermas-as he says they do-then he has to answer
the "boundary" question.
Habermas does not make his answer altogether explicit, but if
he is retaining his system/lifeworld distinction, the answer has to
be that the periphery lies outside the political system's boundary. 61
The political public sphere, he says, is not organized as a system.62
And further, Habermas makes clear that "civil society" belongs to
differentiated and cross-linked channels of communication, the public sphere" "forms the
real periphery").
558 See id. at 352 (referring to "the peripheral networks of the political public sphere
and... the parliamentary complex"); see also id. at 356 (referring to "communication
flows that start at the periphery and pass through the sluices of democratic and
constitutional procedures situated at the entrance to the parliamentary complex or the
courts"); id. at 357 (stating that the possibility of "official" or "constitutional" circulation
of power depends upon "whether the settled routines remain open to renovative impulses
from the periphery"); id. at 358 (stating that constitutional circulation of power requires
that the "periphery must.., introduce [problems] via parliamentary (or judicial) sluices
into the political system in a way that disrupts the latter's routines"); id. at 442 (describing
the political public sphere as "the impulse-generating periphery that surrounds the
political center").
559 See, e.g., id. at 298 (referring to "a political system tied into the peripheral networks
of the political public sphere").
560 Id. at 330 (stating that the possibility of democracy depends upon whether "civil
society, through resonant and autonomous public spheres, develops impulses with enough
vitality to bring conflicts from the periphery into the center of the political system"); see
also id. at 381 (referring to the "civil-social periphery"); id. at 382 ("[E]ven in more or less
power-ridden public spheres, the power relations shift as soon as the perception of
relevant social problems evokes a crisis consciousness at the periphery," and this amounts
to an "endogenous mobilization of the public sphere.").
561 One passage in Between Facts and Norms seems to confirm this interpretation.
Describing the way in which impulses from the periphery may affect official
decisionmaking, Habermas writes: "[A]n activated periphery must then introduce [latent
problems] via parliamentary (or judicial) sluices into the political system in a way that
disrupts the latter's routines." Id. at 358. Here the periphery seems to be conceived as
lying outside the political system.
562 See id. at 360.
HeinOnline -- 23 Cardozo L. Rev. 587 2001-2002
CARDOZO LA W REVIEW
the lifeworld-with the usual specific address being the lifeworld's
"societal component." '563  Thus the periphery, conceived as
including both the political public sphere and civil society, must
not be within the political system's boundaries.
But while this answer resolves the "mapping" issue, it also
raises further problems. One difficulty is at least terminological,
and possibly conceptual. If the "periphery" is not properly part of
the political system, then why does Habermas describe the
political system as differentiated into center and periphery?
Instead of referring to governmental decisionmaking institutions
as the political system's "center," it would be enough to refer to
them as, simply, "the political system." Only if the periphery were
part of the system would we need the distinction between center
and periphery. Otherwise, we should speak more simply of system
and environment, or system and not-system.
Two other difficulties will be the subject of separate sections.
First, if the periphery is beyond the political system's boundaries-
lying in the domain Habermas calls the lifeworld-then Habermas
must account for the interchange between system and lifeworld.
The account he has given in Between Facts and Norms is full of
terms like "influence," "communication of normative messages,"
and the like. These notions are impossible to square with the
austere "media theory" announced in Theory of Communicative
Action. Habermas's "circulation of power" model, I will suggest,
confirms the criticisms I made of the earlier "interchange model."
A second difficulty is that the reasons why the public sphere
and civil society cannot be part of the political system-why they
must be assigned to the lifeworld-also suggest that the center is
not a "system," either. Very little of the Parsons-inspired systems
theory actually animates Habermas's current work-
notwithstanding his formal allegiance to the earlier "systems"
concept.
2. The Two Models and Interchange Among Social Spheres
The model of system/lifeworld interchange presented in
Theory of Communicative Action is a systems-theoretical model.
According to Habermas's critical appropriation of Parsons's media
theory, interchange between systems operates through the media
proper to the related systems. The media proper to the economic
and political systems, Habermas claimed, are money and political
563 Id. at 366-67.
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power. Habermas recognizes only money and power as "steering
media." As described in Part II.C.2 above, Habermas specifically
rejects Parsons's suggestions that "influence" and "value-
commitment" qualify as media analogous to money. And as
described in Part II.D, that makes the model of system/lifeworld
interchange asymmetric. The lifeworld spheres that Habermas
presents as operating in media-controlled interchange with the two
systems-the public and private sphere-have no media of their
own to contribute to the interchange. And so their "inputs" into
the two systems must be assimilated to the media of money and
power. The irony of this conceptual strategy is that, while
designed to preserve the integrity of the lifeworld in all its
normative richness, the strategy requires Habermas to conclude
that the public sphere contributes only "taxes" and "mass loyalty"
to the administrative system, in exchange for "organizational
performances" and "binding decisions." The system-theoretical
frame of Habermas's interchange model, together with the
assumptions he makes about the nature of interchange and
steering media, leads him in Theory of Communicative Action to a
hollowed-out conception of democracy's workings.
As I argued in Part II.D, Habermas likely chose this
conceptual strategy in order to make his argument normatively
minimalist. The argument of Theory of Communicative Action is
not a normative exhortation for more democracy or greater
economic justice. -While Habermas's account of the lifeworld's
"rationalization" is designed to demonstrate the unexhausted
"rational potential" in modern societies-the only selective and
partial realization of "communicative rationality"-his diagnosis
of modern "social pathologies" takes the form of a crisis theory.
Independent of the political will to resist the "colonizing"
tendencies of economic and bureaucratic systems, he argues, those
tendencies face unavoidable limits-limits rooted in the functional
necessity of "symbolically reproducing" the lifeworld. The focus
of Habermas's system/lifeworld model, then, was on the effects
that systems have upon the lifeworld, not so much the influence
that the lifeworld might have on systems.
Between Facts and Norms is a very different project. The
argument is much more strongly normative. Legal norms are
legitimate, he claims, only if they conform to the principle of
democracy. And that means that they must be able to "meet with
the.., assent of all citizens in a discursive process of legislation
that in turn has been legally constituted"5" (though, with due
564 Id. at 110.
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regard for fair compromise). 65  Habermas's recourse to social
theory is designed as a "translation" of the strongly normative
principles of the discourse theory of democracy."6 Accordingly,
the "circulation of power" model focuses on the conditions
necessary for the production of legitimate law: (1) a "vibrant" civil
society567 must transmit "impulses" to the political public sphere
that express unresolved social problems that are susceptible of
political solution; (2) a "robust"568 and "unsubverted '5 69 political
public sphere must discursively process these impulses to generate
"public opinion"; (3) this public opinion must "influence"570 the
deliberations of official decisionmakers (primarily legislative
bodies) in the political system's center; and (4) the
administration's exercise of "administrative power" must be bound
by the normative premises of legal rules and principles whose
existence ultimately depends upon citizens' "jurisgenerative"
communicative power. The focus, then, is on how lifeworld
structures peripheral to the political system-civil society and the
public sphere-may "influence" the operation of the political
system that is differentiated from the lifeworld.571
Notice the term "influence." Habermas's argument in
Between Facts and Norms uses the idea of "influence" to
characterize the relation between spheres constituted through
communicative action-civil society and public sphere-and the
"system" that, Habermas still claims, is qua system organized
around a "steering medium." No longer must system and lifeworld
be related only through money and power. Instead, the "input"
from lifeworld to system operates through "influence," and Theory
of Communicative Action specifically concludes that "influence" is
not the name of a steering medium." Without acknowledging the
point, Habermas effectively has abandoned the premises of his
systems-theoretical conception of "interchange" between system
and lifeworld.
565 See supra text accompanying notes 45-47.
566 See BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 14, at 357-58, 373.
567 Id. at 461.
161 Id. at 280.
569 Id. at 461.
570 Id. at 362, 363.
571 See, e.g., id. at 371 ("[I]nfluence" generated in public sphere must "pass[] through
the filters of the institutionalized procedures of democratic opinion- and will-formation
and enter[] through parliamentary debates into legitimate lawmaking.").
572 See supra text accompanying notes 343-53. Habermas is aware that his use of the
term recalls his rejection of Parsons's proposed "influence" medium. See BETWEEN
FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 14, at 363 (discussing question of public opinion's
"influence" on political system, then reviewing Parsons's conception of influence as
medium); id. at 556 n.50 (note appended to above discussion, recalling his rejection in
Theory of Communicative Action of Parsons's proposed "influence" medium).
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My argument does not depend upon Habermas's having
chosen the term "influence" to describe the effect of the political
system's periphery (read: lifeworld) upon the system's center. The
very premise of Habermas's project is to account for how
informally organized spheres, constituted by and centered around
communicative action, may send "normatively substantive
messages" to spheres that, supposedly, are differentiated as
"systems" that operate and communicate only through steering
media. This conception is impossible to reconcile with the media
theory that Habermas embraced in Theory of Communicative
Action.
3. "System" Revisited
Habermas's media theory was supposed to account not just
for the relations among systems, but for the "internal" operations
of systems as well. Here, too, the concept of "steering medium" is
central for Habermas. A defining characteristic of a steering
medium is that it allows calculating, strategic actors to circumvent
the process of reaching understanding over contested validity
claims."' Habermas in effect defines "systems" as spheres of
action in which steering media, not linguistic consensus, play the
central coordinating role.574  Habermas refers to systems as
"media-steered," as opposed to "communicatively organized."
A second feature of Theory of Communicative Action's
"system" conception is the notion of formal organization. By
"formally organized," Habermas means "created by positive law."
Habermas makes clear, first, that the economic and administrative
systems as a whole are created by positive law: the media of money
and power, he says, must be "legally institutionalized" for the
media to operate as stable systems media. And further, Habermas
extends the notion of formal organization to include the entities
and associations that populate the economic and administrative
systems. Here he is thinking of bureaucratic organizations-both
business firms and government agencies-that are structured
hierarchically and have defined expectations for membership that
are enforced through command.
Combining these two features, I noted in Part ILC above,
Theory of Communicative Action develops a hyperbolic
conception of these systems as "norm-free structures" in which
"the lifeworld"-understood as the cultural tradition, social norms,
573 See supra text accompanying notes 314-15.
574 See supra text accompanying notes 371-79.
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and personal competences and dispositions-is irrelevant for the
coordination of action. I argued strenuously against this
conception.575
In Between Facts and Norms, Habermas's explications of the
"systems" concept do not explicitly revise his earlier account.
While he does not repeat the more hyperbolic claims about
"norm-free structures," he does make clear that a defining
characteristic of a "system," and what renders it "independent"
from the lifeworld, is its development of a steering medium that
allows users to circumvent the process of communicative
agreement.
That understanding of a "system" was what made clear-
despite initial ambiguity-that the "peripheral" spheres of civil
society and the public sphere could not be systems or part of the
political system proper. They have no steering media of their own,
operating instead through "influence"-which, again, is not a
steering medium on Habermas's view. They reproduce themselves
through communicative action and are "communicatively
organized," which for Habermas indicates "lifeworld" rather than
"system" status.
But now consider Habermas's account of the political
system's center. Legislatures, he claims, operate deliberatively,
and while they have special procedures that structure and (because
of time constraints) sometimes terminate discourse,576 they do not
operate simply through the power of command. Instead, they are
part of the process of "democratic opinion- and will-formation." '77
Similarly, Habermas understands the adjudicative structure as
consistent with the "discourse principle," even if time and
relevance constraints limit the scope of available arguments, and
even if the participating lawyers-though not the judge-are
expected to present arguments strategically. 8 And even the
"administration" operates through discourse as well as through
command.579
Communicative action and discourse, then, are not peculiar to
the lifeworld. Habermas's expansion of the idea of political power
to include communicative as well as administrative power, and his
171 See supra text accompanying notes 379-86, 433-37.
576 See BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 14, at 171 (stating that
institutionalized parliamentary discourse may be regulated and structured, provided that
the "necessary communicative presuppositions" of discourse are "sufficiently fulfilled");
id. at 179 (describing majority rule in "institutionalized deliberations" as a "caesura"
rather than a termination of discourse).
577 Id. at 354.
578 See id. at 235-37.
579 See id. at 192 (the administration is limited to "pragmatic discourses").
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ready admission that communicative power is generated through
discourse in the political system's center, suggest a move away
from the earlier conception of "systems." The notion of a
"steering medium"-power as command, in the case of the
political system-is too crude a tool for Habermas's theory of
democracy. And so although his official explications of the
"system" concept still insist that systems are differentiated out
around steering media, Habermas's actual analysis of the political
system is more sophisticated. It had to be, given Habermas's
objectives in Between Facts and Norms.
Here, as with the unacknowledged revisions of the
"interchange" concept, the developments seem to me clear
improvements. But in what sense is the political system now a
"system"? And, with respect to the notion of interchange, are we
limited to the "electronics metaphors"'580 of "impulse," "amplifier,"
"transformer," along with the water metaphor of "sluices"? Is
Habermas's mixing of these metaphors the best theoretical (let
alone literary) strategy?
In the concluding part of this Article, I will suggest that a
better conception of social "systems," and a better account of the
relations among social spheres, might be available through a
selective appropriation of more recent systems theory. I have in
mind here the "autopoietic" theory of the late Niklas Luhmann,
Habermas's longtime partner in debate, and probably Habermas's
equal in eminence among continental social theorists. As I have
noted in passing already, Habermas's encounters with Luhmann's
"autopoietic" theory are almost entirely polemical. I will argue in
the conclusion that Habermas's interpretation of autopoietic
theory is, for the most part, a caricature. And oddly, at the same
time that Habermas blisters the idea of autopoiesis, he states
offhandedly that the political and legal systems are
"autopoietic."581 Habermas appropriates the most dubious aspect
of Luhmann's work-the idea of the binary code, discussed briefly
above and somewhat more expansively below.5 82 A more accurate
reading of Luhmann's work, and a more judicious borrowing from
it, could rehabilitate Habermas's collapsed notion of social
580 1 take this phrase from William Forbath. See Forbath, Habermas's Constitution,
supra note 473, at 999; see also Forbath, Short-Circuit, supra note 473, at 276-77.
581 See BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 14, at 354 ("The language of law
brings ordinary communication from the public and private spheres and puts it into a form
in which these messages can also be received by the special codes of autopoietic systems-
and vice versa."). But cf. id. at 352 (calling it "impossible to conceive politics and law as
autopoietically closed systems").
582 See supra text accompanying notes 480-84; infra text accompanying notes 610, 616-
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systems.
4. "Lifeworld" Revisited
I have described the successive shifts in Habermas's notion of
the lifeworld: from (1) the phenomenological concept of lifeworld
as the unproblematic, naively relied upon set of resources on
which social interaction draws, to (2) the idea that society as a
whole can be conceived as "lifeworld," with the "structural
components" of culture, society, and personality, to (3) the notion
of the lifeworld as a separate (because communicatively
organized) social sphere, involved in interchange with the
systemically integrated economy and administration. These shifts
are particularly apparent in Theory and Communicative Action,
but they appear also in the official lifeworld-explicating passages
of Between Facts and Norms.
In my view, both (2) and (3) above are problematic in
principle, and neither idea fits well with the line of argument
followed in Between Facts and Norms.
Consider, first, the "components" idea. This idea begins to
emerge in Theory of Communicative Action when Habermas is
criticizing, from within, the phenomenological conception of the
lifeworld. If we understand the lifeworld as the background of
social interaction, and as the stock of resources on which actors
draw, then we see that actors rely on culturally transmitted
knowledge, group memberships, and personal identities (including
skills, dispositions, and motivations), not just the cultural "stock of
knowledge" that Schutz emphasized. 83 As I pointed out, and as
Habermas acknowledges, this list corresponds closely to Parsons's
culture/society/personality schema."M These resources of action,
however, become lifeworld "components" only when Habermas
makes a methodological shift. He is interested, he says, in
developing the "lifeworld" concept not just as a means for
analyzing this or that particular context of action, or even the
problematic of social action in general. Instead, his focus is on the
lifeworld "as a whole,""5 5 and in particular, how the lifeworld
reproduces itself through time.586 Not social action so much as
society becomes his object of investigation. And at this point, we
have the idea that society as a whole can be seen as lifeworld.
583 See supra text accompanying notes 176-88.
584 See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
585 2 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 3, at 136.
586 See id. at 136-37.
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Habermas quickly converts the resources of action-"culture,"
"society," and "personality"-into "structural components of the
lifeworld," or rather, structural components of society seen as
lifeworld.
This last move is puzzling. Why would we necessarily think
that society has "components," if that term has the ordinary
meaning of "parts"? And why would we assume that culture,
society, and personality are the appropriate parts?
As Habermas has explained, his interest is in accounting for
how societies reproduce themselves through time. Certainly he is
right that a society's continued existence-as recognizably the
same society-depends upon its ability to maintain, even through
change, a cultural tradition. Clearly, also, a society needs to be
able to maintain (again, even through change) its basic social
institutions, and equally clearly, it needs to transmit appropriate
skills, dispositions, and motivations to its members. What
Habermas calls cultural reproduction, social integration, and
socialization all seem to be necessary functions for a society's
reproduction. But to say that is not to commit ourselves to the
idea that the society has "components" and that the components
are culture, society, and personality. We can speak of
reproductive functions without localizing them in a particular
"component" of society. Nor is the "component" idea necessary
for Habermas's ultimate use of the "symbolic reproduction"
schema-his account of systems' tendencies to "colonize" the
lifeworld and thus to impair the symbolic reproductive functions.
Here, too, we can speak of functions without localizing them in a
"component." Similar arguments apply to Habermas's use of the
"components" idea to organize and reformulate Weber's theory of
"rationalization. 587
In my view, the "components" idea is not just unnecessary but
positively disadvantageous. It suggests that society has parts, and
if the first-order division of life-world is into culture, society, and
personality, then one naturally wonders where to place more
particular social phenomena. The problem, though, is that one-to-
587 As described in Part II.B.3., supra, Habermas presents the lifeworld's rationalization
as leading, first, to the differentiation of the various components from one another, and
second, to the increased importance of discourse in reproducing each component. Here,
too, I think the "component" idea is unnecessary. The idea that the "society" component
has differentiated from the "culture" component can be expressed more directly: tradition
is less likely to suffice by itself as justification for social institutions or norms. The
differentiation of the "personality" component from the "culture" component amounts to
the weakening of traditional role limitations that prescribed in advance who would acquire
which skills, competences, and dispositions. Habermas's account of course is more
complex than this, but the "component" idea seems to add nothing to the picture.
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one assignment generally, is impossible.
Consider, for example, Habermas's account of the
"anchoring" of systems' steering media. Money and power,
Habermas says repeatedly, must be "anchored in the lifeworld," by
which he means "legally institutionalized." Money is "anchored"
through basic principles of private law (especially property and
contract), and power is "anchored" through public (especially
constitutional) law. 88 But where in the lifeworld? Habermas picks
the societal component, on the theory that these basic principles
are "institutions," and he uses the term "institutional component"
as a synonym for "societal component. 5 89 To me, it seems odd to
describe legal principles as "institutions." Further, as Habermas
points out in Between Facts and Norms, legal principles constitute
bodies of knowledge, and so they could be considered part of the
"culture" component. 9° Or, insofar as legal principles encourage
the development of certain motivations, competences, and
dispositions, they could be said to belong to the "personality"
component. 9' Once one starts elaborating upon what it means for
a medium to be "legally institutionalized," it becomes clear that
very little is accomplished by selecting a "component" in which the
medium is "anchored." A full explanation of how money and
power are legally secured could use the terms "culture," "society,"
and "personality," but nothing more would be gained by claiming
that the medium is "anchored in" "components of the lifeworld"
that bear these names.
Or consider an organization such as a church. Is it located in
the cultural component, the societal component, or the
socialization component? Pretty clearly it performs all three
functions that Habermas attributes to those "components": it
transmits and reproduces a cultural tradition; it integrates the
members of the church through shared norms and values, and
through common experiences; and it socializes the members,
encouraging them to develop their personal identities in particular
ways. Showing how the church fulfills these reproductive
functions would be a significant part of explaining the church's
social significance. But claiming that the church is "in" a
"component" called "culture," "society," or "personality"-or
"in" all three-would add nothing to the explanation.
588 See supra text accompanying notes 316-17, 332-41, 369-70.
519 See supra text accompanying notes 189-93.
-90 BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 14, at 80.
591 Id. (Legal rules are "part of the societal component" but "are also represented in the
other two lifeworld components, as legal symbolism and as competences acquired via legal
socialization.").
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Consider, finally, Habermas's notions of the political public
sphere and civil society. In Theory of Communicative Action,
Habermas tried to locate the public sphere within the societal
component. 92 But as he acknowledges in Between Facts and
Norms, the public sphere is not an "institution," "organization," or
"framework of norms. 5 93 The public sphere, then, seems difficult
to place in the "society" component. Probably for this reason,
Between Facts and Norms does not specify a lifeworld
"component" as the public sphere's location. Civil society, which
appears only in Between Facts and Norms, generally is assigned an
address in the "society" component. But the network of voluntary
associations-more so, even than the particular association of a
church-performs the functions of cultural reproduction and
socialization that Habermas attributes to the "culture" and
"personality" components, not just the "social integration"
function he assigns to the "societal" component.
All this is to say that it is fruitless to try to place social
phenomena in one or the other lifeworld "component." But
Habermas himself seems to understand the component scheme as
inviting that exercise. And if the "components" of the lifeworld
are not to be understood as containing subparts, then their
purpose is unclear. Habermas would do better simply to speak of
the reproductive functions-cultural reproduction, social
integration, and socialization-and not of the lifeworld
''components" to which they ostensibly correspond.
This would be consistent with his suggestion in Between Facts
and Norms-not always faithfully followed-that "[t]he
communicative concept of the lifeworld breaks with the idea of a
whole composed of parts." '594 It would be consistent, also, with the
approach of his "circulation of power model." In that model, the
elements of his explanation are civil society, the public sphere, and
the various official decisionmaking political institutions. Only as
an afterthought does Habermas connect civil society to one of the
"components," and it does not occur to him to find a "component"
to house the public sphere.
At the beginning of this section I identified as a second target
of criticism Habermas's idea of the lifeworld as a separate sphere
of society, differentiated from the economic and administrative
systems. This conception is the effect of Habermas's distinction
between system and lifeworld.
In Part II of this Article, I criticized the account of systems'
592 See supra Part I.D.
593 BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 14, at 360.
594 id. at 80.
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"uncoupling" from the lifeworld that Habermas gave in Theory of
Communicative Action. In that work, Habermas understood
"uncoupling" in a radical sense. It meant more than just that new
mechanisms of societal integration had developed, allowing action
to be coordinated without communicative agreement. Uncoupling
meant, also, that the lifeworld's resources were unnecessary in
coordinating media-steered interaction, and that the differentiated
systems were formally organized, "norm-free" contexts of action.5
This stylized contrast between the normatively rich lifeworld and
the normatively empty systems, I argued, is untenable.
As I have suggested in this section of the Article, Between
Facts and Norms tacitly revises the system side of the
system/lifeworld distinction. No longer is the political system, at
least, "norm-free."596 In fact it is both the recipient of "normatively
substantive messages" from the public sphere and also, in
legislatures and courts, the generator of communicative power
through institutionalized discourse. This revised conception of
"system" suggests to me that the system/lifeworld distinction itself
is unnecessary. The difference between "system" and
"lifeworld"-between political center and periphery-now is not a
sharp distinction between the presence and absence of
communicative action (or even discourse). Instead, we can speak
only of more or less reliance on communicative action versus
reliance on command.59 7
I am not denying all distinctions between the political system,
the economic system, and the rest of the social world. The
question, however, is how to account for that rest of the social
world. I have argued above against conceiving it as divided into
the "structural components" of culture, society, and personality.
My suggestion now is that the cover term, "lifeworld," also should
be dropped.
My argument is based, in the first instance, on the history of
the term "lifeworld." As I explained in Part II.B, the term
515 See supra text accompanying notes 379-86.
596 Between Facts and Norms does not provide any significant analysis of the economic
system.
597 Cf Peters, supra note 471, at 120-26 (criticizing the "dualistic conception of system
and lifeworld," id. at 125); id. at 127 ("[T]he important analytical distinction between
social integration and system integration ... should not be... trivialized as a contrast
between a 'living,' informal, creative social world and 'mechanical,' entirely self-directing
social systems."). Peters suggests that Habermas's analysis of law and democracy is
difficult to locate in the system/lifeworld framework, see id. at 123, and he suggests that
Habermas is moving away from a polar distinction between system and lifeworld. Id. at
123. As noted above, see supra note 470-71 and accompanying text, the "model of the
circulation of power" that marks a shift in Habermas's thinking was borrowed from Peters
himself.
[Vol. 23:2
HeinOnline -- 23 Cardozo L. Rev. 598 2001-2002
SYSTEM AND LIFE WORLD
originated in Husserl's later work to mark a contrast between the
world of everyday, pretheoretical, taken-for-granted certainties, on
one hand, and the world as understood by "objectifying" sciences,
on the other. Schutz continued this focus on the "mundane,"
everyday world, as subjectively experienced. Without that focus,
and its implied contrast to other ways of apprehending the social
world, it would be difficult to see why one would choose the term
"lifeworld." Indeed, the term "lifeworld" seems to me linked to a
particular methodological approach in the social sciences-one
that investigates the ordinary, everyday world and how human
beings experience it.
This approach can be practiced in any sort of setting. It need
not be limited to an especially "informal" or "communicatively
organized" setting. One could analyze the "lifeworld" of the New
York diamond business, or a Mafia family, or floor traders on the
New York Stock Exchange, or a conference among social systems
theorists. Habermas is right that one would not fully understand
the workings of an economy through the "lifeworld" perspective.
But at the same time, the "lifeworld" perspective would disclose
insights, relevant to the workings of an economy, that would be
unavailable to social systems theory, or for that matter economic
theory.
My guess is that the term "lifeworld" appealed to Habermas
because it marked, sharply, the difference between the two
theoretical methods he wanted to reconcile, and also the
difference between the conceptions of social life that those
methods disclose. These latter differences were rhetorically
important for Habermas's "colonization" argument in Theory of
Communicative Action: the mechanical systems, born of the living
lifeworld, turn back on the parent to devour it.598 As I have
argued, that version of the system/lifeworld distinction was not
defensible, and the story line of Between Facts and Norms requires
a different conception: one in which "lifeworld" and "system" do
not operate on utterly different premises and principles. The
conception of the political system in Between Facts and Norms is
not systems-theoretical in any sense that Habermas has introduced
and defended, nor is the distinction between the "inside" and the
"outside" of the political system dramatically different in the
respects Habermas's distinction deems relevant. The term
"lifeworld"-as a reference to a separate sphere of the social
world rather than the name of a social-scientific approach-should
in my view be dropped.
598 Cf. Peters, supra note 471, at 127 (quoted supra, note 597 ).
20021
HeinOnline -- 23 Cardozo L. Rev. 599 2001-2002
CARDOZO LA W REVIEW
IV. AUTOPOIETIC THEORY AND THE REFORMULATION OF
HABERMAS'S SOCIAL-THEORETICAL MODEL
In what follows, I proceed from the conclusions of the
preceding parts of this Article: (1) Theory of Communicative
Action's system-lifeworld interchange model is untenable,
particularly when the objective is to develop a theory of law and
democracy; (2) Habermas's model of the circulation of power is
inconsistent with the interchange model, especially in its
conception of "systems" and the relation between systems and
their environments; and (3) the shift in Habermas's concept of
"system" makes his notion of the lifeworld dispensable. But the
collapse of Habermas's media-theoretical conception of systems
raises the question: what exactly is Habermas's conception of a
system? And further, how are systems related to their
environments?
The first question arises because Habermas's "circulation of
power" model introduces the idea of "the political system"
casually. The political system, he says, is differentiated into center
and periphery. 99  The characterizations of center and "inner
periphery," however, have the quality of lists rather than concepts.
Habermas's account of the center (or core area) is as follows:
The core area of the political system is formed by the familiar
institutional complexes of administration (including the
incumbent Government), judicial system, and democratic
opinion- and will-formation (which includes parliamentary
bodies, political elections, and party competition).'
The three branches of government all are represented here, but
not in a parallel way. With the "administration" [Verwaltung],
Habermas seems to include all the personnel who operate it ("the
incumbent Government," or Regierung).0 1  With the judicial
system, he seems to mean just the system of courts, not necessarily
the judges themselves. For the third branch, one would expect
Habermas to say, simply, "legislatures" (or "parliamentary
bodies"), or perhaps 'legislatures (including the elected
representatives)." Instead, he uses a term for a process rather than
an institution-"democratic opinion- and will-formation"-and he
explains that the process "includes" institutions ("parliamentary
599 See BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 14, at 354.
600 Id. at 354-55.
0) Id. at 354. See JURGEN HABERMAS, FAKTIZITAT UND GELTUNG 430 (1992), for
the German terms. Translator William Rehg explains that Verwaltung refers to "the
aspect or branch of the state as a bureaucratically organized implementing power," while
Regierung "refer[s] to the leadership or party in office." Rehg, supra note 35, at xxxvi.
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bodies") and two mechanisms or procedures ("political elections,
and party competition").
Thus the "center" includes a mix of institutions, personnel,
and procedures, all described generally (and misleadingly) as
"familiar institutional complexes." Not only are the items on the
list not all of the same type; they do not all have the same function.
Legislatures have a lawmaking function. Courts and the
administration, Habermas's "discourse theory" makes clear, have
a law-applying function.6°2 Nor are all the items on the list official
state decisionmaking entities. Courts and the "administration"
are, but "political elections" are decisions, or decision procedures,
and selection is made by the people rather than by state officials.
Similarly, "party competition" does not name a state
decisionmaking entity. Obviously, such competition is relevant to
the course of official decisionmaking-it organizes the electoral
process and communication within legislative bodies-but it is not
itself a state decisionmaking institution or procedure. In short,
Habermas's characterization of the political system's center seems
ad hoc-a listing of institutions, personnel, and procedures that
bear upon official decisionmaking, but without a clear concept that
adequately connects the items on the list.
Perhaps the above makes too much of the casual way
Habermas first characterizes the political system's "center." But
even if so, what makes the center, so described, a system?
Habermas's earlier conception of "system" emphasized that
systems are characterized by steering media tailored to strategic
action, with the mechanism of communicative agreement generally
set aside as a basis for coordinating action. While Habermas still
recites this official explication of "system," the political system, for
reasons explained above, does not conform to this conception.
What, then, makes the political system's center a "system"?
Similar observations apply to Habermas's account of the
periphery. The inner periphery consists in a collection of
institutions and associations performing quasi-state functions. 63
There, at least, we have a common theme that connects the items
on the list. At the outer periphery, we have first another collection
of associations and institutions-"customers" and "suppliers," who
are linked in ongoing communication with state decisionmaking
entities. We have, further, a network of voluntary associations
called "civil society." But the pattern is broken with Habermas's
inclusion of the political public sphere in the outer periphery.
602 See BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 14, at 192 (stating that the judiciary
engages in "a discourse of application aimed at decisions consistent over time").
603 See supra text accompanying notes 488-89.
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That sphere, he says, is a network of communication, or a social
space, not an association, institution, or collection of associations
and institutions.
Habermas, then, has an inconsistent conception of the
periphery. It is neither purely a network of communications nor
purely a network or collection of associations. Nor are the
associations he places at the outer periphery necessarily
communicating in the (outer peripheral) public sphere. These
associations, he says, are rooted in the "core private structures" of
the "lifeworld,"6° and whether they participate in the political
public sphere is contingent.605  The civic-social associations
probably are better described, as Habermas sometimes does, as
the "social basis" of the communication that occurs in the political
public sphere.'
Habermas's account of the outer periphery faces a second and
more serious problem. As I noted above, Habermas does not
make clear whether civil society and the political public sphere, as
"peripheral" networks or sites of communication, are inside or
outside the system's borders. I suggested that his theory would
require him to place both networks outside the system's borders,
but only because he stated both that the public sphere is not
organized as a "system" and that civil society is a "lifeworld"
sphere."°7 Once we see that Habermas's model of the circulation of
power undercuts his prior definitions of system and lifeworld, and
in the process undermines the distinction between the two, the
question is again open. Should the "peripheral" networks of
political communication count as "inside" or "outside" the
political system? Or should the term "political system" be taken
to include only official decisionmaking channels (legislatures,
courts, agencies, etc.)? Either way, what establishes the system's
boundaries? If we treat the periphery as "outside," then the
system's boundaries are determined by whether the
communication, or the communicating entity, has official
w4 BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 14, at 354. I am inferring that Habermas
would describe civil society as rooted in these "core private spheres" because (1) he goes
on to say that "the public," i.e., the participants in the public sphere, are "recruited" from
"this private sphere," and (2) he sees communication in the public sphere as an expression
of problems discovered and discussed first in the voluntary associations of civil society.
605 Bowling leagues, for example, are civil-social organizations that do not ordinarily
contribute to discussion in the political public sphere.
606 See BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 14, at 299 (referring to "civil society,
as the social basis of autonomous public spheres"); see also id. at 301 (referring to civil-
social associations as the "basis" for the political public sphere); id. at 308 (referring to
egalitarian relations as the necessary "societal basis" for a democratic political public
sphere).
607 See supra text accompanying notes 561-63.
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decisionmaking power. If we treat the periphery as "inside" the
political system, then the system's boundaries are determined-for
the most part-by the character of the communication. (Is it
"political" communication or not?)
As Habermas notes, Niklas Luhmann's theory of law as an
"autopoietic" system addresses this question of a communicative
system's scope. 8 Luhmann's answer is worth considering to see
whether it might provide the beginning for a more rigorous
conception of Habermas's "systems."
Luhmann defines social "systems" as networks of
communication. 6°9 Communications, as the "elements" and
"operations" of a system, establish the system's boundaries. For
Luhmann, then the legal system is the totality of all legal
communications. By itself, of course, that does not explain what a
"legal communication" is. For that purpose, Luhmann relies on
the notion of a system's code. As discussed briefly above,
Luhmann sees a system code as a binary opposition between
values-legal/illegal, in the case of the legal system.61° And so for
Luhmann, all communications that invoke the code values "legal"
or "illegal" count as operations and elements of the legal system.
That means, for example, that the utterance "get off my property,"
made by one private citizen to another, would be a communication
within the legal system to the extent that it asserts an owner's legal
right to exclude. So, too, does the writing of a will or the
formation of a contract count as an operation of the legal system.
Luhmann thus sees the boundaries of communicative systems
expansively. Any communication that invokes the system's code is
an operation of that system.
But Luhmann quickly introduces two distinctions that make
this conception of the legal system-the totality of all
communication that invokes the legal code-more manageable.
First, Luhmann distinguishes between communications that are
"decisions" and those that are not. By "legal decisions" he means
communications that "change the situation of the law."6 1 Court
decisions are obvious examples, but the category of decisions
includes also "statutes, treaties, administrative acts, wills, land
registry entries," and contracts.612 Second, Luhmann sees the legal
608 See BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 14, at 48-49 (distinguishing between
Luhmann's "broad" and "narrow" conceptions of the legal system).
" This paragraph draws on Baxter, supra note 29, at 2004-08.
610 See supra text accompanying notes 480-84.
611 Niklas Luhmann, Legal Argumentation: An Analysis of Its Form, 58 MOD. L. REV.
285, 286 (1997).
612 Id. at 286; see also NIKLAS LUHMANN, DAS RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT 320
(1993). Translations from this volume are my own.
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system as internally differentiated. The axis of differentiation-as
in Habermas's analysis of the political system-is the distinction
between center and periphery. Luhmann-as does Habermas, in
those passages of Between Facts and Norms that speak of a
separate "legal system"-places communication by and to courts
at the legal system's center.613
One parallel, then, is that both Luhmann and Habermas place
the relevant decisionmaking institution at the system's "center,"
with system-relevant communication of other sorts at the
periphery. A second parallel is in their respective treatments of
the periphery. Habermas, we have seen, emphasizes the role of
political and legal communication outside official state
decisionmaking institutions-in the public sphere, and also in civil
society. This "informal" communication is important to the
system's self-reproduction, according to Habermas's model of the
circulation of power. Civil society, as a source of
"counterknowledge," may stimulate discussion in the public
sphere and generate ideas that, one day, may influence the course
of lawmaking or other official decision. For his part, Luhmann
emphasizes that the "peripheral" status of communication outside
the courts-the most important forms of which are legislation and
contract-does not mean that such communication is any less
important to the system's self-reproduction. Instead, the
periphery is the source of the system's "real dynamism." '614 It is the
"contact zone[] to other functional systems of society"-much as,
for Habermas, the political public sphere is linked to civil society,
and civil society is "attuned to how societal problems resonate in
the private life spheres."6 5  "Peripheral" for both authors thus
does not mean unimportant. Instead, it means potential openness
to the world beyond the system's boundaries.
Let me return to the two problems I raised with Habermas's
revised model. The first problem was that Habermas lacks a
coherent concept of "system" once we reject, as both implausible
and inconsistent with his present work, the earlier account with its
focus on "steering media." The second problem concerned the
scope of a system's boundaries. Do they extend beyond the
613 See, e.g., BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 14, at 196-97 ("Because all legal
communications refer to actionable claims, court decisions provide the perspective from
which the legal system is analyzed. The choice of this perspective implies only a
methodological commitment, not a restriction of the analysis to processes of
adjudication.").
614 Gunther Teubner, The Two Faces of Janus: Rethinking Legal Pluralism, 13
CARDOZO L. REV. 1443, 1459 (1992). Teubner is an autopoietic theorist, and for reasons
stated in text, Luhmann would have agreed with this statement.
615 BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 14, at 367.
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"central" decisionmaking body to include the "periphery"?
One way of reconstructing Habermas's collapsed "system"
concept would be to follow Luhmann. By "system," we then
would mean a network of communication, not (at least not in the
first instance)6"6 institutions or personnel. The political system
then would include all system-relevant communication. For
reasons I have explained in prior work (and here relegate to the
margins),6"7 I would not use Luhmann's idea of the binary code as
the means for identifying which communications count as system-
relevant. Instead, I would select a communicative "theme" or
"point" around which the system seems to center. With respect to
the political system, Habermas emphasizes the centrality of
political power, though in more than one sense. Some
communication is about the production of legitimate law, a process
he describes as the conversion of communicative power into
administrative power. Some is about the exercise of
administrative power. And some (particularly with respect to
elections) is about access to offices with political decisionmaking
power. A good criterion for the political system's communication,
then, might be: "communication related to the generation of,
exercise of, or access to political power," '618 where "political power"
could be defined further along the lines of Habermas's distinction
between communicative and administrative power.619 All such
communication is within the political system's boundaries, and
other communication is not. This conception of the political
616 The qualification is necessary because Luhmann uses a society's institutional
framework-to distinguish between center and periphery.
617 See Baxter, supra note 29, at 2067-72. One problem with the idea of code as unity-
establishing system mechanism is that Luhmann himself posits two codes for the political
system and equivocates on the nature of the economic system's code. His argument would
suggest that the political system really is two systems-because the code is what
establishes the system's unity-and his uncertainty about the economic system's code
makes it difficult to believe that there is a code for that system so basic as to organize all
communication. See id. at 2067-68. A second problem is that the emphasis on
communication as allocation of code values flattens out the nature of communication. See
id. at 2068-69 (with respect to the binary legal/illegal code and legal communication). A
better idea for explaining a system's unity is one Luhmann suggests elsewhere in his
work-the idea of a "circulating symbol," or (non-binary) communicative theme. "Legal
validity" was Luhmann's example of a "circulating symbol," and it seems to me that
communication oriented toward the notion of legal validity (or invalidity) could be said to
be legal communication. See id. at 2070-72. I adopt this approach in text below.
618 This "theme" actually corresponds to the two codes Luhmann posits for the political
system, see LUHMANN, supra note 612, at 420-21, 436, although I state it as a theme rather
than an opposition between binary "code values." See supra note 617.
619 Certainly one could define the organizing theme or point differently. Or one could
choose different conceptions for different purposes of analysis. My idea of this organizing
theme or point is not so "fundamentalist" as Luhmann's notion of the binary code,
according to which all system communication is about the allocation of opposed code
values.
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system's boundaries is expansive: it would include political
discussion in the political public sphere, to the extent that it relates
sufficiently to the theme of political power. Still, following
Habermas's center/periphery scheme, this communication would
be "peripheral," as compared to communication at the system's
decisionmaking center.
On this understanding of the political system, however, most
communication in what Habermas calls "civil society" would be
beyond the system's boundaries. Likely, also, civil society would
not count as a system-at least not a differentiated system with a
unifying communicative theme-because its communication, as
Habermas describes it, is too diffuse. In Luhmann's terms, civil-
social communication would be in the political system's
environment. But that raises the question: what is the nature of
that system/environment relation? How is communication
occurring in the voluntary associations of civil society relevant to
the political system as we now are conceiving of it? The same sort
of question arises also with respect to the political public sphere.
If we see the political system as differentiated into center and
periphery, how do the two spheres relate to one another?
This question of system/environment relations is the focus of
Habermas's polemics against autopoietic theory. According to
Habermas, by denying relations of input and output among the
systems it distinguishes,62 ° autopoietic theory sees each system as
"narcissistically marginalized,"62 "autis[tic]," '622 and autopoietically
"encapsulate[d]" in "its own shell," '623 speaking its own language
and only to itself.6"4 This "mutual indifference" among systems,
Habermas says, is inconsistent with "empirically observed
interdependencies.""62 And the postulated indifference of systems
to their environments makes the democratic process
inconceivable. On Luhmann's premises, says Habermas, "the
620 See BETWEEN FAcTS AND NORMS, supra note 14, at 49, 51.
621 Id. at 51. Habermas refers here to Luhmann's theory of law, but probably he
understands the point as a general one.
622 Id. at 335.
623 Id. at 56.
624 See id. at 54 (discussing Teubner's interpretation of autopoietic theory); see also id.
at 335 (on autopoietic premises, systems develop "their own codes and their own
semantics," mutually untranslatable, and thus can only observe one another rather than
"communicate directly with one another"); id. at 343 (discussing autopoietic premises and
noting that social subsystems have "their own specialized semantics" that... "break[] off a
direct exchange of information with their corresponding environments"); id. at 346
("[T]he problem of successful communication among independent and self-referentially
operating units, each with its own perspective on the world, corresponds almost exactly to
the familiar phenomenological problem of constructing an intersubjectively shared world
from the egological achievements of transcendental monads.").
625 Id. at 51.
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political process, the public sphere, and political culture present
environments whose language the legal system cannot
understand. 626
This reading of Luhmann is the occasion for Habermas's
metaphors of law as "hinge" or "transformer" between system and
lifeworld .62  Law, he suggests, operates not as a special "code" or
system language, as autopoietic theory would have it. Instead, law
is the translator between the ordinary-language communication of
the lifeworld and the system-specific codes of the economic and
administrative systems.628  Because law has the capacity to
"communicate[] with the steering media of money and
administrative power," Habermas claims, it is capable of sending
"[n]ormatively substantive messages" from lifeworld to system.29
Habermas's account of autopoietic theory, however, is a
caricature that exaggerates the distance between his views and
Luhmann's. The feature of autopoietic theory Habermas is
reacting to is the idea of systems' "operative closure." This is the
feature that makes systems "autopoietic," or, self-producing, and
in fact it is a tautological consequence of Luhmann's notion of
"system." If a system's operations consist in all and only those
communications that invoke the system's code, as Luhmann
stipulates, then it is "closed" with respect to those operations. The
system's operations establish the system's boundaries, and the
system is in fact coextensive with its constituent operations.630
What Luhmann is rejecting here is the idea that information
can cross system boundaries unproblematically. Communications
have system-specific meaning, he says, and so a communication
proper to one system is in the first instance just "noise" to another
system.63' Further, to the extent that systems "observe" each
other-that is, to the extent that communication in one system
refers to another system-the observation is framed by the
standards and procedures of the observing system.632 External
reference is in that way at the same time self-reference.
These are the claims to which Habermas's polemic attaches.
Closure with respect to a code means, for Habermas, that each
system is "encapsulated in its own shell," with its own "semantics"
and unintelligible to other systems. The impossibility of direct
626 Id.; see also id. at 343 (noting that for autopoietic theory, the political public sphere
is "hitched to the power code and placated with symbolic politics").
627 See id. at 55-56.
628 See id. at 54.
629 Id. at 56.
630 See Baxter, supra note 29, at 2004-05.
631 See id. at 2005-06.
632 See id. at 2009-10.
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communication between systems means, for Habermas, that the
systems are "autistic," speaking only to themselves. The
connection between self-reference and external reference means,
for Habermas, means that systems are "narcissistically
marginalized." If operative closure, as described above, were the
whole story for autopoietic theory, then Habermas's reading might
be justified.
But operative closure is only part of the story. With that idea
Luhmann pairs the idea of "cognitive openness." Systems are
operatively closed, in the sense that their operations do not cross
system boundaries-by definition, they establish the system's
boundaries, and the system is coextensive with the
communications that are the system's operations. But these
communications may, and ordinarily do, refer to events, processes,
etc. in the system's environment. In that sense, systems are
"cognitively open" to their environments. Luhmann thus does not
deny the possibility of "external reference." Instead, his point is
simply that such reference is not a neutral mirroring of the world.
To the extent that communicative systems have differentiated
from one another, they have developed distinctive standards,
criteria; and procedures, and thus distinctive ways of apprehending
the world.633 Law is not science, and science is not art. Luhmann's
point is simply that we cannot presume identity of meaning across
system boundaries.
But how, on Luhmann's view, is one system "cognitively
open" to another, when in the first instance the systems' respective
streams of communication present not "information" to one
another but just "noise"? Luhmann's answer is in terms of the
notions of "irritation" (or "perturbation") and structural
coupling.634 Communication in one system may "irritate" another
system's communication to the extent that it "registers" or
"resonates" in the irritated system's structures, categories, or
criteria. The meaning of the communication, however, will be
different in the two systems. To the extent that the irritating
communication can neither be screened out as irrelevant nor easily
processed within the irritated system's categories, Luhmann
maintains, it may stimulate change in those categories. This
possibility is the autopoietic equivalent for what more standard
633 Luhmann's term for these standards, criteria, and procedures is "programming."
See id. at 2009-13 (discussing "programming," with particular reference to law). I find the
term "programming" unhelpful. See id. at 2068-69; see also supra note 617 (listing two
reasons for rejecting the idea of the binary code, the second of which also applies to
programming).
634 What follows draws on Baxter, supra note 29, at 2036-39.
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versions of social systems theory call "adaptation to the
environment." Autopoietic theory, however, emphasizes more
strongly that the change is not simply induced from without but
generated from within.
Through "structural coupling," Luhmann says, this process of
mutual irritation can be made more systematic and systems made
more responsive to one another. One meaning Luhmann gives
"structural coupling" is that one system "presupposes specific
states or changes" in another system and "relies on them.
635
Courts, for example, presuppose that their decisions will be
enforced by the political system, and thus legal and political
discourse are "structurally coupled" in this sense. This "coupling"
seems consistent with Habermas's notion of the reciprocal
functions that law and political power perform for one another.636
Another meaning Luhmann gives "structural coupling" is that a
structure or central category might be common to, though
understood differently in, two systems. For Luhmann, legislation
is a mechanism that structurally couples the legal and political
systems, with different "prehistories" and "possibilities for
connection" in the two systems.637 From the perspective of the
political system, a statute's "prehistory" is the political
maneuvering that led to its enactment. By shifting (even if
slightly) the balance of power between government and
opposition, the statute's enactment creates fresh possibilities for
future political maneuvering. From the perspective of the legal
system, by contrast, the statute's "prehistory" is in the dutiful
following (or not) of legally prescribed legislative procedures. As
for new "possibilities for connection," the statute's enactment
creates new valid law that changes the legal position for future
cases.
Law is full of concepts and categories that have this sort of
"double meaning" 638-one meaning in legal communication, and a
related but not identical meaning in the communication of another
system. A good example is the idea of property. Probably the
dominant legal conception of property is expressed in the familiar
"bundle of rights" formula.639 With the reference to "rights," the
formula refers "internally," to the legal system's own categories
and procedures. But the rights in the bundle-to use, exclusive
635 Niklas Luhmann, Operational Closure and Structural Coupling: The Differentiation
of the Legal System, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 1419, 1432 (1992).
636 See supra text accompanying note 43.
637 LUHMANN, supra note 612, at 435, 436.
638 Id. at 455.
639 On the dominance of the "bundle of rights" formulation, see J.E. Penner, The
'Bundle of Right" Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REV. 711, 712-15 (1996).
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possession, disposition, and profit-correspond to economic
interests. The legal concept of property thus also refers externally
and allows (in Luhmann's term) "observation" of the economic
system. But despite the reference to economic "interests," the
legal meaning of property does not coincide with its economic
meaning-as I have argued elsewhere, with reference to "takings"
law.1 0
Consider two further examples of this kind of structural
coupling. First, the concept of "insanity" in criminal law is
informed by its counterpart in psychiatry. But as the Supreme
Court has noted, the two concepts "vary substantially," given the
different senses of "individual responsibility and competency" with
which the two disciplines operate.64 Second, the use of experts in
litigation allows incorporation of scientific knowledge into
litigation, and part of the federal admissibility standard is whether
the "reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is
scientifically valid. 642 The other part of the standard, however,
refers internally, to whether the information in question would
"assist the trier of fact to understand or determine a fact in
issue. '"" In announcing this standard, the Supreme Court noted
differences between legal and scientific inquiry-specifically, in
finality or revisability of conclusions, time constraints on the
proceedings, and the purposes for which knowledge is to be
used.' To this list one might add the different standards of proof
and the different capacities of the relevant inquirers.
The idea of structural coupling suggests an important set of
problems. The goal of improving the system's "openness"-its
ability to incorporate insights from other systems of
communication-must be accomplished through mechanisms,
procedures, and standards of the "observing" system. These of
course can be modified, but they are not infinitely plastic.
Improving a system's "external" reference always is, at the same
time, a problem of the system's self-reference.
Much more could be said about the idea of structural
coupling, but this quick sketch will have to suffice.645 It shows, I
640 See Baxter, supra note 29, at 2047-57.
641 See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 359 (1997) (quoting AMERICAN
PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS xxiii, xxvii (4th ed. 1994)) ("The legal definitions of 'insanity' and
'competency' ... vary substantially from their psychiatric counterparts. Legal
definitions, .... which must 'take into account such issues as individual responsibility ...
and competency,' need not mirror those advanced by the medical profession.")
642 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-93 (1993).
643 Id. at 592.
6" See id. at 596-97.
645 In prior work I have suggested a number of other possible "structural couplings."
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think, that Habermas is wrong to dismiss autopoietic theory so
quickly as a theory of "autistic," "narcissistically marginalized"
systems, "encapsulated in their own shells" and speaking only to
themselves.
At the same time, however, I think there is substance to a
criticism of autopoietic theory that Habermas made seven years
before Between Facts and Norms: that Luhmann errs in conceiving
of systems as observing, communicating subjects. 6  Habermas
argues that autopoietic theory is, in effect, an appropriation of
(what Habermas calls and condemns as) the "philosophy of the
subject.""47 Whether or not that is so, I agree that Luhmann is
wrong to present systems-for example, the legal system-as
unitary observers and communicators. In my view, the conception
is inconsistent with Luhmann's acknowledgement that systems like
the legal system are themselves differentiated-in the case of the
legal system, differentiated into "central" and "peripheral" circuits
of communication. Further, in distinguishing between decision
and argument, Luhmann understands legal communications to
have different effects and different possibilities for connection to
future communications. These differences among communications
are flattened out by statements that present "the legal system" as
communicator and observer.
Luhmann's account of the center/periphery distinction
suggests, further, that some of the totalizing claims he makes for
systems theory need to be trimmed back. Like Habermas,
Luhmann distinguishes between "center" and "periphery" by
Many link the legal and economic systems. For example: the concept of negligence
(particularly as elaborated economically), the idea of the corporation, "competition" in
antitrust law, and the general idea of "liability." Intellectual property law establishes links
between law and both art and science. Administrative law couples the legal and political
systems. The couplings are much more dense than Luhmann's short list of examples
suggests. See Baxter, supra note 29, at 2075-78. Further, Luhmann understates the
coupling of systems through events rather than structures. As he acknowledges, a
communication may be simultaneously (for example) legal and economic-as when a
losing defendant pays a judgment, or when a lawyer presents an argument in court for a
fee. See id at 2038, 2078-79. Further, Luhmann's emphasis on structural coupling leads
him to understate the importance of other kinds of "irritation" among systems-as when,
for example, a legal event (e.g., a decision in the ongoing Microsoft litigation) registers in
both the economic and political systems. See id. at 2079-80.
646 See Excursus on Luhmann's Appropriation, supra note 31.
647 Id.; see also Thomas McCarthy, Interaction, Indeterminacy, Normativity: Comments
on Gumbrecht, Yablon, and Cornell, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 1625, 1625 (1992) ("[S]ystems
theory actually reproduces almost the entire repertoire of the classical philosophy of the
subject in a new medium."); Ginter Frankenberg, Down By Law: Irony, Seriousness, and
Reason, 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 360, 381 (1989) ("[T]he old European project is here
rethought: In place of the self-referential subject stands the self-referential system, the
self-reference of system operations replaces the self-assurance of thinking, and instead of
knowledge of the world we are now dealing with the observation of observations.").
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looking to communications' institutional site. Legal
communication in the courts, he says, is central; communication in
legislatures is peripheral. Courts and legislatures, however, are
not elements of autopoietic theory. That theory conceives of
society as the system of all communications; the legal system as the
totality of all legal communications, and so forth. Only
communications are elements and operations of a system. But
when Luhmann begins to analyze the legal system, he needs more
than elements and operations. He draws on a more conventional
sort of social theory that speaks not just of systems and their
elements but also of institutions-like legislatures and courts.
Underneath the purity of autopoietic theory is a much more
ordinary way of looking at the social world.
What I am suggesting is a double focus. The networks of
communication that Luhmann calls "systems" present possibilities
for ongoing communication. That network makes some
possibilities more likely and tends to close off others. But which
selections will be made depends upon the "place" in the system at
which the communication occurs-by which I mean the social site
of communication, as identified by a more conventional theory
that speaks of agents and institutions. It depends also on the
nature of those agents, individual or collective, who are
communicating. This is not to say that "systems," as Luhmann
conceives of them, are not both constraining and enabling. What
one can say, and whether one will say it, is not simply a matter of
purely free agency. But neither is it best described simply as an
operation of the system.
Instead of systems, then, we might better speak of
"discourses" (or, alternatively, "communicative networks"). And
in addition to those "discourses," we need an account of both the
sites of discourse and those who discourse. Luhmann probably
would not have accepted these suggestions as friendly
amendments. But they strike me as improvements.
Particularly as amended, this conception of systems as
discourses is consistent with what Habermas is trying to
accomplish with his model of the circulation of power and his idea
of law as translator among discourses. The main goal of
Habermas's "communications theory of society" is to show, in
social-theoretical terms, how the "informal" discourses of the
political public sphere can influence the institutionalized
discourses of decision at the political system's center. The
possibility of this influence, he says, depends in turn on the
openness of the political public sphere to the "impulses" of civil
society.
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Autopoietic theory, particularly as revised, provides a way for
Habermas to account for these connections among different
circuits of communication. The "center" of the political system
institutionalizes official discourses that are directed toward
decision. Habermas distinguishes from that network of
communication the political public sphere. This network of
communication is "peripheral," on Habermas's account, but if we
see his "political system" as a communicative network whose
theme is political power, then discussions in the political public
sphere are within the boundaries of the political system. "Civil
society," by contrast, does not name a circuit or network of
communication that is closed by a single theme. Rather, "civil
society" is the collective name for voluntary associations in which
communication-but not communication of a particular sort-
occurs. In autopoietic terms, it is an environment to the political
system, though not one organized as a system or particular
discourse.
What Habermas's account of democracy prescribes is, in
effect, irritation and structural coupling among the three
communicative networks he distinguishes. Recall, first, his
account of the relation between civil society and the political
public sphere. The voluntary associations of civil society are
"attuned to how societal problems resonated in private life
spheres." 8 Moreover, Habermas says, "[t]he great issues of the
last decades" were first discussed in these voluntary associations-
and as examples of these issues he mentions the nuclear-arms race,
the risks of nuclear power and genetic engineering, ecological
issues, the "dramatically progressing impoverishment of the Third
World and problems of the world economic order," feminism,
immigration, and multiculturalism.69 When first raised in civil-
social organizations, none of these issues was on the agenda of the
political public sphere. But the members of the "public"-by
which Habermas means those who participate in the political
public sphere-are "recruited '"650  from these voluntary
associations. The process of getting general public attention to
these issues required, both literally and in terms of autopoietic
theory, irritation: "dramatize[d] presentations" that capture the
attention of the mass media.65" ' "Only through their controversial
presentation in the media," Habermas says, "do such topics reach
the larger public and subsequently gain a place on the 'public
648 BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 14, at 381.
649 Id.
650 Id. at 354.
651 Id. at 381.
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agenda.' "652
This "irritation" of the political public sphere's
communicative network thus required strategic choices by
concerned individuals and groups. For that reason, it is not readily
explained simply as an operation of a "system"-autopoietic
theory unamended. But unsatisfying, too, is the mixed metaphor
Habermas uses to describe the process of agenda-making: civil-
social organizations, he says, "distill and transmit" responses to
social problems "in amplified form to the public sphere.16 3 What
the metaphor obscures is what autopoietic theory suggests: a
communicative network is capable of screening out, as "noise," a
communication that does not conform to generally prevailing
standards and assumptions. Irritation may, but hardly is
guaranteed to, transform the network's prevailing patterns.
The relation between political public sphere ("periphery")
and decisionmaking institutions ("center") is, from the point of
view of autopoietic theory, a relation between subsystems of the
political system.654  In other words, the two communicative
networks are distinct. Habermas would not disagree. He
distinguishes between informal public discourse and
institutionalized discourses of decisionmaking institutions. The
problem is to ensure that the political public sphere "influences"
the course of official decision.
Habermas's reconstructive account of the "constitutional
state" identifies a number of mechanisms that are designed to link
the informal and formal discourses. These mechanisms are, in
autopoietic terms, mechanisms of structural coupling. The most
obvious is the requirement of periodic democratic elections. Like
the other mechanisms of structural coupling, elections do not
require that a particular communication have the same meaning in
the communicative networks they link. Votes, if intended by
voters as a statement of personal commitment, may "irritate" the
official network of communication as threats to (or confirmations
of) the balance of political power and the terms of access to power.
Elections organize and focus these irritations and make outcomes
legally binding.
Similarly, guarantees of free speech, association, press, and
assembly, "provide a continuous influx" '655 of irritations into the
communicative networks that operate through official
652 Id.
653 Id. at 367.
654 See Baxter, supra note 29, at 2014-16 (explaining Luhmann's view that a
center/periphery differentiation is a differentiation between or among subsystems).
655 See Luhmann, supra note 635, at 1433.
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decisionmaking institutions. So does the requirement that official
debate and decisionmaking be public. And so do mechanisms that
provide for public hearings and participation in administrative
decisionmaking. None of these mechanisms guarantee that
"normatively substantive messages" will resonate in official
political decisionmaking just as they do in the political public
sphere. But they do establish and organize the (partial) openness
of the political "center" to its "periphery."
I think, in short, that Habermas's new account of law and
democracy has more in common with autopoietic theory than with
his earlier conceptions of system and lifeworld. The peculiar thing
about the "communication theory of society" is that Habermas
ritually invokes those earlier conceptions, even as his "circulation
of power" model implicitly transforms them. Given the flaws that
the system/lifeworld model had from the start, and given its
incompatibility with a normative theory of radical democracy,
Habermas would do well to abandon it explicitly.
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